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Understanding how domestic institutions and actors interplay with international and foreign 
influences is key not only to understand the politics of decision-making in the globalized world 
we live in, but also to understand why global policies – or policies promoted by transnational and 
international actors – may (or may not) be implemented and have the intended effects “on the 
ground.” This dissertation sets to disentangle the all too often conflated parts of these dynamics by 
separately addressing the domestic processes of adopting, enforcing, as well as, in certain cases, 
preparing policy change influenced from abroad. It does so through the lens of the politics of 
drinking water and sanitation in Latin America from 1980 to 2014 and consists in three 
independent papers.  
The first paper addresses the diffusion of politicized policies, and more precisely the privatization 
of drinking water and sanitation services. This paper highlights one overlooked dimension of 
policy diffusion processes and more specifically of privatization processes: the preparatory 
measures adopted (or not) by governments prior to privatization. It suggests that the ability of 
governments to adopt gradual preparatory measures depends on the time horizon of privatization 
deciders and the political cost this preparatory gradual policy change may entail for the process. 
Theoretically, it contributes to the neo-institutionalist literature by adding a “preparatory” type of 
change to the existing framework of gradual institutional policy changes. Substantively, it 
underlines the redistributive consequences of privatization processes and the political dynamics 
behind the level of political risk these reforms may entail. 
 
 
The second and third papers underline the multifaceted effects of state capacity on policy diffusion 
for non-politicized (or technical) policies through the empirical analysis of the domestic adoption 
and implementation of drinking-water quality standards following the promotion of the World 
Health Organization’s drinking-water quality guidelines. The second paper argues that strong state 
capacity tends to limit the adoption of a diffused policy that represents a strong domestic challenge. 
It contributes to the institutionalist literature by underlining the relevance to compare and measure 
state capacity on the basis of its resources (required to project its power), rather than on its ends or 
outcomes (which depend on the political choices that were made by the state). 
The third paper presents the other side of the coin of the impact of state capacity on diffusion of 
non-politicized policies, at the implementation step. At this step, strong state capacity gives the 
capacity to extensively implement a diffused policy, but implementation will remain partial if there 
are no external pressures on the sector. In weak states, policy diffusion can be both window-
dressing and frame-shaping, depending on political dynamics. To be frame-shaping, it needs a 
sustained foreign capacity support (that can compensate for the weakness of the state) and strong 
external pressures.  
Overall, this thesis disentangles the policy diffusion process by highlighting that receiving states 
and actors are not only passive agents but also proactive ones, regarding the adoption, enforcement, 
and preparation of policy changes influenced from abroad. It also contributes to the understanding 
of two dimensions of water reforms in Latin America largely overlooked by the literature and 
policy studies: measures lessening the privatization shock and drinking-water quality standards. 
These issues, less salient than strongly politicized ones (like privatization itself), are as 
consequential in the life of states and their citizens, especially for their health and wellbeing.
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Domestic policies are today essentially developed by governments aware of, and potentially 
influenced by, international or foreign policies. Understanding how domestic institutions and 
actors interplay with these external influences is key not only to understand the politics of decision-
making in the globalized world we live in, but also to understand why global policies – or policies 
promoted by transnational and international actors – may (or may not) be implemented and have 
the intended effects “on the ground.” This dissertation sets to disentangle the all too often conflated 
parts of these dynamics by separately addressing the domestic processes of adopting, enforcing, 
as well as, in certain cases, preparing policy change influenced from abroad. It does so through the 
lens of the politics of drinking water and sanitation in Latin America from 1980 to 2014, which 
have been developed under external pressures and influences, especially since the 1980 
proclamation by the United Nations of the 1981-1990 era as the “International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade.” Needless to say, water is essential to life and to the well-being of 
populations, but remains an important source of challenge and conflict in our world.  
This dissertation’s overarching argument is that global policy change always remains a domestic 
affair. Policy change rests on domestic political and institutional factors that influence the way in 
which governments anticipate, adopt or enforce a policy promoted by international or transnational 
organizations. These factors go beyond the influence of partisanship, and evidence the wider 
capacity constraints and political dynamics that interplay, sometimes under the partisan radar.  
More specifically, this dissertation consists in three independent papers. The first analyzes the 
stage that precedes the formal adoption of a policy influenced from abroad through the lenses of 
the preparatory measures adopted (or not) by governments prior to the privatization of drinking 
2 
 
water and sanitation services in Bolivia and Chile. The second focuses on the adoption (and non-
adoption) of a policy in response to similar diffusion pressures by analyzing the domestic adoption 
of drinking-water quality standards in 16 Latin American countries following the promotion of the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) drinking-water quality guidelines. The third follows up on 
the second paper and explains the heterogeneous implementation of policies adopted following 
diffusion pressures, through the study of the implementation of domestic drinking-water quality 
standards (influenced by the WHO guidelines) in Bolivia and Chile over more than three decades. 
This dissertation, as a whole, contributes to the literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer, 
of which the increasing growth since the early 2000s is another sign of the inevitable foreign and 
international influences on domestic policy-making in our globalized world. The originality of this 
dissertation first lies in the uniquely synoptic view of the policy diffusion process that the analysis 
provides, before, during, and after the national adoption of a norm, thus refining existing 
understandings of how diffusion takes place (see Figure 1). Second, it highlights that the 
politicization (or not) of a policy as well as the extent to which it entails a transboundary challenge 
influence the dynamics of policy diffusion. More substantially, the dissertation finally calls 
attention to a range of factors that domestically constrain policy choices, but have thus far been 
largely neglected, such as state capacity, which has multifaceted effects on the diffusion of non-
politicized policies. 
This introduction first briefly describes the context of the water reforms that took place in Latin 
America in the last decades. Second, it summarizes the three papers of this dissertation and their 




1. The Context of Water Reforms in Latin America 
In Latin America the 1980s and 1990s decades were characterized by democratic transition and 
market-oriented economic reforms. It is in this broader context that various countries of the 
reforms undertook water reforms, including privatization from the early 1990s on. Water services 
were often the last utilities to be privatized nationally.   
From the 1960s until the early 1980s, water services were largely managed at the national level in 
Latin America. According to the Pan-American Health Organization (2001: 50), this centralization 
“facilitated the development and execution of projects oriented to the expansion of the 
infrastructure and access to the services.” Trade surpluses and access to international finance 
helped these centralized services to expand their network (Herrera and Post, 2014: 622).  
However, by the 1970s and 1980s, these services faced different problems: a lack of maintenance 
led to high rates of water losses, and economic resources available were insufficient to sustain the 
network (due to low consumers’ rates and governmental resources being less available due to the 
debt crisis) (Marin, 2009; Herrera and Post, 2014: 622-623). Savedoff and Spiller (1999: 2) 
characterized this situation of water services in the region as a “low-level equilibrium in which 
low prices are associated with low quality, limited pace of service expansion, operational 
inefficiency, and corruption, which further erode public support”. They argue that this low-level 
equilibrium was mainly caused by governmental opportunism.    
As a response to the challenges facing the sector in the 1980s, organizations like the IMF, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank promoted the modernization of water services 
through the insulation of providers from politics, and more directly the incorporation of private 
participation. The privatization of water services was strongly encouraged, for instance through 
4 
 
loans of these organizations, and indeed was largely implemented in Latin America. Almost half 
of the water privatizations that took place in developing countries took place in Latin America 
(Herrera and Post, 2014; Marin, 2009; Mayaux, 2012).  As part or in parallel to these reforms, 
countries have developed a regulatory framework of the sector, including regulatory agencies and 
drinking-water quality standards (Andrés et al., 2013: 42-43).  
The privatizations of water services have largely generated discontent in the population, and were 
often opposed, renegotiated and even reversed (Guasch et al., 2008; Post, 2014; Mayaux, 2012). 
The cases of Bolivia and Chile stand as contrasting cases in this regional panorama. In Bolivia, 
water services of La Paz/ El Alto (in 1997) and of Cochabamba (in 1999) were privatized but 
reverted. In Cochabamba, the concession lasted only a few months as massive protests irrupted 
little after it came into force and lasted for over three months, until the concession was cancelled 
(these protests consist in the so-called Cochabamba “Water War”). In La Paz/ El Alto, the 
concession was first relatively accepted by the population but protests against it raised a few years 
later, leading to its reversal in 2007 (Simmons, 2016; De Gouvello and Fournier, 2002; Mayaux, 
2008; Nickson and Vargas, 2002). In Chile, the privatization of all urban water services faced little 
opposition and lasted until today: it is often considered the “success story” of water privatizations 
(Valenzuela and Jouravlev, 2007; Baer, 2014).  
Besides, the impact of water privatizations extended beyond the water sector. “Water movements”, 
which largely developed in opposition to the privatization of water services, have had a political 
significance beyond their mere impact on water reforms. They were, arguably, “an integral part of 
[…] Latin America’s left turn—the changes in the political landscape associated with the forced 
retreat of neoliberalism in the region.” (Terhorst et al., 2013: 55).  
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2. Three Papers on Policy Diffusion and Water Reforms in Latin America 
This dissertation unfolds in three independent papers that address different aspects of water 
reforms in Latin America and, as such, of policy diffused in one single policy sector: drinking 
water and sanitation services.  
The first paper addresses the diffusion of politicized policies, and more precisely the privatization 
of drinking water and sanitation services. These privatization reforms have been one of the most 
politicized changes in drinking water services over the last decades. Promoted by international 
organizations, they were implemented in many countries. They have nevertheless been highly 
debated, often strongly contested, and sometimes reverted. They have also been largely analyzed 
and studied. This paper highlights one overlooked dimension of policy diffusion processes and 
more specifically of privatization processes: the preparatory measures adopted (or not) by 
governments prior to privatization. It addresses the question: why governments sometimes (but 
not always) lessen the “privatization shock” when water services are privatized. It suggests that 
the ability of governments to adopt gradual preparatory measures depends on the time horizon of 
privatization deciders and the political cost this preparatory gradual policy change may entail for 
the process. Empirically, the paper analyzes the measures adopted by some (but not all) 
governments prior to the privatization of drinking water and sanitation services in Bolivia and 
Chile, through a process-tracing approach based on quantitative data, interviews, and an extensive 
review of government and providers’ reports, as well as governmental, non-governmental and 
press archives. The main contribution of this paper is to conceptualize and analyze “preparatory” 
policy changes. Theoretically, it contributes to the neo-institutionalist literature by adding a 
“preparatory” type of change to the existing framework of gradual institutional policy changes. 
Substantively, by analyzing the preparatory measures adopted prior to the privatization processes, 
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it allows to better understand the real redistributive consequences of these processes and the 
political dynamics behind the level of political risk they may entail. 
The second and third papers highlight the multifaceted effects of state capacity on policy diffusion 
for non-politicized (or technical) policies through the empirical analysis of the domestic adoption 
and implementation of drinking-water quality standards following the promotion of the World 
Health Organization’s drinking-water quality guidelines. Whereas the privatization and expansion 
of access to water tend to be politicized issues, the adoption or change of regulations for the quality 
of drinking water is rather technical and not politicized per se. Indeed, the definition of national 
standards for drinking-water quality are essentially developed and defined by technical agencies. 
It can easily be understood, since drinking-water quality (except for a few exceptions) cannot be 
easily assessed at time of consumption, and many effects of bad drinking-water quality are only 
evidenced over time. The drinking-water quality guidelines promoted by the World Health 
Organization are also presented as health-based, scientifically-oriented documentation. Focusing 
on the diffusion of non-politicized policies promoted by international organizations to national 
jurisdictions, the second and third papers together disaggregate two steps of policy diffusion that 
are often conflated in the literature in order to address these two questions: first, why are policies 
diffused or not across countries submitted to similar diffusion mechanisms (paper 2); and, second, 
why are “similarly diffused policies” implemented or not (paper 3).  
The second paper argues that strong state capacity tends to limit the adoption of a diffused policy 
that represents a strong domestic challenge. The study explores, first, the diffusion of the WHO 
guidelines in the regulations of 16 Latin American countries through a cross-country comparison 
of process-tracing clues. Second, it develops thorough process-tracing analyses evidencing the 
causal mechanisms in two case studies: Bolivia and Chile (based on systematic archival research 
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and interviews). Its main finding suggests that international influences weigh heavier where state 
capacity is weaker and may, in these cases, lead to the adoption of more ambitious policies than if 
the policy was only developed nationally (and therefore constrained by the weak capacity of the 
state). More generally, this paper contributes to the institutionalist literature by the definition of 
state capacity on which it rests. It underlines the relevance to compare and measure state capacity 
on the basis of its resources (required to project its power), rather than on its ends or outcomes 
(which depend on the political choices that were made by the state). This definition allows to 
conceptually and empirically dissociate state capacity from the political choices that are made to 
develop specific functional capacities. 
In the third paper, the theory posits that strong state capacity gives the capacity to extensively 
implement diffused policies, but that implementation will remain partial if there are no external 
pressures on the sector. In countries with weak state capacity, it postulates that, when they can 
count on sustained foreign capacity support, implementation may also be extensive under external 
pressures. However, if this foreign capacity support is interrupted or absent, implementation will 
at most be partial (under external pressures). Empirically, this paper focuses on the implementation 
of national drinking-water quality regulations in Bolivia and Chile over more than three decades. 
The analysis was developed through a process-tracing approach and builds on extensive and 
systematic research in governmental and non-governmental archives conducted in both countries, 
as well as on over 50 interviews with actors involved in the sector in the last three decades.  The 
main contributions of this paper is to show that policy diffusion in weak states can be both window-
dressing and frame-shaping, depending on political dynamics. To be frame-shaping, it needs a 
sustained foreign capacity support (that can compensate for the weakness of the state) and strong 
external pressures. Otherwise, in weak states, the adoption of a diffused policy is likely to be mere 
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window-dressing. This paper also shows that, when state capacity is strong and there are not strong 
pressures from outside the implementing actors, implementation is partial. This drastically 
contrasts with the common view that partial implementation comes from a lack of resources.  
3. Overall Contribution to the Policy Diffusion/ Transfer Literature 
The literatures on policy diffusion and policy transfer emerged a few decades ago, initially 
independent from one another, but have started to crisscross at the end of the 1990s. Conjointly, 
they have been significantly burgeoning since the early 2000s. This dramatic surge led to the 
publication of numerous reviews of this literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dobbin, Simmons 
and Garrett, 2007; Karch, 2007; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; Shipan and 
Volden, 2012; Stone, 2012; Graham et al., 2013). Most of these literature reviews, including the 
most recent ones, note the numerous avenues left to address the literature’s shortcomings, 
especially regarding the process of policy diffusion, its object and the empirical scope of research. 
This dissertation contributes to each of these three aspects in specific ways. It, first, provides a 
uniquely synoptic view of the policy diffusion process (before, during, and after the national 
adoption of a policy). Second, it highlights that the dynamics of policy diffusion are influenced by 
the type of policy diffused (especially its degree of politicization and the extent to which it 
represents a transboundary challenge). More substantially, the dissertation finally calls attention 
to a range of factors that domestically constrain policy choices, but have thus far been largely 
neglected in the policy diffusion literature, such as state capacity, which has multifaceted effects 
on the diffusion of non-politicized policies.  
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3.1. The Process of Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer 
This dissertation first contributes to the understanding of the process of policy diffusion/transfer. 
The literature has analyzed this process extensively in the last decades and has disaggregated it in 
at least three different ways: first by identifying its explanatory factors, second by defining the 
mechanisms through which it occurs, and third by distinguishing the different steps of the process.  
Initially the policy diffusion literature focused on convergence and on the conditions allowing a 
policy to spread to another state (first in the US federal system). It focused on factors external to 
the state adopting the diffused policy, like geographical proximity, external pressures and 
communication networks, and put little emphasis on comparing the content of the policy diffused. 
As for the literature on policy transfer, emerging from the public policy subfield, it rapidly tended 
to balance the external factors with internal ones, like transfer agents, political interests and 
institutional features (Berry and Berry, 1999; Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2012). As these 
literatures have developed and crossed over one another, external and internal factors are now 
generally acknowledged to be important in the process of policy diffusion and policy transfer. Yet, 
the focus has moved towards the mechanisms through which policy diffusion/transfer occurs. 
Originally developed from a rational-choice perspective, the policy transfer literature first argued 
that policy transfer was the result of a learning, lesson-drawing mechanism. Policy emulation and 
harmonization were also identified as causal mechanisms in the 1980s and 1990s. As the literature 
expanded, particularly in the international relations subfield, other causal mechanisms highlighting 
the influence of power and interdependence relationships appeared as important: competition, 
coercion and imitation. Although the literature has identified dozens of causal mechanisms, they 
are typically summarized into four: learning (from own experiences and peers), competition 
(pressure to follow policies of direct competitors), coercion (sanctions and aid promised by 
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powerful states or international organizations), and socialization/constructivism (change of 
preferences and development of expert epistemic communities). But they are not necessarily 
independent from one another, and more than one may impact the diffusion of a same policy in 
different places (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Graham et al., 2013; Stone, 2012).   
These mechanisms have contributed to the understanding of how the process of policy 
diffusion/transfer unfolds. However, they are mostly orientated toward explaining why diffusion 
occurs and not why it does not when and where similar mechanisms are taking place. Moreover, 
they focus mostly on one specific step of the process: the spread of the policy. Yet, the literature 
has, more recently, emphasized that the policy diffusion process included but was not limited to 
the specific step of spread/diffusion. The policy diffusion process has consequently been 
disaggregated in different steps, and scholars have emphasized that different factors and 
mechanisms may be determinant for each step.  
First, the literature progressively recognized the importance of analyzing the implementation of 
policies diffused or transferred (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 354; Evans and Davies, 1999: 379; 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 6; True and Mintrom, 2001: 30; Karch, 2007: 191; Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009: 279; Shipan and Volden, 2012: 793). However, despite this reiterated recognition 
over the last two decades, some scholars still consider that, with adoption, diffusion is completed 
(Graham et al., 2013: 675). Others distinguish the implementation step of the process, but often to 
specify that their empirical study excludes this step (see, for instance: True and Mintrom, 2001; 
Karch, 2007). Finally, the few studies that analyze the post-adoption dynamics of diffused policies 
have mostly focused on highly politicized policies, like criminal justice or utility privatization, in 
which not implementing or partially implementing the policy translated into modifying the policy 
itself or its content (Karch and Cravens, 2014; Murillo, 2009; Post, 2014). 
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Second, another step that has been distinguished by the literature is the one of adoption. Adoption 
was not just separated from implementation, it was also singled out from diffusion itself (a step I 
label the “spread” to limit confusion with the whole process). Indeed, among others, Karch (2007) 
and Dunlop (2009) noted that adoption differed from learning and diffusion: it could differ a lot 
from what was diffused and, besides, what was diffused could also motivate receiving states not 
to follow the path called for by diffusion.  
Third, the disaggregation of the policy diffusion also started to look at steps prior to the spread 
(diffusion) step and to note the importance of the step of standardization of local ideas and 
practices. Ancelovici and Jenson (2013) conceptualized this step “as the process through which 
local ideas and practices are turned into a ‘standard model’” and suggested that three mechanisms 
may intervene in this step: certification, decontextualization, and framing. Moreover, although the 
emergence, in first place, of a “new” policy or idea somewhere was always acknowledged as part 
of the process, the relevance of analyzing this process was put forward only recently in the 
literature. As Graham et al. (2013: 686) stated: “in order to uncover evidence that earlier adopting 
governments influenced the subsequent decisions of governments adopting later, it is often 
important to know what caused these early adopters to innovate.” 
This dissertation contributes to the disaggregation of the policy diffusion process in two ways. On 
the one hand, it suggests the addition of one step to the ones already defined in the literature as 
part of the policy diffusion process: the step of preparation. This step consists in the elaboration 
by a receiving state of measures to lessen the impact of a policy adopted following diffusion 
influences. Although not necessary to the process of policy diffusion, this step is important to take 
into account in the analysis because if preparatory measures are put in place by receiving states, 
then assessing the impact of policy adoption may be misinterpreted. Moreover preparatory 
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measures may delay adoption, and therefore affect the interpretation one may make of the timing 
of adoption. On the other hand, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the policy 
diffusion process by analyzing separately the adoption and the implementation steps of a diffused 
policy. These empirical analyses highlight how the dynamics of each of these steps is distinct, 
despite the fact that these steps are not totally independent from one another.  
Figure 1 summarizes the different steps of the policy diffusion/ transfer process, as conceptualized 
in the literature but also including this dissertation’s inputs (the step of preparation and the clear 
distinction between the steps of adoption and implementation). 
Figure 1. The Steps of the Policy Diffusion/Transfer Process 
 
Source: Own Elaboration. 
• Emergence
• New Ideas/Policies Rise in Other States or Transnational/International Actors
• Standardization
• New Ideas/Policies Become a "Standard Model"
• Spread/Diffusion
• The "Standard Model" Travels to Other Contexts
• Preparation (Optional Step)
• Receiving State Puts in Place Preparatory Measures to Lessen the Impact of New Policy
• Adoption
• Receiving State Adopts New Policy (Possibly Adapted)
• Implementation
• Receiving State and Other Actors Involved Implement New Policy
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3.2. The Object of Policy Diffusion  
In comparison to the process of policy diffusion/transfer, the nature of what is transferred/diffused 
has been less analyzed theoretically and empirically. It has nevertheless been acknowledged as 
important for the analytical framework of the process, especially given the great and increasing 
scope of areas associated with this dynamic in the literature. This dissertation highlights two key 
characteristics of policies that may influence diffusion: its degree of politicization and the 
transboundary challenge it may entail. 
Initially, the policy diffusion/transfer literature focused on program innovations, mostly of 
technological nature and in social policy (Walker, 1969; Collier and Messick, 1975; Leichter, 
1983; Midgley, 1984; Tarr, 1985). From the 1990s, the diffusion framework was applied more 
broadly and in a great range of policy areas, especially economic policy (Wever and Allen, 1993; 
Radaelli, 1995), public management (Berry, 1994) and legal policy (Hays, 1996). In the 2000s, 
environmental policy (Tews et al., 2003), gender mainstreaming (True and Mintrom, 2001), as 
well as trade and enterprise standards (Cao and Prakash, 2011) were also analyzed from the 
diffusion perspective. As the policy diffusion framework was applied to any policy area, the policy 
area per se apparently did not seem to impact which causal mechanisms were determinant or the 
scope of policy diffusion. However, the impact of other characteristics of what is diffused has 
progressively stood out.  
As the policy diffusion literature extended in the 1990s, it became clear that diffused policies 
varied in their “type of content”, and that this could impact their likeliness to be diffused. Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996) identified seven categories of content transferred/diffused, which they later 
updated to eight. These eight categories were policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, 
policy programs, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative lessons (Dolowitz and 
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Marsh, 2000: 12). They reflect the clear diversity of what may be diffused/transferred. Although 
there is no unanimity on the matter, the literature tends to suggest that the diffusion/transfer of 
broad policy goals or general policy ideas are more likely to be diffused than specific policy 
programs (Majone, 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Stone, 2012).  
Another characteristic of the content diffused/transferred that appeared early in the literature as 
analytically relevant is the complexity of the policy. It was first argued that more complexity 
disfavors diffusion/transfer (Bennett, 1991). However, scholars most recently noted that the impact 
of a policy’s complexity on diffusion had to be put in relation with the capacity of policy-makers: 
this capacity became particularly “crucial […] in the spread of highly complex policies, but largely 
inconsequential for diffusion of less complicated policies” (Graham et al., 2013: 701). 
Although the policy diffusion literature has highlighted the diversity of policy areas and types of 
content, the nature of what is diffused remains a dimension to be better explored and understood, 
and especially to be put in relation with how, where and when diffusion takes place. In this respect, 
this dissertation considers that the type of policy that is intended to be diffused is key, and 
especially two specific characteristics of it: the degree of politicization of the policy, and the extent 
to which the expected impacts of the policy go (at least partly) beyond borders. 
First, the impact the politicization of a policy may have on its diffusion, especially through the 
actors influencing its diffusion, is not totally new in the literature. Karch (2007: 71-72), for 
instance, noted that “interest groups might be especially influential on highly politicized policies, 
and variation in their strength across states might explain policy content variation across states. 
For more technical or administrative policies, content may vary due to variation in the efforts of 
executive branch officials and program administrators.” Weyland (2005: 277) also stated that 
policies where “decisions […] have concentrated winners, yet diffuse losers” are more “politically 
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attractive” than those “where decisions have broad categories of winners and losers.” This 
dissertation develops the idea further by arguing that the diffusion of politicized policies is likely 
to imply actors and be related to institutional capacity differently from non-politicized 
(technical/administrative) policies. I define the degree of politicization of a policy as the extent to 
which it is associated to a traditional conflict between the left and the right or between political 
parties in the country. This dissertation puts forward this argument by studying, in paper 1, a 
dimension of drinking-water policies that is highly politicized (the privatization of the services) 
and, in paper 2, an aspect of drinking-water policies that is not politicized per se (the adoption of 
drinking-water quality standards).     
Second, this dissertation suggests that one dimension of policies that has been overlooked in the 
literature is also key to diffusion: the expected impacts a policy may have abroad. Indeed, policy 
diffusion is essentially analyzed as a relationship in which a receiving state, following foreign, 
transnational and international influences, adopts a new policy or idea within its domestic context. 
It is also commonly acknowledged that states may have “foreign influences” on other states 
(Graham et al., 2013: 686). However, what is missing from the equation is the extent to which a 
domestic policy adopted and implemented domestically (for instance following diffusion 
influences) may have impacts abroad by its own nature (i.e. independently of whether it is 
“diffused” abroad). The existence of such impacts is likely to have an effect on actors involved at 
the adoption and implementation stages of the policy that are mostly overlooked in the literature 
as of now. This dissertation analyzes this issue specifically in paper 2, studying why Latin 
American countries adopt (or not) national drinking-water standards complying with the World 
Health Organization’s guidelines. This paper argues that, indeed, the transboundary nature of a 
challenge associated with a specific policy impacts policy adoption by states.  
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3.3. The Empirical Scope 
As it developed over the years, the policy diffusion/transfer literature largely extended its empirical 
scope. Nevertheless, its original focus on the USA and Europe as well as its dominant interest in 
“successful” diffusion cases still imprint its theoretical and its analytical frameworks. This 
dissertation contributes to the systematization of empirical analyses of diffusion outside of 
Western countries and to the identification of new explanatory factors, like state capacity.  
Overall, an important empirical shortcoming of the policy diffusion/transfer literature has been the 
focus on positives cases. Stone (2012: 488-489) noted: “Poor, incomplete or partial transplantation 
is not as well documented as the ‘success stories’ of transfer. […] Empirical questions such as why 
and how a certain type of transfer occurs in one context and not elsewhere have not, as yet, been 
fully addressed in the policy transfer literatures.” Graham et al. (2013: 697) also called for “future 
work […] to discern systematic patterns in the conditional nature of diffusion.” 
The second and third papers of this dissertation directly contribute to extending diffusion empirical 
studies to positive and negative cases. They analyze the adoption and implementation phases of 
policy diffusion in countries where the drinking-water standards adopted nationally followed the 
World Health Organization’s guidelines and in others where they did not.  
Besides its focus on positive cases, the literature largely developed by analyzing policy diffusion 
in Western countries, especially between American states and European countries. This has 
recurrently been raised as an issue of concern in the 2000s (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). 
Progressively, and especially in the last decade, many diffusion studies of non-Western countries 
have emerged. Many of these analyzed a few countries where diffusion took place, which limited 
the generalizability of their findings. However, some systematically compared diffusion patterns 
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in developing countries which generated important theoretical contributions. For instance, 
different scholars (Croissant and Tosun, 2016; Milner, 2006; Richter and Wurster, 2016) suggested 
that regime type was a relevant explanatory variable of diffusion, at least for some policy areas.  
This dissertation suggests that one key explanatory variable that previous studies have overlooked, 
possibly because of their original focus on Western countries, is state capacity. Papers 2 and 3 
argue that state capacity interplays significantly in the adoption and implementation of non-
politicized policies influenced from abroad. 
Overall, by analyzing how water reforms promoted by transnational actors were put in place in 
Latin America between 1980 and 2014, this dissertation helps understanding why policies 
promoted by transnational and international actors may (or may not) be implemented and have the 
intended effects “on the ground.” It disentangles the policy diffusion process by highlighting that 
receiving states and actors are not only passive agents but also proactive ones, regarding the 
adoption, enforcement, and preparation of policy changes influenced from abroad. It also 
contributes to the knowledge on water reforms in Latin America, as it analyzed in details two 
dimensions largely overlooked by the literature and policy studies: measures lessening the 
privatization shock and drinking-water standards. These issues, less salient than strongly 
politicized ones (like privatization itself), are as consequential in the life of states and their citizens, 
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Paper 1: Why Do Governments Sometimes (but not Always) Lessen the 
“Privatization Shock” when Water Services are Privatized? 
 
Privatization reforms of drinking water and sanitation services have been one of the most 
politicized changes in drinking water services over the last decades. Promoted by international 
organizations, they were implemented in many countries. They have nevertheless been highly 
debated, often strongly contested, and sometimes reverted. They have also been largely analyzed 
and studied. 
The literature analyzing drinking water and sanitation services has largely focused on the effects 
of the participation of the private sector on services. For some, privatization came with efficiency 
gains that allowed to extend coverage, lower prices and improve the quality of services (Chong 
and López-de-Silanes, 2004; Estache and Trujillo, 2003; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003; Barja 
et al., 2002); for others, privatization did not yield the incentives to improve water services and 
indeed failed in doing so (Castro, 2007; Amakom, 2007; Azpiazu, 2010; Mulreany et al., 2006). 
For yet another group, privatization was not determinant in itself (Clarke et al., 2009; Budds and 
McGranahan, 2003; Sciandra, 2005). Progressively, the latter perspective has become dominant 
and scholars highlighted that the outcomes of privatization depended on other factors like 
regulation, governance, state capacity and investor portfolios (Lee and Floris, 2003; Delfino et al., 
2007; Araral, 2009; De Gouvello, 2014; Baer, 2014; Post, 2014; Post and Murillo, 2016).  
The latter and dominant perspective has acknowledged directly the possible heterogeneous 
outcomes of the privatization of water services. In doing so, some scholars have noted that reforms 
of the sector prior to privatization have important impacts on privatization. Water utilities that are 
in better economic and infrastructural shape at the time of privatization obviously attract more 
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bidders (therefore facilitating the process of privatization), require less short-term investment 
(therefore easing the installation of private entities and lowering their risk to engage in an 
“obsolescing bargain”1) and provide more accurate information about the state of their utility 
(therefore favoring a more stable post-privatization period) (Clarke et al., 2009: 336; Shirley, 
2000: 147-152; Tecco, 2008: 135-138). Yet, the extent to which governments adopt measures to 
prepare water utilities for privatization varies strongly across countries and often between water 
utilities within a single country, and this has led to very different experiences with water 
privatization.  
This paper specifically addresses the question of why governments sometimes (but not always) 
lessen the “privatization shock” when water services are privatized. Considering the high political 
visibility of water services and the fact that they have specific assets (Herrera, 2011; 2017; Clarke 
et al., 2009; Post, 2014), this paper argues that privatizing deciders favor gradual policy change 
that prepares to the “abrupt policy change” of privatization. However, the extent to which they 
may (or not) take this path of change depends on two factors: their time horizon and the political 
cost this preparatory gradual policy change may entail for the process. The time horizon of deciders 
limits the measures they may take and depends on the institutionalization and strength of political 
ties (materializing in political alliances and relationships) between deciders. The political cost of 
the gradual policy change influences which preparatory measures (if any) deciders actually put in 
place; this cost is determined by the extent to which a strong external challenge jeopardizes 
privatization. 
                                                          
 
1 It has been argued that foreign firms investing infrastructure may face an “obsolescing bargain” if they invest in 
fixed capital and national governments, afterwards, do not stand by their initial commitments (Kindleberger, 1969: 
149-151; Vernon, 1971: 46-53).  
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By conceptualizing a “preparatory” type of gradual policy change, this argument contributes to the 
neo-institutionalist literature that has evidenced the possibility of institutional policy change to 
take place not only abruptly, at critical-juncture moments, but also gradually (Hacker, 2004; 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). It also directly contributes to the literature on economic and 
privatizing reforms by pinpointing a dimension that has generally been overlooked: the measures 
adopted prior and in preparation to privatizations.   
The empirical analysis focuses on the concession-type privatization processes of drinking water 
and sanitation services that took place in two cities of Bolivia and eight regions in Chile. It analyzes 
measures adopted (or not) prior to concession on two aspects of water and sanitation services: 
consumers’ rates and drinking-water quality. Especially for the concession type of privatization, 
these two aspects are key, both for providers’ revenues and for the popular acceptance (or 
opposition) to privatization. The analysis is done through a process-tracing approach, on the basis 
of quantitative data, interviews and extensive research in governmental, providers’ and press 
archives.  
The first section presents the theoretical framework, and the second details methodological 
aspects. The third and fourth sections present and analyze the results for the water concessions that 
occurred in Bolivia and Chile, respectively.  
1. Theoretical Framework: Why Smoothening (or Not) the Big Bang 
This paper develops a theory to explain why governments sometimes (but not always) smoothen 
the shock the adoption of a policy (like a privatization reform) is expected to provoke.  
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1.1. Gradual vs. Abrupt Policy Change 
Policy change may take place gradually or abruptly, as the institutionalist literature has particularly 
highlighted. Historical institutionalism initially considered that institutions changed drastically at 
critical moments (as a response to exogenous shocks) and adjusted incrementally between these 
abrupt transformations, over a very long period of time (Pierson, 2000; see Capoccia and Kelemen, 
2007 for a literature review). Other more recent institutionalist theories rather argue that 
institutional change may also be gradual as well as abrupt, and take multiple forms (Hacker, 2004; 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Mahoney and Thelen (2010), for instance, define four types of 
institutional change (displacement, layering, drift and conversion). Whereas they associated abrupt 
patterns of change with displacement, all four types of change may correspond to patterns of 
gradual change. They argue that the type of institutional change depends on the strength of veto 
possibilities and the level of discretion in the targeted institution, two characteristics suggesting 
which type of “change agents” may lead the change.  
Overall the (neo-) institutionalist literature offers explanations about what type of gradual changes 
is pursued but provides only limited insights into why change takes place gradually or abruptly. 
Nevertheless, it tends to assume that policy change is gradual rather than abrupt when change 
agents or advocates face constraints or incapacities to pursue abrupt change. Mahoney and Thelen 
state: “If displacement [a type of change likely to be abrupt] occurs gradually, it is likely because 
insurrectionaries are unable to make things change as quickly as they would like” (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010: 24). Hacker, on his side, suggests that “actors who wish to change popular and 
embedded institutions in political environments that militate against authoritative reform may find 
it prudent not to attack such institutions directly” (Hacker, 2004: 244). He argues that, when “the 
basic political structure and partisan context privileges the status quo […], pragmatic advocates of 
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change may find it more attractive to adapt existing policies to their ends than to wage frontal 
assault” (Hacker, 2004: 247).  
Gradual and abrupt policy changes are therefore perceived and analyzed as two distinct strategies 
for policy change, that are constrained by possibilities offered by the political context. This 
conceptualization does not suggest that (and less so explain why) change advocates and agents 
who are not constrained and thus have the ability to carry about abrupt changes could nevertheless 
choose to adopt gradual changes. 
Another shortcoming of the (neo-) institutionalist literature is its lack of explanation for the 
succession of different institutional changes. Although scholars acknowledge that “all these forms 
of [institutional] change, if successful in undermining support coalitions or the ability of policies 
to achieve their goals, should increase the ability to convert, alter, or eliminate existing policies in 
the future” (Hacker, 2004: 248) and emphasize the “need to disentangle actors’ short-run behaviors 
from their long-run strategies” (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010: 22), they largely focus on one 
institutional change at a time. This focus may have been influenced by the fact that this literature 
largely developed in the context of strong institutions, which are expected to “be enforced and 
minimally stable” (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009), and for which the study of an institutional change 
per se is understandable. 
This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing one path of successive and different 
institutional changes that directly relates to the framework developed by Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) to explain institutional changes that may be abrupt or gradual. This path is one in which 
gradual policy change prepares the ground for an abrupt policy change, i.e. when gradual changes 
are pursued prior to abrupt changes to smoothen the shock the latter may provoke (particularly if 
it is likely to be unpopular) (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Change Agents, Constraints of the Political Context, and Gradual vs. Abrupt Policy 
Changes 
 
The theory explains why governments sometimes (but not always) smoothen the shock a policy is 
expected to provoke. Given that change agents in favor of “abrupt policy change” may also be 
expected to prefer this change to be successful, I suggest that they may be more favorable to a path 
that first considers gradual policy change that prepares to abrupt policy change for certain types of 
policy. Indeed, when the abrupt policy change relates to a highly capital-intensive or asset-specific 
policy sector and is likely to be politicized and unpopular, first adopting gradual policy change 
that would lessen the possible negative impacts or drawbacks of abrupt policy change is an 
appealing option for deciders. Contrary to what the literature suggests, I argue that abrupt policy 
change is not automatically and necessarily the first preference of agents who have the ability to 
make that change abruptly. Change agents may sometimes prefer to prepare gradually to that 
abrupt policy change. The extent to which they may (or not) take this path of change depends on 
two factors: their time horizon and the political cost this preparatory policy change may entail for 
the (following) abrupt policy change.  
I develop the details of my theory in the frame of the privatization of public utilities, but it is not 
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and unpopular, as well as usually developed over the long term (for instance having specific 
assets). The privatization of public utilities, a sector that meets these criteria, highlights the 
importance and contribution of the theory. 
1.2. Privatization as a “Critical-Juncture” 
Privatization reforms (or their counterpart, nationalization policies) for public services and public 
utilities can clearly be categorized as abrupt changes: these reforms redefine formally and 
significantly rules and practices of the sector affected. And, especially in the developing world, 
the fact that they resulted (at least partly) from the influence of exogenous pressures is largely 
accepted.  
Indeed, the literature on privatization of public utilities in the developing world largely analyzed 
privatization reforms of public utilities since the 1980s as “critical-juncture” moments. Many 
studies have compared the pre-privatization period to the post-privatization period; others analyses 
suggested explanations to why, when and where privatization reforms took place; and some other 
works have highlighted the importance of the regulatory framework developed at the time of 
privatization and the regulation dynamics in the post-privatization period (Azpiazu, 2010; Barja et 
al., 2002; Castro, 2007; Lee and Floris, 2003; McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2003; Murillo, 2009; 
Post, 2014).  
Yet, these three trends of research have neglected one aspect that impacts each of them: the 
preparatory measures governments may have put in place to smoothen the privatization shock. 
First, these measures may directly impact the baseline of comparison of the pre-privatization 
period to the post-privatization one. Second, preparatory measures may be an important dimension 
to understand the timing of adoption: postponing privatization may entail putting in place gradual 
changes of the sector to ease privatization. Third, the regulatory framework at the time of 
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privatization and post-privatization may be influenced by the policies regulating the sector prior 
to privatization. 
1.3. Dealing with the Privatization Shock 
Governments that put in place privatization reforms may do so for different reasons; the most 
common ones mentioned are: ideology and beliefs (arguing that privatization will improve services 
and efficiency), economic resources expected to be given to the government in the privatization 
process, and political gains (from the voters or political actors in favor of the policy). Yet, no 
matter why the governments are privatizing, they certainly prefer the privatization process to 
succeed as there would be ideological, economic or political prices associated with its failure. This 
is true both if privatization is reverted and if it is negatively perceived. Privatizing governments 
have therefore strong incentives to prevent opposition to these reforms. Their best way to do so is 
to address the potential sources of discontent, by dissociating privatization from unpopular 
consequences (like higher prices or bad quality of services).  
In policy sectors that developed over the long term and are highly visible, guaranteeing that 
privatization is not associated with unpopular consequences requires putting in place preparatory 
measures to smoothen the “privatization shock”. The extent to which governments do so depends 
on two factors: the time horizon of deciders and the political cost entailed by the preparatory 
measures.  
Post (2009) already noted that time horizons of politicians and firms were determinant for the 
“introduction and successful implementation of revenue or reputation-enhancing measures” in the 
post-privatization period. This paper argues time horizon is also key in the pre-privatization period, 
as it may constrain whether measures can be implemented gradually or only abruptly. The time 
horizon of governments deciding over privatization depends on the political ties between deciders. 
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Deciders include all veto players of the privatization decision-making process. They typically 
include the executive members and the majority of the legislative body of the different levels of 
government deciding over privatization (the levels of government involved in privatization 
decision-making processes vary from a country to another; see Herrera and Post 2014 about water-
services privatizations). The political ties between deciders are institutionalized when interparty 
competition is stable (at all levels of government involved in the privatization process) and when 
the parties are strongly institutionalized (stable in time and in their alliances). Under these 
conditions, privatization deciders have a longer time horizon and may put in place extended and 
gradual measures to prepare privatization. As detailed hereafter, these long-term preparatory 
measures also open possibilities for short-term adjusting measures, at the time of privatization, if 
needed. When non-institutionalized, political ties depend on temporary alliances, they are strong 
when such alliances are in place and weak otherwise. When (non-institutionalized) ties are strong, 
time horizon is short (limited to the time corresponding to the mandates of deciders) and only 
short-term measures may be taken. When ties are weak, time horizon is undefined and therefore 
preparatory measures are unlikely (see Figure 2).  

















Whereas the political ties between deciders constrain the type of preparatory measures that may 
be undertaken, the political cost these preparatory measures may entail determines what measures 
are actually put in place. Indeed, because these measures are preparatory, and not the main goal, 
deciders would not put in place preparatory measures that are likely to jeopardize privatization 
itself (which remains the objective). The political cost of these measures is higher when a strong 
external challenge is jeopardizing privatization and weak otherwise. An external challenge consists 
in external opposition voiced by non-deciders (which include the population, but also social and 
political actors not directly involved in the decision-making process) or in an exogenous 
(unpredictable) change in natural conditions. More specifically, the political non-deciders include 
the members of opposition parties, and politicians at levels of government that do not have a veto 
in the decision-making process. The external challenge is considered strong when the opposition 
of non-deciders or the change in natural conditions is publicly and repeatedly reported.  The impact 
on preparatory measures of a strong external opposition depends on its propensity to jeopardize 
privatization. When ties between deciders are institutionalized and long-term measures could be 
taken over time, deciders have a space to manoeuver closer to the moment of the privatization, 
which allows them to implement short-term adjusting measures prior to privatization in response 
to external opposition. The latter is therefore unlikely to impede privatization. When ties between 
privatization deciders are strong but not institutionalized, a strong external challenge to 
privatization is likely to jeopardize the whole process: deciders will therefore block the 
implementation of preparatory measures. Finally, when ties are weak, since no measures are 
expected to be taken prior to privatization, a strong external opposition does not have a significant 
impact. Table 1 summarizes the argument. 
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Table 1. Measures Taken Prior to Privatization to Smoothen Privatization Shock (Summary 
of Argument) 
 
Ties between Privatization Deciders 










Long-term preparatory & 
short-term adjusting measures 
No measures 
(prior to privatization) 
 
The argument unfolds through the following hypotheses. Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 relate to the 
impact of the institutionalization and strength of ties between privatization deciders on the 
measures they implement (or not) prior to privatization to lessen the shock that may come along 
with the process. 
Hypothesis 1.1. When ties between privatization deciders are institutionalized, 
(revenue-enhancing and quality-improving) measures to lessen the privatization 
shock are implemented gradually over various years (more than a mandate), prior 
to privatization. 
Hypothesis 1.2. When ties between privatization deciders are strong but not 
institutionalized, (revenue-enhancing and quality-improving) measures to lessen the 
privatization shock, if put in place prior to privatization, are implemented over a 
short period of time (less than a mandate).  
Hypothesis 1.3. When ties between privatization deciders are weak (and not 
institutionalized), no measures are implemented prior to privatization to lessen the 
shock of the process. 
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Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 present the expected impact on pre-privatization measures when the 
decision-makers are facing an external challenge to the concession.  
Hypothesis 2.1. In a context in which ties between privatization deciders are 
institutionalized, if the privatization faces an external challenge, short-term adjusting 
measures are put in place prior to privatization (in addition to long-term revenue-
enhancing and quality-benefiting measures).  
Hypothesis 2.2. In a context in which ties between privatization deciders are strong 
but not institutionalized and the concession faces an external challenge, no measures 
are implemented prior to privatization to lessen the shock of the process.  
1.4. Alternative Explanations  
The neo-institutionalist literature and the literature on privatization of water services proposed 
alternative explanations to our research question.  
First, the neo-institutionalist literature on gradual change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Hacker, 
2004) would suggest that measures resulting in gradual change are put in place when change agents 
or advocates face constraints or incapacities to pursue abrupt change (as detailed in section 1.2 
above). This contrasts directly with our argument.  
Second, the literature specifically on Latin American water reforms suggests that different 
institutional characteristics may impact on the capacity of states to put in place preparatory 
measures in road toward privatization. Baer (2014) argues that strong state capacity is necessary 
for reforms of the water sector to take place prior to privatization. Herrera (2017) considers that 
the decentralization of the management of water services favors short-termism. Her argument 
therefore suggests that where decentralization reforms took place, preparatory measures put in 
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place prior to privatization are likely to be short-term ones. Both arguments (of Bauer and Herrera) 
are consistent with our argument. However, the factors they identify (strength of state capacity and 
decentralization) cannot explain the within-country variations (between subnational units and 
across time) in the preparatory measures put in place (or not) prior to privatization.  
1.5. Why is the Path Leading to Privatization Important? 
One may ask why it is important whether measures were adopted over the long or short term or 
not adopted at all prior to privatization. At least two important and concrete aspects underline the 
importance of taking into account the preparatory road toward privatization.  
First, one important impact is certainly the redistributive consequences of such measures, which 
are furthermore somehow hidden when these are put in place over the long term. Indeed, neither 
the analysis of decisions made at the time of privatization (for instance regarding regulatory 
choices), nor the comparison of the periods prior and posterior to privatization are likely to take 
into account the redistributive effects of long-term gradual preparatory measures.  
Second, the preparatory path toward privatization also influences directly the political risk and cost 
of the privatization process, which is a variable likely to influence both whether the privatization 
reform will be adopted and the sustainability of privatization over time after its enactment. On the 
one hand, preparatory measures influence the responsiveness of the privatization process prior to 
its conclusion. If an external challenge jeopardizes privatization prior to privatization, adjusting 
measures to respond to this challenge can only be adopted where long-term preparatory measures 
have been taken. The privatization process is therefore more adaptable to changing contexts when 
the path to privatization included long-term preparatory measures.  
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On the other hand, the path toward privatization also impacts on the political cost of adopting 
privatization reforms. This political cost is lower when long-term preparatory measures have paved 
the way to privatization, to the extent that privatization is not associated with unpopular measures. 
This political cost is stronger when no preparatory measures were adopted, since in these cases, if 
unpopular measures are required to reform the sector, they will tend to directly be associated with 
privatization. Finally, when only short-term preparatory measures have been adopted, the impact 
on the political cost can be characterized as average: because the preparatory measures were taken 
a short time before privatization, the population may still associated them with the process 
(especially if these measures are unpopular and include, for instance, increases of consumers’ 
rates). Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the preparatory path taken (or not) toward privatization on 
the political cost and risk of privatization.  
Figure 3. The Impact of the Preparation to Privatization on the Political Cost of Privatization 
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2. Framework of Analysis, Methodology, Variables and Data 
This paper tests the hypotheses by analyzing the measures adopted by some (but not all) 
governments prior to the privatization of drinking water and sanitation services (to lessen the 
“privatization shock”) in Bolivia and Chile. This section details the relevant characteristics of the 
sector, justifies the case selection and methodology, and presents the variables and data used for 
the empirical analysis.  
2.1. The Potential Shock of Privatizing Water Services 
Three main characteristics of the water and sanitation sector make its privatization likely to be 
unpopular and politicized. 
First, water and sanitation services are developed over the long term, are highly capital-intensive 
and have specific assets. Indeed, this public utility demands high-capital investments, especially 
to expand the network at first, but also to maintain it over time. Because the supply network is 
“about two-thirds of the cost of water supply”, it makes it “too costly to duplicate” (Clarke et al., 
2009: 329; referring to London Economics, 1998; see also Post, 2009). Privatizations of water and 
sanitation services that are not auto-financed are therefore likely to come with high increases of 
consumers’ rates, which may be expected to be unpopular.  
Second, water is not only essential to life, it is also “the quintessential massively consumed 
product, and access to water is generally perceived to be more of a "social" and "basic" service 
than other utility services” (Savedoff and Spiller, 1999: 6). The UN General Assembly also 
recognized water and sanitation as a human right in July 2010 and it is largely acknowledged that 
water and sanitation services have direct effects on health and on the everyday life of citizens. 
Therefore, short-term changes affecting the access or accessibility of these services are likely to 
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be unpopular, highly visible and heavily opposed (Herrera, 2011). Simmons (2010) indeed argues 
that water threat can be associated to a subsistence threat (which is not only material but also a 
threat to community), which can foster mass mobilization around the issue; and Chng (2010) that 
there is a “moral economy” of subsistence rights to water upon which mobilization for water can 
take place. 
Third, the privatization of water and sanitation services is likely to be politicized because it is a 
central issue of partisan divide and governmental intervention. On the partisan side, privatization 
(more generally) is at the basis of the opposition between right- and left-oriented parties. Besides, 
the water sector also has the peculiarity of being locally-based, even when it is governed and/ or 
regulated at other levels of government. Therefore information flows depend on local social 
networks, and investments in the sector is likely to be politicized between the different levels of 
government involved (Post, 2014; Herrera and Post, 2014). 
The likely politicization and unpopularity of the privatization of water services may potentially be 
limited if the association of privatization with increases in consumers’ rates and worse quality of 
drinking water is impeded. Preventing this association is particularly key where services have low 
consumers’ rates and deficient drinking-water quality monitoring (features that were widespread 
in Latin American countries in the 1980s). Where privatization takes place through concession 
contracts (whose cost-effectiveness is critically tied to the preliminary conditions in place), good 
ways to ease the transition to privatization would therefore be to increase consumers’ rates 
incrementally and invest in drinking-water quality prior to the privatization process.2 Investments 
                                                          
 
2 The World Bank and other international organizations promoting the privatization of water and sanitation services, 
as well as governments, were aware of the risk of popular opposition to privatization (especially with increases of 
consumers’ rates) as early as in the mid-1980s, and increasing rates prior to privatization was indeed encouraged by 
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in drinking-water quality include not only investments for primary (microbiological) treatment of 
water, but also investments in wastewater treatment, treatment of chemicals in the water source 
(which tends to be expensive) and adequate maintenance of the distribution system (where treated 
water can be contaminated by non-treated wastewater or the pipes themselves). 
2.2. Case Selection and Comparative Analysis 
The study focuses on subnational cases from Latin America, a region that has experienced various 
water reforms in a relatively short period of time (the 1990s and 2000s), and which is the world 
region that experienced the most privatization of water and sanitation services during this period 
(Marin, 2009). Comparing within a region allows to control for other factors, such as the fact that 
similar multinationals may be involved in the countries, and that the same supranational or 
international organizations are potentially influencing the countries. More specific to this study, 
common features of Latin American countries in the early 1980s (i.e. years before the privatization 
wave) included low water consumers’ rates that were “well below the cost-recovery level” favored 
by private investors. Moreover, little or no control of drinking-water quality was in place (Marin, 
2009: 109-112; Andrés et al., 2008; Herrera and Post, 2014: 622-623; Savedoff and Spiller, 1999: 
2).  
Despite these commonalities, there was also a significant degree of variation across Latin 
American countries and also within countries over measures adopted prior to privatization. The 
evolution of water consumers’ rates prior to privatization ranged from a relative statu quo on 
consumers’ rates to drastic hikes (as high as 80%) of rates in the last year prior to privatization to 
                                                          
 
promoters of privatization, as a way to mitigate this risk (Loftus and McDonald, 2001: 19-20; Valenzuela and 
Jouravlev, 2007).  
39 
 
gradual but substantial increases in rates over a decade. As for drinking-water quality, there was 
also a great variety of situations associated with privatization: whereas in a few places issues with 
drinking-water quality occurred right after privatization, other privatizations have been associated 
with increasing drinking-water quality.  
The subnational cases analyzed in this study are all concession-type privatization of water services 
that took place in two countries: Bolivia and Chile. Within each country, the time period analyzed 
for each subnational case goes from the first legislative or executive signal (at the national level) 
announcing an intention to privatize water and sanitation services up to the year of the concession. 
Controlling for the type of privatization (concession) is necessary to compare preparatory 
measures of the same nature: for instance, measures enhancing providers’ revenue are likely to 
take different forms depending on the type of privatization. Whereas the longitudinal analysis of 
subnational cases do analyze successful and unsuccessful bidding processes (for concession), cases 
that were not privatized by concession or not privatized at all are not included in the analysis 
because we cannot control for the type of privatization and for the intention to privatize (similarly 
to other cases). 
These subnational cases are analyzed in a within-case framework, which by allowing to control 
for other factors, provides causal inference in small-N studies (Brady and Collier, 2010; Goertz 
and Mahoney, 2012). This within-case framework also controls for a factor that is key to our study: 
the political unit responsible for regulation and decision-making in water services. The latter varies 
from a country to another and even sometimes between subnational units within a same country 
(Herrera and Post, 2014). In our study, the subnational cases, within each country, are under the 
responsibility of the same political unit. In Bolivia, public providers of drinking water and 
sanitation services were decreed to be decentralized municipal companies in 1985 (Supreme 
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Decree 21021). It was then established that their board (decisive entity) was formed of 
representatives from the municipal and regional governments. However, as regard to consumers’ 
rates, it was clearly stated that these still had to be approved by the National Rates Council 
(Consejo Nacional de Tarifas – CONATA) as had been decreed by Hugo Banzer during his 
dictatorship in 1973 (Supreme Decree 11104). As for drinking-water regulations, they were set 
nationally but controls over their implementation were limited, since local public services 
determined to which extent they would implement them. In Chile, although operationalization and 
daily management of water services were regionalized, regulation and decision-making were 
centralized at the national level. As for rates specifically, they were decreed by the Ministry of 
Economy as established in the “Law of Rates” (D.F.L. MOP N°70/1988), following a “rate-
setting” process (proceso tarifario) in which the national regulator negotiated with the public or 
private companies and consulted other actors (including municipalities). As for drinking-water 
quality regulations, they were developed at the central level through a process led by the Instituto 
Nacional de Normalización (INN) and decreed by the Ministry of Health, which was officially 
responsible for regulating compliance to drinking-water standards. Starting in 1990, the 
Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) was in charge of overlooking the self-controls 
made by water services and realized parallel controls.   
Together with these different configurations of decision-making and regulatory actors, each of the 
two countries studied present different settings of ties between privatization deciders. In Bolivia, 
these ties were not institutionalized and their strength varied depending on temporary strategic 
alliances between deciders. In Chile, ties between privatization deciders have been strong for the 
whole period, but were only institutionalized after the transition (so a few years into the time period 
analyzed). These variations in ties within each country allow to test hypotheses 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. 
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Because concession processes did not take place at the same time, even within a same country, 
and faced challenges of different levels, the longitudinal analysis of each subnational case allows 
to test for the impact of external challenges of different strengths (Hypothesis 2.1 and 2.2). We 
may expect the timing of the concession to have an impact on the emergence of external 
challenges, in different (not unidirectional) ways, given factors like the proximity of upcoming 
elections and the order the concessions take place within the country.   
Figure 4 shows the classification of the different cases studied according to the variation of 
independent variables. Table 2 summarizes the nature of variations (between and/ or within 
subnational cases) for each country and specifies the hypotheses tested by the comparison of 
subnational cases for each country. 
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Table 2. Variation Between and Within Subnational Cases and Hypotheses Tested 
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2.3. Dependent Variables: Changes in Consumers’ Rates and Drinking-Water Quality Prior to 
Privatization 
Data availability of both dependent variables is a challenge. Consumers’ rates and drinking-water 
quality were not compiled nor systematically reported by all public providers or (when existing) 
regulators prior to privatization. And analyzing only countries (or cases) for which data is 
systematically available would imply a major selection bias, as this data would most likely have 
been systematically compiled precisely because of the type of regulatory framework that was in 
place prior to privatization. Therefore, the methodology chosen is to prioritize systematic 
quantitative data when available, but also to rely on primary and secondary sources referring to 
changes or levels of consumer rates and drinking-water quality. Data for consumers’ rates 
considers water prices in real national devices (i.e. excluding inflation). For drinking-water quality 
the comparative unit of data is indicators of microbiological and chemical quality and of its 
controls.  
In Bolivia, the report of the Superintendencia General del Sistema de Regulación Sectorial 
(SIRESE) released in 2004 on the evolution of the water and sanitation sector between 1990 and 
2002 includes a table on consumers’ rates which specified that no data was available for average 
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consumers’ rates by m3 of water for SEMAPA (the Cochabamba provider) for the whole period 
(1990-2002) and, for La Paz/ El Alto, that data was only available starting in 1997 (when the 
private company Aguas del Illimani started to be in charge) (SIRESE, 2004: 46). A proxy used 
was the prices of water services compiled monthly by the national statistics institute (computed on 
its own, as part of the consumer price index, starting in 1992). Moreover, a systematic review of 
all ministerial resolutions and municipal ordinances and resolutions between 1985 and 1999 (1997 
for La Paz) was conducted in order to compile all changes in consumers’ rates approved in the 
period. A systematic review of newspaper articles on the water sector of the ten main Bolivian 
newspapers between 1992 and 19983, of reports on water and sanitation services filed in the Public 
Works, Services and Housing Ministry archives and the virtual library archives of the CEPIS4, and 
university theses (on SEMAPA, SAMAPA and the Bolivian water sector) completed in three main 
Bolivian universities since 19855, also contributed to the collection of data on consumers’ rates 
and drinking-water quality in the 1992-1998 period. Over 35 interviews were conducted with 
governmental officials, representatives of international, foreign and private organizations and 
academics, in both La Paz and Cochabamba, to inform and complement data collection.  
In Chile, data of changes in consumers’ rates have been computed first on the basis of effective 
consumers’ rates per m3 of water (including fixed charges) in regional capital cities out of the data 
                                                          
 
3 Over 8000 newspaper articles were classified under this subject/category for 1992-1998 by the Centro de 
Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB) of the Universidad Mayor de San Simón and were reviewed (in paper 
format). The ten newspapers constituting the CEDIB archives are: Los Tiempos, Presencia, Hoy, El Deber, Primera 
Plana, Opinión, La Razón, El Mundo, El Diario and Última Hora. 
4 CEPIS was the Sanitary Engineering and Environmental Science Center (its acronym comes from its Spanish name: 
Centro Panamericano de Ingenieria Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente) of the Pan American Health Organization and 
the Regional Office of the World Health Organization.  
5 Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, Universidad Católica Boliviana and Universidad Mayor de San Simón.  
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released by the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in its 1995 report (Memoria) and 
the consumers’ rates journal (Boletín de Tarifas) released every month from September 2000 to 
2005. Data on consumers’ rates per m3 of water was unfortunately not available by year (nor less 
so by month) between December 1995 and September 2000. To compensate for this gap, and also 
to document consumers’ rates between 1990 and 1995, data from a proxy was compiled: changes 
in average consumers’ rates, which corresponds to average exploitation revenues per billed m3. 
This data has been computed from data of SISS’ 1992, 1990-1993, 1995, 2000 reports (Memorias) 
and SISS’ annual management reports (Informes de gestión) from 1997 to 2005. Chilean data on 
drinking-water quality also came from SISS’ documentation, specifically the annual reports of 
drinking-water quality in urban services for years 1991-2004 and the monthly drinking-water 
quality journals (Boletín de Calidad de Agua potable) from 2000 on. Over 15 interviews were also 
conducted with governmental officials and representatives from different ministers and agencies, 
as well as with representatives of water providers and private organizations, to better inform data 
collection. 
2.4. Main Independent Variables and Process-Tracing Analysis 
The argument has two main independent variables: the political ties between privatization deciders 
and the strength of the external challenge jeopardizing the privatization process.  
On one hand, political ties between privatization deciders consist in political alliances and 
relationships tying veto players (from all levels of government) of the decision-making process for 
the privatization of water services. These ties can be characterized as institutionalized (strong and 
stable), strong but not institutionalized (unstable) or weak (not institutionalized). Their 
institutionalization is based on two dimensions: the stability of interparty competition (or weakness 
of political opposition) and the institutionalization of the political parties (stable in time and in 
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their alliances). In democratic settings, results of elections are considered to assess the stability of 
the interparty competition and of parties over time. Sources of data include governmental 
publications on electoral data, the Political Database of the Americas (2010) and Murillo et al. 
(2010). In non-democratic settings, in the absence of elections, the interparty competition is 
assessed on the basis of the opposition encountered by the dictatorial government: ties are 
considered institutionalized if political opposition is not likely to turn down the dictatorial 
government. For non-institutionalized ties, their strength is established on the basis of the alliances 
between deciders at each moment in time: when deciders are from the same party, coalition or 
political group, these are strong; otherwise they are weak. The strength of non-institutionalized 
ties is particularly dynamic over time.   
On the other hand, an external challenge consists in external opposition voiced by non-deciders 
(which include the population, but also social and political actors not directly involved in the 
decision-making process) or in an exogenous (unpredictable) change in natural conditions. It is 
characterized as strong when the opposition of non-deciders or the change in natural conditions is 
publicly and repeatedly reported. It is weak when there is no external challenge repeatedly reported 
in the public arena or when the public opposition is coming from actors tied politically to the 
deciders (in which case they may be controlled internally). The external challenges jeopardizing 
the concessions are assessed through the primary and secondary sources documenting the decision-
making process and the different positions of actors.  
The in-depth process-tracing analyses for Bolivian and Chilean cases included an extensive 
compilation of various archival documents and interviews. For Bolivia, the following sources were 
systematically reviewed: all ministerial resolutions and municipal ordinances and resolutions 
between 1992 and 1999 (1997 for La Paz) related to the privatization process of drinking water 
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services, all articles related to the process of water services privatization of the ten main Bolivian 
newspapers between 1992 and 19986, published written accounts of the water war in Cochabamba 
by four actors (three members of the Coordinadora from different political allegiances, and one 
informed outsider)7, and the Coordinadora’s archives of the Cochabamba water war (1999-2000). 
Over 35 interviews with actors from different perspectives and roles in the privatization decision-
making process were also conducted.  
In Chile, sources systematically reviewed included all decrees and laws related to the privatization 
of drinking water and sanitation services, all rates’ decrees of the Economy Minister between 1988 
and 2005 (and their supportive tables in the Diario Oficial), the debates and supporting documents 
of “law history” from the (Chilean) National Library of Congress archives (Historia de Ley 18.778, 
18.885, 18.902 and 19.549), SISS’ 1992, 1990-1993, 1995, 2000 reports (Memorias), SISS’ annual 
management reports (Informes de gestión) from 1997 to 2005, articles of Reuters - Noticias 
Latinoamericanas from 1997 to 2004 and of Business News America from 2001 to 2004, SISS’ 
press releases from 2001 to 2004, and report of the Chilean Sistema de Empresas on the 
modernization of the sector in Chile, including 10 interviews with Chilean actors of privatization8 
                                                          
 
6 These were selected from the review of the thematic press archives for CEDIB (see note 3 for details). 
7 Omar Fernández (leader of the Federación Departamental de Cochabamba de Organizaciones de Regantes/ 
FEDECOR, member of the Coordinadora, later senator for the MAS), Gonzalo Maldonado Rojas (representative of 
the Comité de Defensa del Agua y la Economía Familiar, member of the Coordinadora, later member of de Lozada’s 
government), Oscar Olivera (executive of the Federación de Fabriles, main speaker of the Coordinadora, later refused 
to be part of Morales’ government) and Roberto Vera Varela (Cochabamba native retired engineer, documenting and 
publishing on the Misicuni water project and other water issues in Cochabamba since 1987). 
8 Eduardo Arriagada Moreno (president of the executive board of the SAE, 1997-2000), Carlos Mladinic Alonso 
(president of the executive board of the SEP, 2002-2006), Felipe Sandoval Precht (executive vice-president of CORFO 
1994-1997, president of the executive board of SAE), Juan Eduardo Saldivia Medina (superintendent of sanitary 
services, 1996-2006), Roberto de Groote González (director of ESSAN, 1990-2006), Hugo Maturana Aguilar 
(president of FENATRAOS, 1995-1998, 2000-2006), Sergio Henríquez Díaz (general manager of ESVAL S.A. 1995-
1997, director of ESVAL S.A. 2004-2006), Edmundo Dupré Echeverría (ex-manager of CORFO, ex-president of 
ESVAL S.A. and ESSBIO S.A.), Santiago Hernando Pérez (representative of Agbar in Chile since 1995, ex-manager 
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(Selman Biester et al., 2006). Over 15 interviews were also conducted with governmental officials 
and representatives, as well as with representatives of water providers and private organizations. 
3. Bolivia: Concessions of SAMAPA (La Paz/El Alto) and SEMAPA (Cochabamba) 
Neoliberal policies were adopted by Bolivian politicians starting in 1985, as a response to the 
economic crisis that was ongoing. In 1985, through Supreme Decree 21060, the Nueva Política 
Económica was enacted, but: “While privatization of state-run enterprises was a fundamental pillar 
of this policy, despite pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, Paz Estensorro [the Bolivian 
president from 1985 to 1989] did not initiate privatization during his administration” (Kohl, 2004: 
896). Laws allowing the privatization of state-owned enterprises were adopted in the early 1990s: 
the Ley de Privatización in 1992 (when Jaime Paz Zamora was president), and the Ley de 
Capitalización in 1994 (when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was president). The road toward 
privatization was embarked on with these laws and clearly accelerated starting in 1993, with the 
election of De Lozada as president. This road lead to the concessions of water and sanitation 
services in three of the main Bolivian cities: in La Paz and El Alto in 1997 (together in the same 
concession contract) and in Cochabamba in 1999. In Cochabamba, there have been three calls for 
bids (in 1996, 1998 and 1999) before the concession could be concreted and it finally lasted only 
a few months, as it was reverted following the emblematic Cochabamba Water War that took place 
in the first months of year 2000 (Salinas Gamarra et al., 2007; de Gouvello and Fournier, 2002).   
                                                          
 
of new business of Aguas Andinas S.A, general manager of Aguas Nuevas S.A. starting mid-2004), and Francisco 
Encina Moriamez (congressman, Socialist Party).  
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3.1. The Setting: Non-institutionalized Ties between Privatization Deciders  
Bolivia had its democratic transition in 1982. Starting in 1985, presidents elected governed with 
“pacted democracy” coalitions that were negotiated after each election to support the elected 
presidency, depending on vote shares. Coalitions were not based on programmatic alliances, but 
rather on practical ones.  
Between 1985 to 2002, three traditional parties (the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario – MNR, 
the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria – MIR and the Acción Democrática Nacionalista – 
ADN) alternated the presidency. From 1989 to 1993, Jaime Paz Zamora, from the MIR party, was 
president, thanks to a post-election coalition with ADN and parliamentary support from 
Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA). From 1993 to 1997, a MNR president, Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada, governed a coalition of the MNR with two smaller parties, the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Tupac Katari (MRTK) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL), a “MIR spin-off.” The president 
had been elected with 33% of the votes. From 1997 to 2002, Hugo Bánzer from the ADN party 
was elected president with 22% of the votes, and supported by a coalition of the MIR, the Unión 
Cívica Solidaridad (UCS), Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), CONDEPA, and the Nueva 
Fuerza Republicana (NFR) (Political Database of the Americas, 2010).  
The party system was weakly institutionalized both in terms of party themselves and coalitions. 
Indeed, coalitions were negotiated essentially after elections, on the basis of who was elected 
president, after different presidential candidates from the to-be coalition had ran one against the 
other (Cyr, 2007). Interparty competition was relatively unstable, as shown in Table 3. Overall, 
given the instability of coalitions and vote shares at the national level, politicians from different 
parties were not institutionally tied to one another (Lazarte, 1991; Mayorga, 2003; 2005).   
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Table 3. Presidential Vote Share by Candidate of Party in Bolivia, 1989-1997 
Party Electoral Year 
1989 1993 1997 
MNR 25,6% 35,6% 18,2% 
ADN 25,2% 21,1% (ADN-MIR)* 22,2% 
MIR 21,8% 21,1% (ADN-MIR)* 16,8% 
CONDEPA 12,2% 14,3% 16,8% 
IU - 8,0% - 
MBL - - 5,4% 
UCS - 13,8% 16,1% 
*The ADN and MIR allied to form the Acuerdo Patriótico (AP) in the 1993 election.  
Source: Murillo et al., 2010 
Note: The results reported include only parties that received at least 5% of the vote. 
 
As for the municipal level, elections took place in 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1999, and were of course 
key in determining who would be the local actors in power at a time when the privatization of 
water and sanitation services was on the agenda. The rules of municipal elections changed during 
this period. Up to 1994, the mayor was elected indirectly, by the councilmembers. In 1994, the Ley 
de Participación Popular and the reform of the constitution established new rules of the game: an 
absolute majority of popular votes guaranteed the party candidate to be mayor; if there wasn’t an 
absolute majority, the mayor was elected by the councilmembers (Velasco Aguilar et al., 2012; 
Pérez Mandieta, 2015). 
In La Paz, because of the frequency of municipal elections, and the uprising of the CONDEPA 
party (in opposition to traditional parties) in the early 1990s, interparty competition was very 
unstable. Moreover, because of the electoral system, mayors could even be contested between 
elections by the councilmembers, as occurred in early 1997. Ronald MacLean was mayor by 1991 
but lost the election to Julio Mantilla (from CONDEPA). Mantilla was mayor until 1993; but left 
(or was expulsed from, depending on the perspective) CONDEPA in 1993, and then turned to the 
MNR party. As the MNR candidate in 1993, he lost to Mónica Medina de Palenque (from 
CONDEPA), who became mayor until 1995. Although she obtained more votes in the 1995 
election than her main opponent Ronald MacLean (from ADN), the latter became mayor as a result 
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of his supports among the city council. But in early 1997, he lost supports in the council, and 
Gabriela Candia, from the MNR party, became mayor in early 1997. Gabriela Candia was not only 
from the same party than the president; she was also the sister of Fernando Candia, a trustworthy 
man of the president (and Finance Minister). Overall, during two time periods the national 
government had strong ties with the mayor of La Paz: between 1991 and 1993 (until the change of 
president), when the mayor was from a party supporting the president (and the AP alliance also 
supported CONDEPA’s mayor), and in 1997, when Gabriela Candia was mayor (Romero 
Ballivián, 1997; Velasco Aguilar et al., 2012; CEDIB, 1997). 
In Cochabamba, after a competitive election in 1991, a municipal crisis irrupted in 1992, but the 
1993, 1995 and 1999 elections were marked by stable interparty competition (and a winner with 
clear absolute majorities). Manfred Reyes Villa was elected mayor in 1993. He was already in 
power since early 1993: after the 1992 municipal crisis in Cochabamba (during which three mayors 
succeeded themselves), he was chosen to be mayor by the council, as he called the city 
councilmembers to leave their party affiliation aside. In 1992-1993 he left his party (ADN) and 
was the candidate for the MBL party in the 1993 and 1995 elections, which he won clearly. By 
1995 he created a new party (Nueva Fuerza Republicana – NFR), to open possibilities of alliances 
with other parties; and to pursue his own political ambitions. He won the 1999 election as a NFR 
candidate, and his majority was so high that he did not need any ally (7 out of 11 councilmembers 
were from NFR). We therefore identify three periods of strong political ties between the national 
government and Cochabamba mayor: in 1992 (when Fernando Rivas from the UCS was supported 
by the ADN-MIR alliance of the Paz Zamora president and when Manfred Reyes Villa then 
affiliated with ADN became mayor), between 1993 and early 1996 (when Reyes Villa was 
affiliated with MBL, which supported the MNR president de Lozada, and when his newly created 
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party NFR had not yet allied with the ADN for the 1997 election), and from August 1997 to early 
1999 (when the ADN president Hugo Bánzer took power, with support of Reyes Villa’s NFR 
party, and before the 1999 municipal electoral campaign, during which both were competitors) 
(Romero Ballivián, 1997; Velasco Aguilar et al., 2012; Achi Chritèle and Delgado, 2007: 153; 
CEDIB, 1997). 
Table 4. Presidents’ coalitions and Mayors’ Parties in La Paz and Cochabamba, 1990-1999  
Year President coalition La Paz Mayor Cochabamba Mayor 
1989 
Jaime Paz Zamora 
(MIR, ADN, CONDEPA) 
Ronald MacLean (ADN-MIR) Germán Carmona (UCS) 
1991 
Julio Mantilla (CONDEPA) 
Humberto Coronel Rivas (ADN) 
1992 .. Germán Carmona (UCS) 
1992 Fernando Rivas (UCS) (MIR-ADN) 
1993 Manfred Reyes Villa (ADN) 
1993 Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada 
(MNR, MRTK, MBL) 
Mónica Medina (CONDEPA) 
Manfred Reyes Villa (MBL) 
1995 Ronald MacLean (ADN) 
1997 
Gabriela Candia (MNR) 
Manfred Reyes Villa  
(NFR) 
1997 Hugo Bánzer 
(ADN, MIR, UCS, PDC,  
CONDEPA, NFR) 
1999 … 
Own elaboration with information collected from various sources: Romero Ballivián et al., 1998a; 1998b; Velasco 
Aguilar et al., 2012; Pérez Mandieta, 2015; Achi Chritèle and Delgado, 2007: 153. 
 
3.2. Changes in Consumers’ Rates Prior to the SAMAPA Concession 
In La Paz/ El Alto, consumers’ rates of drinking water have significantly been increased over the 
1980s and 1990s, prior to the concession of SAMAPA (which took place in July 1997). These 
increases can be classified in three types: first, the ones adopted in reaction to inflation and debt 
crises (which were, for the most part, adopted for all departmental capital cities and not only those 
where services were privatized); second, the ones required to obtain the 1990 World Bank loan; 
third, the increases adopted on the road to the privatization of SAMAPA.  
First, increases implemented in response to high inflation, increase of wages and increase of debt 
services were frequent in the second half of the 1980s. In 1985, increases of consumers’ rates in 
La Paz (like those of water services of other departmental capital cities) were approved by the 
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Minister of Urbanism and Housing (Ministro de Urbanismo y Vivienda) on the basis of the 
economic crisis that Bolivia was going through (inflationary crisis, increases of wages and 
increasing debt services) (Resolutions 039/85, 040/85, 125/85, 136/85, 137/85, 168/85 and 
227/85). Between 1986 and 1990 other increases of SAMAPA’s consumers rates were also 
approved for motives of inflation and debt service (to the Inter-American Development Bank) by 
the Minister of Urbanism and Housing (Resolution 050/87), La Paz Municipality (Ordinance 
15/86), and the Minister of Urban Affairs (Ministro de Asuntos Urbanos, resolutions 17/89).  
Second, increases of consumers’ rates in La Paz were also required by the World Bank for Bolivia 
to obtain loan 2187-BO to rehabilitate water and sanitation services of its three metropolitan areas 
(La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz). A World Bank report specified that in order to negotiate 
the loan it was required that SAMAPA increased its tariffs by 29%, which was done through 
Ministerial Resolution 198/90 in April 1990 (World Bank, 1998: 5). Additionally, the World Bank 
reported that “[as] a condition for negotiating the Credit (in February 1990) IDA [the International 
Development Association] requested that a financial policy be established for the basic sanitation 
sector” (World Bank, 1998: 25). To comply with this requirement, a new consumers’ rates policy 
for metropolitan areas stating clearly that rates had to reflect “the real cost of water” was ratified 
by a resolution of the Minister of Urban Affairs (Resolution 120/90, in February) and by Supreme 
Decree 22627 (on October 24, 1990). Following these ratifications, the Minister of Urban Affairs 
approved increases of consumers’ rates that were differentiated for each departmental capital city 
(Resolution 070/91 in March 1991) and automatic indexation of water prices to the US dollar value 
(Resolution 177/91 in May 1991). In the meantime, on October 5, 1990, the municipal council of 
La Paz considered modifying SAMAPA’s board in order to exclude the national government from 
it, and to require all rates’ changes to be approved by the Municipality Council (Ordinance 73/90). 
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However, this ordinance later entered a process of “reconsideration”, and never took force. This 
suggests that there was disagreement with the national government on consumers’ rates, at a time 
when La Paz mayor (Ronald MacLean) was from the same coalition than the president (ADN-
MIR) (Prada et al., 1995; Machicado Terán, 1997; Villegas López, 1998; Vargas Vucsanovich, 
1994). 
Third, from 1992 until the privatization of SAMAPA, increases of water prices took place, as 
shown by the real water prices in La Paz/ El Alto between 1992 and 1996 (see Graph 1; Candia 
Aliaga, 2002; CEDIB, 1997). Additionally to adjustments resulting from the indexation to the US 
dollar, four significant hikes took place, as illustrated by Graph 2 and explained in details hereafter.  
Graph 1. Real Water Prices in La Paz/ El Alto for 10 m3, 1992-1998  
 
Sources : Monthly average prices for 10 m3 of water for La Paz/ El Alto, Bolivian national 
statistics institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas – INE). Data on water prices started 





Graph 2. Cumulative Changes of Real Water Prices for 10 m3 in La Paz/ El Alto and of 
Bolivianos US Exchange Rate (in Percentage, since January 1992) 
 
Sources : Percentages are computed from data of the INE (water prices in La Paz/ El Alto) 
and the Central Bank of Bolivia (US-BOL exchange rate).   
 
As evidenced in Graph 1: two hikes of 22% and 26%9 took place, respectively, between May and 
July 1992 (right after the Law of Privatization was enacted on April 24, 1992, by the president Paz 
Zamora) and between January and March 1993 (following the adoption of a new regulation for 
water services by Ministerial Resolution 510/92 in October 1992). At that time, Julio Mantilla 
(from the CONDEPA party that supported the president) was mayor of La Paz and was involved 
in the approbation of these hikes, as the president of SAMAPA. There was no political conflict 
reported in the newspapers about these hikes (CEDIB, 1992; 1993), suggesting that when ties 
between the mayor and the president were strong, hikes were adopted smoothly.  
Another rates increase, out of the indexation-to-the-US-dollar pattern, took place between August 
and October 1994, following the enactment of the Ley de Capitalización on March 21, 1994. 
                                                          
 
9 According to data from the INE on monthly average prices of water for 10 m3. 
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However it was of 11%, therefore much smaller (half) than the previous ones. This was the result 
of a compromise between the mayor and national government that were not strongly tied. Indeed, 
in 1994 the mayor of La Paz was Monica Medina de Palenque, from CONDEPA, a party that was 
not supporting the president elected in 1993 (Sánchez de Lozada). After the resignation of 
SAMAPA’s general manager at the beginning of 1994 both authorities openly disagreed on the 
nomination of a new one for months (between March and July 1994). Diverging views on the 
“necessity” for SAMAPA to increase consumers’ rates were also expressed publicly in April 1994 
by the interim general manager (saying there was no need for any increase) and the marketing 
manager. In July 1994 the interim general manager was finally confirmed in its position until the 
end of 1994, a compromise was apparently made between the national government and the 
Municipality about the management of SAMAPA, and its consumers’ rates, which were increased 
precisely the following month, but only of 11% (CEDIB, 1994). They were not further increased 
after October 1994 (besides the indexation to the US dollar) until April 1997 (see Graph 2). 
Between October 1994 and early 1997 Monica Medina and then Ronald MacLean (ADN) were 
mayors of La Paz, both from parties not supporting the MNR president (Sánchez de Lozada). These 
weak ties between the mayor and the president apparently discouraged the increase of consumers’ 
rates.   
The increase of SAMAPA consumers’ rates between April and October 1997 (as shown in Graph 
1) distinguished itself from other increases, given its approval process was delayed and contested 
over various months. Approved by SAMAPA’s board on October 7th, 1996 (Resolution 44/96) and 
the national government the same month (to be implemented in December 1996), this increase was 
not approved by La Paz Municipality until April 29th, 1997 (Resolution 32/97). Although it was 
first intended to be retroactively applied to March bills, its implementation was finally delayed 
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(Laurie and Crespo, 2007: 247; CEDIB, 1997). It was reported in newspapers that Ronald 
MacLean, who was destitute on January 6th, 1997 by his own coalition, was responsible for 
postponing the implementation of the increase. Once Gabriela Candia (from the ADN party, like 
the president) became mayor, the council approved the rates’ increase and intended to implement 
it retroactively to March but the retroactivity was contested legally by Guido Riveros (deputy of 
the MIR party, not part of the coalition of the president), who won his case. The increase was 
finally implemented but not retroactively (starting in April 1997). An interviewee involved in the 
privatization process of SAMAPA described: “there was support from La Paz mayor, who was 
then presiding SAMAPA’s board of directors. There was sufficient support from her. […] In the 
case of SAMAPA [where there was no opposition from the mayor, contrary to the case of 
SEMAPA], [consumers’ rates] were increased prior [to the concession]” (author’s translation, see 
Appendix 2). The mayor of El Alto, Alberto Jiménez, from CONDEPA, along with various local 
organizations, largely opposed the rates’ increase, which was also implemented in El Alto 
(although the municipality of El Alto had no control over SAMAPA)10. It made no doubt that the 
rates increase was associated with the concession process, as mentioned by different political and 
social actors publicly, like the president of the Citizen Committee Pro La Paz: “The president of 
the Comité Cívico pro La Paz, Jorge Nemer, pointed out that the aim of the new pricing regime 
was that SAMAPA be transferred to private owners with better profitability. This process is 
therefore more beneficial to private interests than to the peoples” (Última Hora, 1997; author’s 
translation). According to various national newspapers articles, a 1997 World Bank report would 
                                                          
 
10 SAMAPA provided water to La Paz and El Alto, but the Municipality of El Alto had no representative in SAMAPA’s 
board, as the latter was created when El Alto was part of the municipality of La Paz, and not changed when El Alto 
was created as an independent municipality (in 1985). 
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indeed state that Gabriela Candia had compromised to implement the rates’ increase prior to the 
concession of SAMAPA (to a World Bank mission visiting Bolivia in April) (CEDIB, 1997; 1998). 
SAMAPA’s concession was adjudicated to Aguas del Illimani in the last days of July 1997, about 
10 days before the new elected president Hugo Bánzer took power (who did so on August 6). An 
interviewee involved in the privatization process described the pressure there was within the team 
to conclude by the end of de Lozada’s mandate, and that the process was adapted to this calendar: 
“We had considered the possibility of having a law for the water sector prior to the concession, 
but we had to manage with the secondary legal framework because there was no time to adopt a 
law. The capitalization process was coming to an end, the government would change in August 
1997, […] and the mandate of the [Capitalization] Ministry was also coming to an end” (author’s 
translation, see Appendix 2).   
In sum, the consumers’ rates were increased in road toward the privatization of SAMAPA when 
the municipal government of La Paz (and especially its mayor) was strongly tied politically to the 
national government.  
3.3. Changes in Consumers’ Rates Prior to the SEMAPA Concession 
Like for La Paz/ El Alto, drinking-water consumers’ rates in Cochabamba increased significantly 
at different moments prior to the concession. These increases resulted from four main forces: 1) 
inflation and rationalization, 2) foreign loans requirements, and 3) the preparation for privatization.  
First, in 1985, like for other departmental capital cities, ministerial resolutions of the Urbanism 
and Housing Minister approved increases for SEMAPA, given the inflationary crisis and constant 
increases of wages (Resolutions 040/1985, 110/85, 125/85, 168/85 and 227/85). SEMAPA, who 
was under the supervision of the Urbanism Minister in 1986, had also the rationalization of its 
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consumers’ rates approved in 1986 and 1988 (Resolutions 168/86, 1/88). An increase due to 
inflation was also approved in 1991 (Resolution 048/91).    
Second, in the early 1990s, increases of SEMAPA consumers’ rates were also required for 
negotiating foreign loans. As detailed for the case of SAMAPA, the negotiation of loan 2187-BO 
of the World Bank also required an increase of consumers’ rates of SEMAPA by 25% (that was 
ratified by Ministerial Resolution 197/90 in April 1990) and the adoption of a financial policy 
defining that rates would reflect “the real cost of water” (which was done by Ministerial Resolution 
120/90 and Supreme Decree 22627; see World Bank, 1998: 5, 25). This policy was followed by 
an increase of consumers’ rates in March 1991 (Ministerial Resolution 070/91) and an automatic 
indexation of water prices to the US dollar value starting in May 1991 (Resolution 177/91) (Prada 
et al., 1995; Vargas Vucsanovich, 1994). Moreover, in 1992, an additional increase of SEMAPA 
consumers’ rates took place (out of the trend of the indexation to the US dolar value). It was 
implemented between May and August 1992, in order for SEMAPA to “become creditworthy” 
(Resolution 273/92; author’s translation). It was ratified a few weeks after Fernando Rivas became 
the interim Cochabamba mayor in the midst of the municipal council crisis (Municipal Resolution 
933 of June 9, 1992). Newspapers did not report any political or popular contestation or opposition 
to this increase (CEDIB, 1992). An ex-manager of SEMAPA stated that these increases were not 
approved to prepare the privatization of SEMAPA, which was not discussed locally before mid-
1993 (Interview with ex-manager of SEMAPA).  
Third, between 1994 and 1999, as SEMAPA had embarked on the road toward its privatization, 
consumers’ rates increased significantly at different specific moments, additionally to the clear 
trend of incremental increases relatively aligned with the indexation to the US dollar which, 
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according to the general manager of SEMAPA during this period, was applied every three months 
(Interview with Roberto Prada; CEDIB, 1993; 1994; see Graphs 3 and 4).  
Graph 3. Real Monthly Water Prices in Cochabamba, 1992-1999  
 
Sources : Monthly average prices of water for Cochabamba, Bolivian national statistics 
institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas – INE). Data on water prices started to be compiled 
on its own in 1992. 
Graph 4. Cumulative Changes of Real Monthly Water Prices in Cochabamba and of 
Bolivianos US Exchange Rate (in Percentage, since January 1992) 
 
Sources : Percentages are computed from data of the INE (water prices in Cochabamba) and the 
















































































































































































































Between the 1992 hike and the 1994 one, consumers’ rates were increased incrementally, 
following the indexation to the US dollar. Interestingly, however, there was an intent to increase 
rates during this period that was initially blocked, later conditionally approved (but delayed) by 
the municipal council, and finally put in effect by the national government in March 1994. 
SEMAPA asked the municipal council to approve increases in March-April 1993, which it rejected 
until July (after De Lozada was elected president). At the end of August, the council approved the 
request of SEMAPA for an increase (about half of the one originally requested), but made it 
conditional on the popular acceptance of it; different councilmembers publicly stated that they did 
not want to take only upon themselves this important responsibility. Social organizations rejected 
the increase, which finally was not formally approved by the municipal council, although 
SEMAPA’s general manager declared to the press the increase could have taken place easily as 
the national government was supporting it and had also the jurisdiction to approve it (CEDIB, 
1993).  
In March 1994, the rates were finally increased, with formal approval of the national government. 
The city council did not then protest nor oppose publicly the decision of increasing rates of the 
national government, suggesting agreement (CEDIB, 1994). The varying position of the municipal 
council regarding this increase can be associated with the variation of the composition of the 
national government and the municipal council and, therefore, the ties between them. With the 
1993 general election (held in early June), the MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada became 
president, supported by the MBL and MRTK. In parallel to this, Manfred Reyes Villa left the ADN 
party and became a MBL mayor candidate for municipal elections (held in early December), which 
he won with a strong majority. The divided municipal council was replaced by one in which 8 out 
of 12 councilmembers were from the MBL party, a party that was part of the president’s coalition.  
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As local and national authorities were strongly tied, increases of consumers’ rates were not 
contested nor publicly opposed by authorities and, after the increase in early 1994, others followed 
in 1995 and 1996 (see Graphs 3 and 4). The mayor, who was also the president of SEMAPA, and 
therefore part of SEMAPA’s board of directors that approved all of these increases, defended the 
1996 increase when complaints from the population and the Federación Departamental de Juntas 
Vecinales were raised in March 1996. Local and national authorities were then working together, 
to increase consumers’ rates and prepare the concession of SEMAPA (CEDIB, 1994; 1995; 1996; 
Maldonado Rojas, 2004: 57-59). According to one of SEMAPA’s general manager in the 1990s, 
it was clear that SEMAPA was then embarked on the road toward privatization: “at that moment 
[in 1993-1994] privatizing views appeared” (author’s translation, see Appendix 2). 
These regular increases of consumers’ rates since 1994 stopped around mid-1996. From then until 
the first concession process of SEMAPA (that was expected to be concluded by August 6, 1997, 
prior to the change of president, in parallel to the SAMAPA concession), there was no further 
increases of consumers’ rates, nor indexation to the US dollar value (see Graphs 3 and 4). 
According to an IDB memo, the 1996 increase “was implemented to allow the company to cover 
its operating and maintenance costs and full depreciation of its fixed assets” (IADB, 1996: 24). 
Yet, consumers’ rates had to be further increased for the privatization process to proceed. An 
interviewee involved in the first bidding process of SEMAPA mentioned: “we considered 
increasing consumers’ rates prior to the concession, but there was then opposition from the mayor” 
(author’s translation, see Appendix 2). While the mayor was opposing the increase of consumers’ 
rates it was also evident that the national and municipal governments were disagreeing about 
SEMAPA’s concession process. This conflict was publicly evidenced when the national 
government (in May 1996) modified the composition of SEMAPA’s board (in May 1996) by 
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removing the mayor from the presidency and lowering the relative power of Cochabamba’s 
municipality (Supreme Decree 24298), and when the president of the municipal council publicly 
stated that the council had to see the details of the contract to approve it (in July 1996) (CEDIB, 
1996). From then on until the end of the mandate of de Lozada, the president de Lozada and the 
mayor Reyes Villa have openly disagreed regarding SEMAPA’s future (including on SEMAPA’s 
board composition). Negotiations and discussions took place between both levels of government, 
but were not successful to reach and implement a common agreement11. The mayor lead the 
opposition to the national government’s (excluding) privatization process and appealed on the 
grounds of the unconstitutionality to the modification of SEMAPA’s board and of the invalidity 
of the international public bidding call for the capitalization of SEMAPA (CEDIB, 1996; 1997; 
Interview with Claudia Vargas). ADN deputy Tito Hoz de Vila took side with Cochabamba’s 
mayor, a position that confirmed that the broken alliance between the newly-created NFR and the 
party of the president (MNR) was determinant of the new trend of policies regarding consumers’ 
rates and the privatization of SEMAPA. This new trend included a concession contract that 
considered increasing consumers’ rates after the concession (CEDIB, 1996; 1997). The broken 
alliance was evidenced again on de Lozada’s last days as president, as he modified again 
SEMAPA’s board not designating Cochabamba’s mayor as the president and reaffirming that the 
Superintendencia was in charge of the bidding process (Supreme Decree 24767, July 31, 1997). 
By then, the 1997 bidding call for the privatization of SEMAPA had finally been suspended, but 
                                                          
 
11 An agreement was reported to have been reached in mid-March 1997 but one week after the mayor was complaining 
that the national government was not taking action: “The behavior of the central government is miserable. The honour 
commitments made are useless.” The national government replied saying they would take action, but postponed doing 
so and finally did not (quote from Los Tiempos, 1997, author’s translation; CEDIB, 1997). 
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not cancelled (concluding the bidding process within four months, with the new elected president, 
was publicly presented as a possibility) (CEDIB, 1997). 
Small increases of consumers’ rates (corresponding approximately to adjustment of the indexation 
to the US dollar value of the past year) occurred between September and November 1997, little 
after the new ADN president (Hugo Bánzer) took power and changed the SEMAPA board back to 
its original composition, with Cochabamba’s mayor as its president (Supreme Decree 24828). The 
relationships between the Cochabamba mayor and the president were then relatively good (Oporto 
Castro, 2007: 22-23) and small increases (less than 3% in total) also took place during the first 
months of 1998 (see Graph 3). In November 1997, the Superintendent of Waters (Superintendente 
de Aguas) stated that SEMAPA’s consumers’ rates were not covering administrative, operational 
and maintenance costs, implying increases would be required for privatization (CEDIB, 1997). 
But these increases were not implemented right away. A few weeks later, the Superintendent stated 
that the privatization process encountered another pitfall: severe shortage of water supplies was 
expected for 1998. It was confirmed a few months later that low rains limited drastically sources 
of water of SEMAPA for 199812. Rationing measures were implemented starting in mid-March 
1998. Nevertheless, in July shortage of water was already very severe (still months away from the 
rain season). Although some residents were billed despite not receiving water, this sustainable 
water shortage resulted in monthly average water prices in Cochabamba going down, as shown in 
Graph 3 (CEDIB, 1997; 1998). As this water crisis unfolded, opposition from irrigators to water 
policies organized itself and became increasingly important, including a massive demonstration in 
                                                          
 
12 Additionally, there were strong opposition to the perforation of deep and semi-deep wells in regions around of 
Cochabamba, complicating seriously the provision of water for SEMAPA. Water sources of SEMAPA and scarcity 
of water is a recurrent issue in Cochabamba’s history (see Hines, 2016). 
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August 1998 of 20 000 of them (Fernández, 2004). The second bidding call for the concession of 
SEMAPA (in 1998) was unsuccessful.  
From then on, the national and municipal governments negotiated the conditions of the concession: 
the main point left to agree on (in July 1998) was water prices. The national government suggested 
an increase of 20% of rates prior to the concession to be implemented before the end of 1998. The 
public position of the mayor (reported in national newspapers) was ambivalent: first disagreeing 
(in July), then agreeing (in August), then disagreeing (in November, as the proposal was first 
rejected by SEMAPA’s board), then finally agreeing for the measure to be implemented by January 
1999 (CEDIB, 1998). Finally, the measure was not implemented prior to the concession. It was 
agreed that rates would be increased by 35% at the time of concession (on January 1st, 2000)13, 
and by 20% after 1 or 2 years (Vera Varela, 2001; García Orellana et al., 2003). Essentially, the 
local and national governments authorized this increase, but decided not to proceed with it 
themselves, prior to privatization. As an interviewee who participated in the Water War reported: 
“In December the bills were sent. The municipal elections were over. This had also been politically 
very well planned” (author’s translation, see Appendix 2). By 1999 the ties between the mayor’s 
party (NFR) and the president’s party (ADN) were weaker than in 1997, since they were opponents 
in the 1999 Cochabamba municipal election and since the “megacoalition” of the president was 
more fragmented (Lozada Pereira and Saavedra Mogro, 1998). Moreover, from September 1998 
on, the increases of rates and the concession were increasingly encountering opposition of local 
organizations in Cochabamba, which organized various protests; this opposition movement 
                                                          
 
13 The level of the hike varied according to household category and consumption, from values between 10-17% and 
106-120%, and even higher according to some social actors (Maldonado Rojas, 2004; Mélançon, 2005; Aguas del 
Tunari S.A., 2000; Oporto Castro, 2007; Olivera, 2004). 
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accelerated in 1999 (and led to the so-called Cochabamba Water War at the end of 1999 and early 
2000) (CEDIB, 1998; Coordinadora, 1999; 2000). 
3.4. Changes in Drinking-Water Quality Prior to SAMAPA and SEMAPA Concessions 
Across Bolivia in the 1980s and 1990s drinking-water quality remained self-controlled by water 
providers, and there were no obligations nor regulations about the methods and frequency of the 
control of drinking-water quality (Prada et al., 1995; Oficina Internacional del Agua, 1999; 
LRCCA, 1984). Unsurprisingly, there are therefore little data on drinking-water quality for this 
time period.  
In 1979 SAMAPA was the only water service with SAGUAPAC (in Santa Cruz) to control the 
quality of water in Bolivia (PAHO/WHO and World Bank, 1979, quoted by LRCCA, 1984: 2). 
Nevertheless, the Programa de Control de la Calidad del Agua, Proyecto Etapa Inicial de La Paz 
implemented in 1985-1987 found bacteriological contamination in sampling points of the 
Achachicala and Pampahasi systems, and chemical contamination (of manganese) in sampling 
points of the Achachicala system (IIS, 1987; Villalba Asebey, 2006; Quiroga et al., 1999). The 
turbidity of the water and the high-cost treatment that had to be applied to water in the Achachicala 
treatment plant lead many to still consider drinking-water quality an issue in the early and mid-
1990s, despite a 1994 study of ANESAPA and SAMAPA itself arguing SAMAPA waters were of 
good quality in 1994 (CEDIB, 1994; PAHO-Bolivia, 1989). A report from the Controlaría 
General de la República of 1996 concluded that the waters of the Achachicala treatment plant did 
not reach drinking-water standards, especially given the risk of (re)contamination in the 
distributive network. This risk of recontamination of drinking water in the network was indeed 
said by two interviewees who actively participated in SAMAPA’s concession to be the biggest 
challenge in La Paz, given the sewage system was left to be largely expanded. And, although the 
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concession contract included the construction of a (highly needed) treatment plant, it was planned 
only in the second five-year plan. Finally, despite official good self-control results, issues of 
turbidity and recontamination in the network were still part of the public discussion after 1997, 
since they could not be solved prior to the concession, nor early into it (CEDIB, 1996; 1997; 1998; 
Vargas García, 1998).  
In Cochabamba, the first laboratory to control drinking-water quality was created in 1983 
(LRCCA, 1984). The first analyses of drinking-water quality in 1983-1984 done by the laboratory 
showed high levels of bacteriological contamination and iron in the whole area tested, which 
included but was not limited to SEMAPA’s network). At least at some points of SEMAPA’s 
network, there was bacteriological contamination, despite the development of a sewage system in 
the early 1980s (including a wastewater treatment plant) (LRCCA, 1984; Sánchez, 1993). 
SEMAPA maintained publicly over the 1990s that the quality of the water they provided was of 
good quality, and specifically, not bacteriologically contaminated, although some cases of 
contamination were reported publicly and documented by the laboratories of the Universidad 
Mayor de San Simón (CEDIB, 1993; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). Control of drinking-water quality 
was originally (and until approximately 1997) done at the exit of the treatment plant, and not in 
the tanks nor the distribution network (Interview with SEMAPA worker). Indeed, a 1996 report of 
the Controlaría General de la República stated that the quality of the water at the exit of the Cala 
Cala treatment plant was respecting standards of quality, but that in pumping stations water had 
not enough chlorine left and was bacteriologically contaminated. This contamination came from 
leaks in the (deteriorating) distribution and wastewater network (Oficina Internacional del Agua, 
1999; CEDIB, 1995; 1997; 1998; Interview with SEMAPA managers in the 1990s and 
independent expert). Although the creation of a Laboratory Unit around 1997 allowed to monitor 
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regularly the quality of water in tanks and the distribution network and the Cala Cala treatment 
plant was rehabilitated and expanded by March 1998, issues with the recontamination of water in 
the distribution systems were still not resolved by the end of 1999, when SEMAPA was conceded. 
Indeed the contract obligations of the licensee included the expansion of treatment plants, and the 
general manager of SEMAPA who took over when the concession contract was reverted 
mentioned: “We documented that drinking water was contaminated by wastewater because [their 
respective networks] were one next to the other” (author’s translation, quote from Interview with 
Jorge Alvarado, see Appendix 2; see also CEDIB, 1998). 
3.5. Summary of Analysis for Bolivian Cases 
Table 5 summarizes the values of the independent and dependent variables for the two Bolivian 
subnational cases.  
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Overall, Bolivian concessions of drinking-water services suggest that, in a setting in which ties 
between the privatization deciders are strong but not institutionalized, measures that may be 
adopted prior to privatization are limited to short-term revenue-enhancing and limited quality-
improvement measures (Hypothesis 1.2). Indeed, increases of consumers’ rates that did take place 
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were implemented over short periods of time and rather drastically. As for drinking-water quality 
measures requiring a longer term perspective, like replacing large parts of the distribution network 
to prevent recontamination, they could not be implemented prior to concessions (given the non-
institutionalized ties between deciders).  
The adoption of these short-term revenue-enhancing and limited quality-improvement measures is 
not, however, always possible. Bolivian cases suggest it requires strong ties (although not 
institutionalized) ties between deciders and the absence of an external challenge to the privatization 
process (Hypothesis 2.2). These conditions were met for SAMAPA’s concession in 1992-1993 
and 1997 and indeed lead to strong hikes of consumers’ rates in mid-1992, early 1993 and mid-
1997. Improving drinking-water quality would have required replacing large parts of the 
distribution network, and these short periods of times when deciders were tied did not allow to 
progress significantly in that direction (which would have required a longer time horizon). In 
Cochabamba, ties between local and national authorities were strong for most of the period 
between 1993 and 1999, except for a short interlude of approximately a year (from mid-1996 until 
mid-1997). However, the privatization process was challenge by the outside, as Cochabamba 
population faced water shortage and opposed increases of consumers’ rates in 1998-1999. Between 
1993 and 1996, as ties were strong and there was no external challenge, consumers’ rates were 
increased significantly and regularly and some measures to improve drinking-water quality were 
developed (for instance the expansion of the treatment plant and monitoring). These latter still did 
not solve the issues encountered with drinking-water quality, which would have required higher 
and longer-term investments. When Cochabamba population faced water shortage and opposed 
increases of consumers’ rates, no measures to increase rates were adopted, even when local 
authorities were strongly tied to the national government.  
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Finally, when ties between privatization deciders are weak, Bolivian cases suggest that no 
measures will be implemented prior to privatization to lessen the shock of the process (neither 
long-term nor short-term) (Hypothesis 1.3). When the national and municipal governments were 
not part of the same alliance (in La Paz between mid-1993 and early1997; in Cochabamba between 
mid-1996 and mid-1997), consumers’ rates were not increased prior to the concession of 
SAMAPA and SEMAPA, and there was no significant quality-improving measures adopted.  
4. Chile: Eight Successive Regional Water Concessions14    
Like other neoliberal reforms in Chile, the process that led to the privatizations of water and 
sanitation services started under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. The sector was restructured 
starting with the creation of a national coordinating entity, the SENDOS (Servicio Nacional de 
Obras Sanitarias) in 1977, but it was really with the promulgation, between 1988 and 1990, of a 
series of decrees and laws establishing a new regulatory framework that the road toward the 
privatization of drinking water and services was embarked on concretely (Valenzuela and 
Jouravlev, 2007: 17; Cariola and Alegría, 2004: 67-68).  
It was however after the democratic transition and under governments of the Concertación (which 
privatized various state-owned enterprises between 1990 and 2010) that these privatizations took 
place (Maillet, 2013). Indeed water services in all regions of Chile were successively privatized 
between 1993 and 2004, but not all took the form of concessions. Besides the first small-scale 
“trials of different privatization type” in 1993 in Valdivia (region XIV) and in 1995 in Litoral Sur 
                                                          
 
14 As previously mentioned, this paper analyzes only concessions and no other types of privatization although some 
others are part of the description of water privatizations in Chile in the first paragraphs of this section.  
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(region V)15, the first privatizations were made through the progressive sale of actions of public 
water providers of the regions of Valparaiso (region V), Santiago (metropolitan region), Bío-Bío 
(region VIII), Los Lagos (region X), and O’Higgins (region VI). The sale of actions of all these 
water companies started under Eduardo Frei’s presidency (between 1998 and 2000) and continued 
in the 2000s.  
Ricardo Lagos, who assumed presidency starting in 2001, followed up Frei’s privatization agenda 
of water and sanitation services for other regions, but through 30-year concession contracts. These 
concessions took place successively in the regions of the Maule (region VII) in 2001, in the region 
of Aysén (region XI) in 2002, in the four Northern regions of the Atacama Desert (regions I, II, III 
and IV, including region XIV with region I) in 2003-2004, and in the region of Araucanía (region 
IX) and Magallanes (region XII) in 2004 (Valenzuela and Jouravlev, 2007: 25; Cariola and 
Alegría, 2004: 76-77; Selman Biester et al., 2006; SISS, 2011). 
4.1. 1988-1990: A Period of Transition and Uncertainty   
At the end of the 1980s, there was strong political uncertainty. Although Pinochet was still in 
power, a coalition of Socialists and Social Democrats was emerging as a political force of 
opposition. On October 5, 1988, the plebiscite asking whether the population agreed for Pinochet 
to remain in power for ten more years took place. Since the later was lost by the dictatorship, 
negotiations took place between the dictatorship and the coalition to agree on amendments to the 
1980 constitution. An agreement was reached and presented to the population in a second 
plebiscite which took place on July 30, 1989 and in which the amended constitution was approved. 
                                                          
 
15 These first privatizations are characterized this way by the representatives of the SISS themselves (Espinoza Sarria 
and Rodriguez Sandoval, 2008). 
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In December 1989 a new president (and Parliament) was elected and he took office on March 11, 
1990. Candidates for the presidential election were only announced in July 1989, and the post-
election outcome was uncertain. 
While Pinochet and its junta were still in power in 1988-1990, and definitely controlling the 
decision-making process, the ties between privatization deciders cannot be considered as 
institutionalized because there was a lot of uncertainty around the follow-up of the 1989 elections 
and what the electoral results would be (indeed a shift of government took place). What were to 
become strongly institutionalized coalitions were at a stage of formation and consolidation. In this 
setting, we consider ties between deciders to be strong but not institutionalized: we would therefore 
expect the adoption of short-term revenue-enhancing measures (for instance quick and drastic 
increases of consumers’ rates) and short-term quality-enhancing measures following the first 
legislative step toward the privatization of water and sanitation services (in 1988-1989). 
4.2. Post-1990: Institutionalized Ties between Privatization Deciders 
It became quickly evident that the 1990 negotiated transition led to a relative stability of interparty 
competition. The constitution adopted under Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1980 and amended 
in 1989 maintained the binomial electoral system (at the national level), such that in each senatorial 
district and in each Chamber-of-Deputies electoral district, the two candidates with most votes got 
elected (or on the two most-voted lists; to have two candidates from the same list elected, the most 
successful list must double up the number of votes of the second list). This binominal electoral 
system was combined with two strongly institutionalized opposing coalitions (Concertación and 
Alianza), such that they usually each got one seat in each district (Huneeus, 2005).  
The Chilean (post-transition) party system has traditionally been classified as institutionalized in 
the literature (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Kaufman, 2010), especially on the basis of its low 
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electoral volatility. While Luna and Altman (2011) recently argued that the Chilean system (in the 
2000s) was not as institutionalized as portrayed in the literature and that important nuances had to 
be added, they still found that at the national level there was low electoral volatility. In the 1989, 
1993 and 1999 presidential elections, the Concertación obtained respectively 55, 58 and 51% (2nd 
turn) of the vote, and the Alianza 29, 24 and 49% (2nd turn). For deputy elections, the Concertación 
also obtained clear majorities during all the period: nationally it got 51% in 1989, 55% in 1993, 
51% in 1997 and 48% in 2001 (more than 3% over the Alianza, who got 34, 37, 36, and 44% of 
the vote in these elections). The repartition of votes for deputy elections by circumscriptions (there 
the Concertación was the first majority or the second one), given the binomial system, guaranteed 
a relative stability of the weight of the Concertación in the House of Representatives. In the 
Senate’s elections, the Concertación had nationally the first majority in all regions of Chile, and 
these regional majorities varied between 37 and 66% in 1989, between 45 and 57 % in 1993, 
between 45 and 68% in 1997, and between 39 and 61% in 2001. Nevertheless, it was not 
majoritarian in the Senate, because the latter was constituted with 38 elected, 9 designated and up 
to 2 lifelong members between 1990 and 2006 (data from the Servicio Electoral de Chile).  
In post-1990 Chile interparty competition and party coalitions were highly stable; the negotiated 
transition had taken place while smoothing uncertainties. The composition of the two chambers of 
Congress was relatively stable, and the president was always from the Concertación coalition (that 
had majority in the House of Commons but not the Senate). Overall, the privatization deciders had 
strong institutional ties between them.  
Also noteworthy is the fact that other political actors that were not deciders for the privatization 
process were also often institutionally tied to the government. Regional authorities were nominated 
by the national government, therefore being directly dependent on this same system. At the 
73 
 
municipal level, elections were held every four years, and the mayors were usually affiliated with 
one of the two main national coalitions and the councillors were from parties and sub-coalitions 
of these main coalitions, with some rare exceptions. Table 6 lists mayors of the eight regional 
capital cities where urban water services were privatized by concession, with their political 
affiliation in the municipal elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004. It comes out clearly that all mayors 
(except two) who governed between 1996 and 2004 were affiliated with one of the two main 
coalitions. These two exceptions are Jorge Soria Quiroga in Iquique and Daniel Adaro Silva in 
Antofagasta, who both won the 2004 elections as independents. In Iquique, the mayor Jorge Soria 
had been elected in 2000 as an independent on the Concertación list but he and the Concertación 
broke their institutional tie between 2000 and 2004. During these years, public conflicts between 
the mayor and the Concertación president were frequent. In 2001, his wife (publicly supported by 
the mayor) postulated as an independent in senatorial elections. The mayor also created his own 
party in December 2003, and won the 2004 municipal election with this new party with more than 
50% of the vote (El Mercurio de Antofagasta, 2001; El Mercurio, 2001; La Estrella de Iquique, 
2003a; 2003b; Observatorio Político Electoral ICSO-UDP, 2011). In Antofagasta, Daniel Adaro 
became mayor in August 2003, prior to the election, since the mayor (from the Partido Democráta 
Cristiano – PDC) in power died and he was the most-voted councilmember of the list. For the 
2004 election, he was not chosen as the PDC candidate for mayor, and therefore decided to 
postulate as an independent. Nevertheless, the other parties of the Concertación (PRSD, PPD and 
PS) supported his candidacy from October 2003, so although he was independent, his ties with the 




Table 6. Elected Mayors of Capital Cities of Regions where Water Services were Privatized 
by Concession in Chile, Municipal Elections 1996-2004    
Municipal 
Election 
1996 2000 2004 
Arica Iván Paredes Fierro, PS 
(Concertación) 
Carlos Valcarce Medina, 
RN (Alianza por Chile) 
Carlos Valcarce Medina, RN 
(Alianza por Chile) 
Iquique Jorge Soria Quiroga, PPD  
(Concertación) 
Jorge Soria Quiroga, Ind. 
(Concertación)   
Jorge Soria Quiroga, Ind. 
(Nueva Fuerza Regional) 
Antofagasta Pedro Araya Ortiz, PDC 
(Concertación) 
Pedro Araya Ortiz, PDC 
(Concertación) (July 24, 
2003) 
(August 6, 2003) Daniel Adaro 
Silva, Independiente 
Copiapó Marcos López Rivera, PS 
(Concertación)  
Marcos López Rivera, PS 
(Concertación)  
Marcos López Rivera, PS 
(Concertación)  
La Serena Adriana Peñafiel Villafañe, 
RN (Unión por Chile)  
Adriana Peñafiel Villafañe, 
RN (Alianza por Chile) 
Raúl Saldívar Auger, PS 
(Concertación) 
Talca Germán Verdugo Soto, Ind. 
(Unión por Chile) 
Germán Verdugo Soto, 
Ind. (Alianza por Chile) 
Patricio Herrera Blanco, PS 
(Concertación) 
Temuco René Saffirio Espinoza, 
PDC (Concertación)  





Coyhaique Carlos Balbontín Balbontín, 
PDC (Concertación)  
David Sandoval Plaza, RN 
(Alianza por Chile) 
David Sandoval Plaza, UDI 
(Alianza por Chile) 
Puntas 
Arenas 
Nelda Panicucci Bianchi, PS 
(Concertación) 
Juan Morano Cornejo, 
PDC (Concertación) 
Juan Morano Cornejo, PDC 
(Concertación) 
Notes: ** Name of mayor followed by the abbreviation of their party and, in parenthesis, their coalition pact. 
** “Ind.” stands for independent, i.e. not member of a party. 
 
In the post-1990 setting in Chile, when there were strong institutionalized ties between 
privatization deciders, we would expect long-term revenue-enhancing and quality-improving 
measures to be put in place prior to privatization, including gradual increases of consumers’ rates 
rather than strong hikes at the moment of concession. Also, when the concession process faced an 
external challenge jeopardizing it, we would expect short-term adjusting measures to be adopted.  
4.3. Changes in Consumers’ Rates Prior to Concessions 
Between 1990 and the year of each concession contract (ranging between 2001 and 2004), rates 
have significantly increased in these eight regional water services in Chile. Graphs 5 and 6 
illustrate the evolution of average regional rates and the regional capital city consumers’ rates. 
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Graphs 5 (-vii, -ix, -xi and –xii). Average Regional Rates and Capital City Consumers’ Rates 









Sources : Data on regional average rates computed on the basis of data of rates in December of each year that were 
reported in SISS’ 1992, 1990-1993, 1995, 2000 reports (Memorias) and SISS’ annual management reports (Informes 
de gestión) from 1997 to 2004. Data on consumers’ rates for 15 m3 in regional capital cities compiled from SISS’ 
1995 report (Memoria) and SISS’ consumers’ rates journal (Boletín de Tarifas) from September 2000 to 2006. The 
Consumer Price Index used for computation comes from data in real 2008 pesos from the Chilean national statistics 




Graphs 6 (-i, -ii, -iii and –iv). Average Regional and Capital City Consumers’ Rates of 







Sources : Data on regional average rates computed on the basis of data of rates in December of each year that were 
reported in SISS’ 1992, 1990-1993, 1995, 2000 reports (Memorias) and SISS’ annual management reports (Informes 
de gestión) from 1997 to 2004. Data on consumers’ rates for 15 m3 in regional capital cities compiled from SISS’ 
1995 report (Memoria) and SISS’ consumers’ rates journal (Boletín de Tarifas) from September 2000 to 2006. The 
Consumer Price Index used for computation comes from data in real 2008 pesos from the Chilean national statistics 
institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas). 
 
These increases showed some similar patterns between regions: a significant increase of real 
average rates between 1990 and 1992, followed by a few years of relative stability and further 
increases starting in the mid-1990s. Overall real average rates increased of at least 300% over a 
period of 12 to 15 years for all regional water services but EMSSAT (that had nevertheless 
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increases of over 200%). Average rates were not necessarily associated with consumers’ rates 
increases, as Graphs 5 and 6 also illustrate, since they also largely depended on cost, including 
investments (which could bring returns a posteriori, especially when leading to expansion of 
services).   
Real consumers’ rates for 15 m3 of water also increased significantly: between 70 to 135% starting 
in 1995, and they were not specially focused on the year of (or the year prior to) the concession. 
In only one case (Iquique, region I), this long-term increase was followed by a very significant 
decrease (over 20%) of consumers’ rates for 15 m3 of water the year before concession. 
All these changes in consumers’ rates were essentially the results of two types of dynamics: first, 
the rate-setting processes modifying rates (by considering parameters of a “model enterprise”) and 
defining their indexation formulas for the following years; and second, the timing of the effective 
expansion of the sewage system and sewage water treatment (where it occurred) which determined 
when new charges associated to the sewage system were included in consumers’ bills (at the rate 
determined by the rate-setting processes).  
The significant increases of rates in 1990-1992 were the result of the first “rate-setting” processes 
following the 1988 decree Ley de Tarifas (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley 70). Parameters and 
methodology to determine the level of these increases were fixed in this decree and Decree 
453/1989, both adopted when Pinochet was still in power. These regulations defined that rates 
would be fixed on the basis of those a “model company” would need to efficiently operate and 
invest. A consultant firm was mandated by the government to suggest rates that would tend to a 
“model company”. These new rates took effect when the (Concertación) government decreed them 
officially in 1990 and 1991 (Decrees 334/1990, 336/1990, 374/1990, 375/1990, 376/1990, 
457/1990, 510/1990 and 511/1990 of the Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción –  
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MEFR). The government also decided that the new rates would be implemented progressively, i.e. 
increased over five years, to limit the impact on the population and potential popular protests. The 
privatization of water and sanitation services was “suspended” but different actors directly 
involved in the sector at that moment sustained the president did not stop it. One actor said: 
“Aylwin decided that we would first see how it would operate and work, and then we would see 
whether we privatize or not.” Another stated: “[Aylwin] did not stop the privatization, he rather 
did everything to make it happen” (author’s translations, see Appendix 2). A SISS report of that 
era also suggests the idea of privatization had not been abandoned (SISS, 1993).  
Only ESSAN (region II) had its rates modified (by decree) between the first and second rate-setting 
processes: in 1993, to add interconnection charges (Decree 567/1993 of the MEFR). This decree, 
as well as the significant expansion of ESSAN’s sewage system in 1993-1994 and the significant 
increase of ESSAT’s proportion of sewage water treated (over 40% of population served) in 1994 
(with the construction of a submarine sewage pipe), generated the important increases in average 
rates noted in these two regions in 1994 (SISS’ reports).  
For all eight regions, second rate-setting processes defined new increases of rates effective in 1996, 
and the “indexation” formulas for the following years (Decrees 801/1995, 230/1996, 231/1996, 
456/1996, 458/1996, 666/1996, 780/1996 and 845/1996 of the MEFR). In regions XI (EMSSA), 
II (ESSAN) and XII (ESMAG) treatment of sewage water was also expanded (of over 50%) in 
(respectively) 1998, 1999 and 2004, which resulted in important increases of consumers’ rates 
(SISS’ reports). New rates were decreed at different moments in each region between 1998 and 
2004, following the modification of the 1988 Ley de Tarifas (by the adoption in 1998 of law 19.549 
modifying the legal regime applicable to water and sanitation services). In May 1995, the bill that 
led to law 19.549 (that, by modifying the legal regime of water and sanitation services, allowed 
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their privatization) had been presented to the senate (initiating the first constitutional procedure 
toward its adoption) (Historia de Ley 19.549). Without any doubt, privatization was concretely in 
the public and political agenda when the second rate-setting processes (in 1996) and the following 
changes of rates (from 1998 on) took place. Besides, when Law 19.549 (adopted in 1998) was 
debated, the possible levels of increases of consumers’ rates were discussed. The initial bill 
suggested to limit increases (from a rate-setting process to another) to 5%, a measure that was 
rejected in the first senatorial commission analyzing the bill (in 1995), where the Alianza coalition 
was majoritarian and voted against (Historia de Ley 19.549). 
In April 2001, the government publicly announced that it would privatize by concessions the eight 
regional water services it still owned. The concession processes, although taking place at the 
national level, were distinct16 for each regional entity. The government decided to start with 
ESSAM and ESSAR (the latter was finally not adjudicated in this bidding process). State 
waterworks unions protested starting in June (especially the ones of ESSAM, ESSAR and 
ESSAT), until the National Federation of Waterworks Employees (Federación Nacional de 
Trabajadores de Obras Sanitarias – FENATRAOS) reached a labor protection agreement with 
the government in August (Business News Americas, 2001; Chile, 2001). The concession of 
ESSAM (in region VII) nevertheless proceeded at the end of 2001. During the bidding process 
(but before the deadline to present offers expired), an agreement was signed specifically with 
ESSAM’s unions including workers’ indemnities (the Convenio Colectivo Complementario de los 
Contratos Colectivos Vigente en ESSAM S.A.) and new rates were decreed (both in September 
                                                          
 
16 Concessions initially considered the concession of each regional water service by itself; in 2003 and 2004 concession 
of packages including 2 of 3 regional services were also made possible (and concluded) (Selman Biester et al., 2006). 
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2001). The rates-setting process had faced disagreements between ESSAM and the SISS which 
could not be overcome by the two protagonists, and were decided upon by an Experts’ Commission 
on July 21. Despite the consumers’ rates increase of 2001, the operational results of ESSAM at the 
end of 2001 and beginning of 2002 were significantly lower compared to the previous year, 
because of workers' indemnity payments and infrastructure donations (Decree 335/2001 of the 
MEFR; Business News America, 2001; 2002; Selman Biester et al., 2006; SISS, 2001). ESSAM’s 
concession did not face other strong external challenge; newspapers did not report any politician 
opposing publicly ESSAM’s concession or the increases of consumers’ rates.  
Starting in 2002 and until their concession, the seven regional water services left to be privatized 
had relatively stable consumers’ rates, except ESMAG (where, as previously mentioned, the 
increase of sewage water treated resulted in increases of rates) and ESSAT (where an important 
decrease of rates, of over 20%, took place in 2003 in Iquique but not in Arica). These rates were 
defined by rate-setting processes that concluded between 2000 and 2003. In all of these processes 
except the one for ESSAT, the SISS and the regional waterworks reached an agreement (Decrees 
42/2000, 728/2000, 263/2001, 334/2001, 412/2001 and 430/2001 of the MEFR). As for ESSAT, 
it disagreed with the SISS on the rates, and therefore an Experts’ Commission fixed the rates 
(Decree 48/2003 of the MEFR). 
Of these seven concession processes (adjudicated between 2002 and 2004), few faced strong 
external challenges (from national politicians, unions or local politicians). Indeed, there was no 
reported opposition from politicians to the concessions in regions IX, XI and XII, and the national 
politicians who publicly opposed concessions of the northern regions (I, II, III and IV) mostly did 
so for a very limited period: in the few months prior to the 2001 parliamentary elections. These 
included a few senate and congress candidates from the Concertación (but not from the socialist 
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party, which was the party of the president). The most active opposition apparently came from 
Antonella Sciaraffia (candidate in the parliamentary elections of 2001, but who wasn’t elected) 
who presented an anti-privatization bill (Business News Americas, 2001). After the parliamentary 
elections, congressmen and senators (from the Concertación and the Alianza) did not oppose 
privatization publicly. Some criticized it but focused on maximizing its profitability to the state 
and its transparency: some legislators from the Concertación questioned which resources would 
stay in the regions; some others from the Partido por la Democracia (also from the Concertación) 
initiated the creation of a Congress committee to investigate the legitimacy and transparency of 
water consumers’ rates; some legislators from the opposition coalition (from the Renovación 
Nacional party) focused on possible government money losses attributed to an undervalued price 
(Diario Financiero, 2003; El Mercurio, 2004; Business News Americas, 2002).  
Besides, there was no major unions’ protests opposing these adjudication processes (from 2002 
until 2004), except in the case of ESSAT. The agreement signed in 2001 with the FENATRAOS 
had also been signed by representatives of regional waterworks’ unions and specific agreements 
were signed with unions from each regional waterworks at the beginning of each bidding process 
(Selman Biester et al., 2006; Business News Americas, 2001).  The labor unions federation 
“Central Unitaria de Trabajadores” argued against concessions in 2003 but stated that they 
focused their actions on “lobbying politicians” rather than protesting publicly (Business News 
Americas, 2003). Only in the case of ESSAT do newspapers reviewed reported local unions’ 
protests (in Iquique). These took place in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and other social organizations also 
joined the opposition to the privatization (La Estrella de Arica, 2003; Aravena, 2003; Business 
News Americas, 2001). 
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 Additionally to these unions’ protests in ESSAT, the mayor of Iquique (supported by the one of 
Arica) publicly and vigorously opposed water concessions. Both mayors notoriously protested and 
organized a rally in Santiago to oppose the concession, especially focusing on the argument of 
possible increases of consumers’ rates, when the first bidding was opened in August 2003. This 
bidding closed inconclusively in December 2003, but a second one opened in 2004, putting out 
ESSAT together with ESSAR and ESMAG in one package, and was successful. Protests had faded 
by the end of 2003 (especially those of the unions and of the Arica mayor), and the privatization 
finally proceeded in 2004 (Business News Americas, 2003; Diario Financiero, 2003; La Estrella 
de Arica, 2003; Aravena, 2003).  
It is noteworthy that an important decrease in consumers’ rates took place prior to the 2003 bidding 
process, in March 2003 in Iquique (the city of the mayor and unions leading the protests) but not 
in Arica, as shown in Graph 7. Consumers’ rates were then maintained relatively stable for the 
following years. It suggests that, considering the unions’ protests and the opposition of the Iquique 
mayor, short-term adjusting measures were adopted prior to the privatization. 
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Graph 7. Evolution of Consumers’ Rates for 15 m3 of Water in Arica and Iquique, 1995-2006 
(in 2008 real pesos) 
 
Sources : Data on consumers’ rates at December 1995 reported in SISS’ 1995 report (Memoria) and 
monthly date reported in SISS’ consumers’ rates journal (Boletín de Tarifas) from September 2000 to 2006. 
 
 
Another concession process was also opposed by a local politician: the one of ESSAN. The mayor 
of Antofagasta (Daniel Adaro) had only come into power in August 2003, after the death of the 
elected mayor. He opposed the concession by striking protests and declarations but, after meeting 
with the President Ricardo Lagos on November 27, 2003, his opposition faded and he said that 
water prices would not raise, that there could be higher water subsidies for the region and that 
regional investments (like a regional hospital) would be possible with the funds generated from 
the concession (Business News Americas, 2003; Diario Financiero, 2003; El Mercurio, 2003). Its 
opposition was apparently “controlled” by the national government, given its institutionalized ties 




















































































































































4.4. Changes in Drinking-Water Quality in Chilean Regional Water Services Prior to Concessions 
As for drinking-water quality, this issue only became important for the government in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The main focus was first essentially on bacteriological quality, which 
started to be monitored by the Health Ministry with the implementation of a national program 
starting in 1980. At the end of the 1980s, the government also drew a (limited) picture of the 
remaining pitfalls of physical and chemical quality of drinking water provided by all regional water 
services (Interviews with Health Ministry’s and SISS’ civil servant; SISS, 1991). It did not, 
however, implement significant measures to improve drinking-water quality at that time, when the 
first legislative steps toward privatization were taken (in 1988-1990). 
The reporting on the monitoring of bacteriological, physical and chemical quality of drinking water 
was systematized starting in 1991, by the SISS. SISS compiled the information reported by the 
main cities’ public water companies on drinking-water quality starting in 1991, on a yearly basis, 
and conducted some parallel controls of quality (Interviews with Magaly Espinosa and SISS’ civil 
servant; SISS, 1991). The reporting included compliance with microbiological, disinfection, 
physical and chemical requirements of the drinking-water quality regulation in-effect (Norma 
Chilena 409 of 1984). Whereas in the early 1990s various water services showed incompliance 
with bacteriological and disinfection standards, the issue was largely taken care of by 1998 (see 
Table 7). Nevertheless SISS parallel controls have found that bacteriological standards were still 
not always met until 2000: for instance, levels of coliforms higher than the national regulation 
were found in Iquique, Pisagua and Alto Hospicio (region I) in August 2000 and in Balmaceda, 
Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén (region XI) in November 2000. By 2001, however, bacteriological 
standards were apparently met in all eight waterworks that were to be privatized by concessions.  
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Table 7. Percentage of Compliance with Bacteriological/ Disinfection Requirements of 
Chilean Regional Water Providers, according to Reported Self-control Results, 1997-2004 
Region,  
Provider* 

















































































































































* Indicates the regional public provider prior to privatization. 
Sources: SISS’ annual reports of drinking-water quality in urban services from 1991 to 2004. 
 
As for chemical quality, chemicals for which the national drinking-water quality standards were 
not met were identified in SISS’ annual reports of drinking-water quality starting in 1991. The 
ones reported not complying the Chilean standard most recurrently were: arsenic, chloride, iron, 
manganese, nitrates and sulfates (according to SISS’ annual reports of drinking-water quality in 
urban services from 1991 to 2004). Of these, SISS focused mainly on nitrates and arsenic at the 
end of the 1990s, which were the two identified by the Health Ministry as “likely to affect users’ 
health” and by the WHO as part of the “few key chemicals [causing] largescale health effects 
through drinking-water exposure” (WHO, 2008). (Furthermore, for all other chemicals of the list, 
the 1984 national regulation stipulated that the Health Ministry could allow higher levels in 
drinking water than the ones fixed by the NCh409 of 1984.) Finally, both for nitrates and arsenic, 
the reported chemical quality of drinking waters reached standards in all eight regional water 
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services prior to their concession. For nitrates, by 1999 all services reported complying with the 
national standard (see Table 8).  
Table 8. Chilean Drinking-water Services Not Complying with the NCh409 for Nitrates, 
1991-2004 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ESSAT (Region I)   
Iquique      X X X       
Alto Hospicio        X       
La Huayca        X       
Arica        X       
ESSAM (Region VII)  
Cauquenes X      X        
Sources: SISS’ annual reports of drinking-water quality in urban services from 1991 to 2004. 
 
For arsenic, it was an issue in urban services in some localities of regions I and II. ESSAN and 
ESSAT reported compliance with the national regulation by 2001 and 2003 (respectively), at least 
one year prior to the adjudication of the concessions in these two regions (see Table 9). Parallel 
controls conducted by the SISS documented that the standard was not yet met in July 2002 in Alto 
Hospicio, La Huayca and Pisagua; and in March 2003 that they were in Iquique and Alto Hospicio, 
but not yet in La Huayca and Pisagua. The following parallel controls conducted by the SISS in 
this region (in 2007), found compliance for arsenic in Iquique, La Huayca, La Tirana, Pisagua and 
Pozo Almonte (SISS’ Parallel Controls 1998-2007).  
Table 9. Arsenic Levels in Chilean Drinking Water Services with Levels Higher than 0.05 
mg/L (NCh409) at Least Once Between 1990 and 2004, according to Waterworks’ Self-
controls (in mg/L) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ESSAT (Region I) 
Iquique >0.05  >0.05          C 0.02 
Alto Hospicio      >0.05     0.07 0.05 C 0.05 
La Huayca  >0.05    >0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 C 0.05 
La Tirana  >0.05            C 0.03 
Pisagua >0.05 >0.05  >0.05  >0.05 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.13 C 0.04 
Pozo Almonte >0.05            C 0.01 
ESSAN (Region II) 
Taltal >0.05     >0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04  C 0.01 
C: indicates level reported to be complying, but level not given. 
Sources: SISS’ annual reports of drinking-water quality in urban services from 1991 to 2004. 
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4.5. Summary of Analysis of Chilean Cases 
Table 10 summarizes the values of the independent and dependent variables for the eight Chilean 
subnational cases.  
Table 10. Summary of Values of Variables in Chilean Cases 
Region (year 
of concession) 





Consumers’ Rates Drinking-Water 
Quality* 
VII (2001) 








Strong increases in 1988-
90; gradual increases in 
1991-2002 (but strong 
decreases of average rates in 
2001 due to workers' 
indemnity payments) 
Improved to main 
standards in 1991-1998 
XI (2003)  Weak 
Strong increases in 1988-
1990; gradual increases in 
1991-2001; stable after 
2001 
Improved to main 
standards in 1991-2001 
II (2003) Weak Improved to main 
standards in 1991-2001 
IV (2003) Weak Improved to main 
standards in 1991-1998 
III (2004) Weak Improved to main 
standards in 1991-1998 








Strong increases in 1988-
1990; gradual increases in 
1991-2002; strong 
decreases in 2003 in 
Iquique  
Improved to main 







Strong increases in 1988-
1990; gradual increases in 
1991-2001; stable after 
2001 
Improved to main 





Weak Strong increases in 1988-
1990; gradual increases in 
1991-2004 
Improved to main 
standards in 1991-1997 
* For all cases: no quality-improving measures in 1988-1990 
 
Overall, Chilean concessions suggest that institutionalized ties between privatization deciders 
indeed lead to pre-privatization measures taken over time, gradually, which lessen the privatization 
shock (Hypothesis 1.1), and that, when these ties are not institutionalized (but strong), short-term 
measures are rather adopted (Hypothesis 1.2). Indeed, between 1988 and early 1990, when there 
was uncertainty about the transition process in Chile, measures adopted toward the privatization 
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of water and sanitation services focused on guaranteeing quick and drastic increases of consumers’ 
rates and did not significantly improve drinking-water quality. Yet, once in power with a 
comfortable majority and in a stable political setting, the Concertación rather opted for gradual 
increases of consumers’ rates, an increasing trend that was perpetrated over more than a decade, 
through different decision-making processes. Simultaneously, from 1991 on, drinking-water 
quality was monitored by the SISS, and incentivized progressive improvements, which led to the 
compliance with main quality standards by the regional water providers before they were 
conceded.  
Moreover, the analysis of the Chilean cases seems to confirm that when an external challenge 
jeopardizes the concession in a setting with institutionalized ties, short-term adjustment measures 
are put in place (Hypothesis 2.1). Strong external opposition to concessions occurred in three 
concession processes in Chile: one that was successful (ESSAM in region VII in 2001) and two 
that were originally inconclusive (ESSAR in region IX in 2001 and ESSAT in region I in 2003). 
In the case of ESSAM, face to strong opposition of workers unions to the concession (as part also 
of a national movement of protest against privatization through concessions), an agreement 
involving indemnity payments was negotiated, despite the fact that it lowered significantly 
profitability of the public service just before the concession and for the first few months of it. In 
the case of ESSAR, unions’ protests took place during the first bidding process in 2001 that ended 
up being inconclusive. Then, starting in 2001, consumers’ rates were maintained relatively stable, 
there was no further strong opposition to the process, and the water services were finally conceded 
in 2004 (through another bidding process). In the case of ESSAT, the concession process was 
jeopardized by the opposition of local unions, social organizations and the mayor of Iquique (who, 
contrary to mayors of Arica and Antofagasta, was likely to foster opposition against the concession 
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since he had conflicts over regional policies with the president and had left the president’s 
coalition). In response to these challenges, consumers’ rates in Iquique were highly decreased prior 
to the call of bids; the protests persisted despite this decrease for some months but finally faded by 
the end of 2003. When a new bidding was opened in 2004, water services were conceded.  
Conclusion 
The results overall suggest that the extent to which privatization deciders implemented preparatory 
measures to ease the privatization of drinking-water services depended heavily on these deciders’ 
time horizon (determined by the political ties between them) and the strength of external challenges 
jeopardizing the processes. Indeed, where ties between deciders were institutionalized, and 
therefore their time horizon longer, preparatory measures were put in place progressively many 
years prior to privatization. Then, if the privatization process faced an external challenge, adjusting 
short-term measures (like consumers’ rates decreases or other revenue-enhancing measures not 
affecting directly the population) could be adopted to limit opposition to the process. When ties 
between deciders were not institutionalized but strong, only short-term preparatory measures could 
be adopted, and they were only put in place if there was no external challenge jeopardizing the 
process. Finally, when ties between deciders were weak (and not institutionalized), no preparatory 
measures were taken.  
In the absence of preparatory measures put in place prior to the privatization process, the cost of 
privatizing has been higher and the privatization process more risky, especially when privatization 
was challenged externally. Interestingly, the cases analyzed suggest that this variation of cost and 
risk tended to impact the privatization process. The case of Cochabamba, in Bolivia, illustrates the 
situation where the privatization process went forward although very little preparatory measures 
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had been put in place and there was a strong external challenge jeopardizing the process. The result 
was that privatization was reverted a few months after the concession and, essentially, never really 
took effect. The cases of regions VII, IX and I in Chile suggest that where gradual preparatory 
measures have been taken gradually over time and the privatization process was challenged 
externally (for instance by unions’ protests), the privatization deciders had more options and 
indeed could put in place adjusting measures prior to proceeding with the privatization in order to 
prevent the expansion of the challenge. In region VII, indemnities were given to workers before 
the water services were finally conceded. In region IX, the first bidding process (challenged by 
unions’ protests) was finally inconclusive and the water services were only conceded three years 
later; in the meantime the consumers’ rates remained stable and the national federation of unions 
signed a labor protection agreement. In region I, although unions first challenged the privatization 
process, the external challenge extended beyond them when local actors and authorities also 
opposed publicly the privatization process. Consumers’ rates were significantly decreased before 
the concession of services finally proceeded.  
On the whole, this paper fosters a better understanding of Latin American water reforms, by 
highlighting that, additionally to decentralization and state capacity (Herrera, 2017; Baer, 2014), 
political ties between deciders are a key explanatory variable for these reforms. Indeed, the ties 
between deciders better explained the variation in preparatory measures over time and between 
subnational units within a single country.  
Moreover, this paper documents and underlines the importance of an overlooked aspect of 
privatization reforms: the preparatory measures a government may (or not) adopt prior to 
privatizing. Taking into account these measures is essential to understand privatization processes, 
and more specifically their real redistributive consequences and the political risk they entail. 
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Preparatory measures may delay the moment privatization is launched, but may also smoothen the 
privatization shock (therefore lowering the risk of privatization reversal and enhancing revenue 
for the firms).   
The conceptualization of this preparation step of the privatization process is also a contribution to 
the policy diffusion literature, which considers the adoption of policies following international or 
foreign influences. Privatization reforms are a great example of policy diffusion, since they were 
highly promoted by transnational actors in the 1980s and 1990s, and largely spread around the 
world. This paper suggests that it is conceptually important to add the (optional) step of preparation 
to the steps of the policy diffusion process already identified in the literature (emergence, 
standardization, spread, adoption, and implementation).  
More generally, the paper contributes to the neo-institutionalist literature by conceptualizing a 
“preparatory” type of gradual policy change that adds to the framework of gradual institutional 
policy change (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). This type of gradual change considers 
a path of successive and different institutional changes: (preparatory) gradual changes followed by 
abrupt changes.   
Finally, on a different note, this paper makes an indirect contribution to the understanding of how 
policy-making interacted with a “negotiated” democratic transition, given the privatization process 
of water services in Chile was started under the Pinochet dictatorial government and finalized after 
the democratic transition. Interestingly, the sector’s reform was slowed down (once it became clear 
that it could not be adopted prior to the transition) as Chile underwent through its democratic 
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Most interviewees requested not to be identified when quoted and not to be named anywhere in 
the dissertation. This is what explains the format of the list of interviewees listed hereafter and 
the way references are made to interviews in the text. 
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 Ana María Romero, Centro Aguas y Saneamiento Ambiental, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Carlos Crespo, CESU, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Claudia Vargas Vucsanovich, expert on water and sanitation, videoconference interview, 
2014. 
 Gover Barja, profesor, Universidad Católica Boliviana, La Paz, 2014. 
 Independent consultant on water and sanitation issues, worked on projects of the World 
Bank in Bolivia (among others), La Paz, 2014. 
 Julián Pérez, CESU, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Patricia Venegas, principal adviser in policies, PERIAGUA (Programa para Servicios 
Sostenibles de  de Agua Potable y Saneamiento en Áreas Periurbanas), GIZ (German 
Technical Cooperation), La Paz, 2013. 
 Ricardo Cisneros, Programa Agua y Saneamiento - Bolivia, World Bank, La Paz, 2014. 
 Rocío Bustamante, Centro AGUA, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, 
2014. 
Public Administration 
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 Civil servant from Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas, La Paz, 2014. 
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 Civil servant 2 from Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (Dirección de Planificación), 
Cochabamba, 2013. 
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2013. 
 Civil servant 1 from Ministerio de Obras públicas, Servicio y Vivienda, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 2 from Ministerio de Obras públicas, Servicio y Vivienda, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 1 from Ministerio de la Presidencia, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 2 from Ministerio de la Presidencia, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant from Health Ministry, 1980s-1990s, phone interview, 2016. 
 Civil servant 1 from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 2 from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 3 from Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, La Paz, 2014. 
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 Civil servant 1 from SENABSA, La Paz, 2013. 
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 Jorge Alvardo, SEMAPA manager in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014.  
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 Roberto Prada Ramírez, SEMAPA manager 1985-1994, independent consultant on water 
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Chile 
Public Administration & Political Representatives 
 Carlos Hurtado Ruiz-Tagle, Minister of Public Works (1990-1994), Santiago, 2015. 
 Jorge Ale Yarad, civil servant of the Ministerio de Economía in the 1980s (in charge of 
the development of the regulatory framework for the water and sanitation sector), 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Magaly Espinosa, superintendent, Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS), 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Instituto Nacional de Normalización (INN) in the 2000s, Santiago, 
2015. 
 Civil servant of the Ministerio de la Salud in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
 Civil servant of the Ministerio de Economía in the 1980s, Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Servicio Nacional de Obras Sanitarias (SENDOS) in the 1980s, 
Santiago, 2015. 
 Civil servant 1 of the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in the 2000s, 
Santiago, 2014. 





Water Providers, Private and International Organizations 
 Alex Chechilnitzky, president, AIDIS (Asociación Interamericana de Ingeniería 
Sanitaria y Ambiental) - Capítulo de Chile, Santiago, 2015. 
 Andrei Jouravlev, CEPAL, Santiago, 2013. 
 Representative, CONADECUS, Santiago, 2014. 
 Representative, Consumers International, Santiago, 2013. 
 Worker of water provider 1 in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
 Worker of water provider 2 in the 1990s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
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Table 11. Excerpts from Interviews Corresponding to Quotes in Text 
Interviewee Quote in Text Original Excerpts from Minutes of 
Interviews 
From Section 3.2 
Interviewee 




“there was support from La Paz mayor, 
who was then presiding SAMAPA’s 
board of directors. There was sufficient 
support from her. […] In the case of 
SAMAPA [where there was no 
opposition from the mayor, contrary to 
the case of SEMAPA], [consumers’ 
rates] were increased prior [to the 
concession]” 
“había apoyo del alcalde de La Paz, 
alcaldesa era en ese momento, que era 
presidenta del directorio de SAMAPA. 
Había bastante apoyo de ella. […] En el 
caso de SAMAPA, por ejemplo [dónde 
no había oposición del alcalde como en 
SEMAPA], se aumentó [la tarifa] antes 
[de la concesión].” 




“We had considered the possibility of 
having a law for the water sector prior 
to the concession, but we had to 
manage with the secondary legal 
framework because there was no time 
to adopt a law. The capitalization 
process was coming to an end, the 
government would change in August 
1997, and the mandate of the 
[Capitalization] Ministry was also 
coming to an end.” 
“Habíamos discutido esa opción, tener 
una ley [del sector] antes [de la 
concesión], pero vimos que teníamos 
que hacer con un marco legal 
segundario, [porque] ya no había tiempo 
para hacer aprobar una ley. Ya se iba a 
terminar el proceso de capitalización. 
Iban a cambiar el gobierno en agosto de 
1997. […] Ya se iba a cambiar el 
gobierno y también se terminaba el 
mandato del ministerio. Iba a 
desaparecer, sólo fue creado por la 
capitalización.”  
From section 3.3 
Ex-manager of 
SEMAPA (1990s) 
“at that moment [in 1993-1994] 
privatizing views appeared” 
“ya en ese momento [en 1993-1994] 
empezaron visiones privatizadoras.” 
Actor involved in 
the first bidding 
process of 
SEMAPA 
“we considered increasing consumers’ 
rates prior to the concession, but there 
was then opposition from the mayor” 
“se consideró [aumentar la tarifa antes 
de dar la concesión], pero allí había 
oposición del alcalde.” 
Participant in the 
Water War 
“In December the bills were sent. The 
municipal elections were over. This 
had also been politically very well 
planned.” 
“En diciembre ya salieron las facturas, 
ya habían pasado las elecciones 
[municipales], eso también 
políticamente fue muy bien organizado”. 
From section 3.4 
Jorge Alvarado “We documented that drinking water 
was contaminated by wastewater 
because [their respective networks] 
were one next to the other.”  
“pudimos documentar que se 
contaminaba el agua potable con el agua 
del alcantarillado porque están una al 
lado de la otra” 
From section 4.3 
Actor involved in 
the sector in the 
early 1990s 
“Aylwin decided that we would first 
see how it would operate and work, 
and then we would see whether we 
privatize or not.” 
“Aylwin toma la decisión de que vamos 
a ver primero como eso opera, como 
funciona, y después se verá si se 






Actor involved in 
the sector in the 
early 1990s 
“[Aylwin] did not stop the 
privatization, he rather did everything 
to make it happen.” 
“[Aylwin] no paró la privatización, más 
bien se hizo todo para hacerla.” 
105 
 
Paper 2: Who Follows WHO Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines in Latin 
America? The Overlooked Effects of State Capacity on Policy Diffusion 
   
Although the literature on policy diffusion has been burgeoning in the last decades, it has largely 
focused on “successful” diffusion processes. This focus has highlighted the role of epistemic 
communities, communication networks, transfer agents, and international organizations’ sanction 
and aid policies. This abundant literature has however limited explanatory power regarding why 
policy diffusion is sometimes partial or inexistent when the policy spreads thanks to these factors. 
This paper addresses directly this question by analyzing cases of complete, partial and no national 
adoption of diffused policies under similar diffusion pressures.  
The main argument is that stronger state capacity limits the adoption of diffused policies that 
represent a strong domestic challenge for the country. Correlatively, weak state capacity does not 
limit diffusion, and therefore leads to extended diffusion. Two causal mechanisms are at play. 
First, before adopting nationally a policy diffused from abroad, a state with strong state capacity 
has, thanks to its resources, a stronger ability than a weak state to assess whether (and to which 
extent) the implementation of the policy would entail a domestic challenge. It is therefore less 
permeable to policy entrepreneurs who would advocate for the adoption of a policy and, if the 
policy does represent a strong domestic challenge, diffusion is likely to be restrained. Second, 
since strong state capacity also enables the enforcement of a diffused policy by the state, 
stakeholders that would be directly affected (now or possibly later) by the adoption of the policy 
(because it represents a strong domestic challenge) are likely to put pressure on the state to prevent 
the adoption of more restrictive regulations. This may also limit the adoption of diffused policies 
when the domestic challenge is strong. 
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A complement to the main argument considers an additional factor: the arena in which the 
challenge plays. One of the main argument’s scope condition is that the challenge is domestic (i.e. 
the cost comes from its implementation within borders) and not transboundary (i.e. the cost comes 
from whether other countries will implement the policy). If the challenge is transboundary, the 
repertoire of actions a state with strong capacity may and would want to undertake varies. It then 
first tries to influence the standardization of the policy (at the international level). If the 
standardized policy is not modified, states where a strong transboundary challenge is associated to 
the diffused policy block the adoption of the policy (independently of the strength of their state 
capacity). If the standardization of the policy is successfully modified, then adopting the “diffused 
policy” is no longer an issue for states where a strong transboundary challenge would have been 
associated to the diffused policy, and they (both weak and strong states) adopt the diffused policy. 
This paper studies policy diffusion through the case of the diffusion of the drinking-water quality 
guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Latin America. The WHO published the 
first edition of its “Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines” in 1984, in line with the concerns about 
the lack of access to safe and ample water for the populations expressed by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations as it proclaimed the 1981-1990 era the “International Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation Decade.” These guidelines have been revised once per decade since then. Because 
they emerged from a Western European and North American perspective, and because the changes 
from one version to another can be clearly identified, it allows to analyze the diffusion of an 
evolving policy defined abroad.  
The first section of this paper presents the theoretical framework, the argument and the hypotheses. 
The second describes the WHO drinking-water quality guidelines as they evolved from the 1980s 
until 2011 and details the national regulations for drinking-water quality in force in Latin America 
107 
 
during this period. The third section presents the analytical framework, the methodology and data 
sources. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analysis when challenges are 
domestic, and the fifth those for transboundary challenges.  
1. Theoretical Framework, Argument and Hypotheses 
The policy diffusion process has been extensively analyzed in the last decades (for literature 
reviews, see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Karch, 2007; Marsh 
and Sharman, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2012; Stone, 2012). More recently, these analyses have 
increasingly acknowledged the importance of disaggregating this process in different steps. 
However, the causal mechanisms of diffusion proposed in the literature do not address specifically 
the adoption step. This paper presents a theory to explain why policies diffused through similar 
mechanisms are adopted completely, partially or not adopted by countries. It focuses more 
precisely on non-politicized (technical/administrative) policies, i.e. not associated to a traditional 
conflict between the left and the right or to a known clash between political parties in the country. 
1.1. Policy Adoption as a Distinct Step of the Diffusion Process 
This paper highlights that adoption is one step of the policy diffusion process that needs to be 
distinguished from the step that follows it (implementation) and the ones that precede it 
(emergence, standardization, preparation, spread). Figure 1 sketches the policy diffusion process 
with its different steps, as conceptualized in the literature and in this dissertation. 
The first step of the policy diffusion process that was noted as important to single out was the one 
posterior to adoption: implementation. On the one hand, there is the adoption of a diffused policy 
at the national level through a formal domestic instrument, like a regulation, a law, or a policy. On 
the other hand, there is the actual implementation of the “diffused policy” on the ground, which 
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entails change in practices, methods or other means to comply with (or at least work toward) the 
diffused norm or standard. It was quickly and generally acknowledged that different factors came 
into play at the implementation stage (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 354; Evans and Davies, 1999: 
379; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 6; True and Mintrom, 2001: 30; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005: 
118; Karch, 2007: 191; Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 279; Shipan and Volden, 2012: 793). This step 
is analyzed in the third paper of this dissertation. 
Figure 1. The Steps of the Policy Diffusion/Transfer Process 
 
Source: Own Elaboration. 
 
It is also important to disaggregate the steps of the policy diffusion process that take place before 
the spread (diffusion) step: first, the emergence of a “new” policy or idea somewhere in first place 
(Graham et al., 2013: 686); second, the standardization of local ideas and practices (Ancelovici 
• Emergence
• New Ideas/Policies Rise in Other States or Transnational/International Actors
• Standardization
• New Ideas/Policies Become a "Standard Model"
• Spread/Diffusion
• The "Standard Model" Travels to Other Contexts
• Preparation (Optional Step)
• Receiving State Puts in Place Preparatory Measures to Lessen the Impact of New Policy
• Adoption
• Receiving State Adopts New Policy (Possibly Adapted)
• Implementation
• Receiving State and Other Actors Involved Implement New Policy
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and Jenson, 2013); and third, the optional step of preparation (see paper 1 of this dissertation). The 
distinction between these steps and the adoption one appears evident. 
The disaggregation of the spread/diffusion step and the adoption one is less commonly 
acknowledged, as many studies conflate them in what they label “diffusion”. Indeed, when what 
is diffused is an ideology, an idea or a norm, the step of adoption may not necessarily be a formal 
one, that can easily be identified. Yet, the adoption of a “diffused policy” differs from learning and 
diffusion, as different authors have noted. Karch (2007: 55-56) detailed: “Diffusion is about 
movement of a policy across jurisdictional boundaries. In contrast, adoption is the decision to 
establish a policy in an individual jurisdiction.” This distinction is not only conceptually but also 
substantively very important for at least two reasons. First, what is diffused and what is adopted 
may differ, as “policies or practices [may be] altered during processes of adoption” leading to 
“poor, incomplete or partial transplantation” (Stone, 2012: 484-488). Moreover, Dunlop (2009) 
stated that “decision-makers can learn ‘negative lessons’ where learning from the ideas that are 
diffused help crystallize what ideas and policy paths they do not wish to follow.” Guzman and 
Linos (2014: 605) also argued that the diffusion of international human rights standards (through 
international law or international norms) can “undermine efforts to adopt or maintain high levels 
of protection in countries that would otherwise offer protection above the international norm”. 
Second, as the object of diffusion and adoption differs, so do the factors influencing these two 
steps (Karch, 2007: 64-65).  
This paper focuses on and is limited to the study of the adoption step of the policy diffusion 
process. It intends to disentangle dynamics behind the national adoption of a policy diffused from 
abroad. It addresses “[empirical] questions such as why and how a certain type of transfer occurs 
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in one context and not elsewhere [, questions that] have not, as yet, been fully addressed in the 
policy transfer literatures” (Stone, 2012: 488-489). 
1.2. Mechanisms of Diffusion and Adoption 
The mechanisms of the policy diffusion process developed in the literature essentially consider the 
spread step (or the steps preceding the spread; for instance, for standardization, see Ancelovici and 
Jenson, 2013). These mechanisms are typically summarized into four: learning (from own 
experiences and peers), competition (pressure to follow policies of direct competitors), coercion 
(sanctions and aid promised by powerful states and international organizations), and 
socialization/constructivism (change of preferences and development of expert epistemic 
communities) (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Graham et al., 2013; Stone, 2012).  
These mechanisms are tinted by the original focus of the literature on successful cases, where a 
diffused policy is adopted. They assume a positive reaction of “receiving states” to diffusion 
pressures: they learn, they adapt their policy when pressured, they obey to international 
organizations, they change their preferences as influenced by epistemic communities. They are 
reactive rather than proactive in the process. This paper questions this view and rather argues that, 
at the adoption step, it is necessary to consider that states and other domestic actors are not only 
“receiving”. This perspective is necessary to explain why a policy that was “diffused” in similar 
conditions or through similar mechanisms is adopted to different extents (fully, partially or not) 
by states.  
1.3. Argument and Hypotheses 
To explain why states opt for different (adoption) responses under similar diffusion pressures, the 
present argument suggests that two key explanatory factors interplay: the strength of state capacity 
and the strength of the challenge entailed by the policy if adopted.  
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State capacity is conceptualized and defined in different ways in the literature. It is often specified 
as a certain function, or a combination of two or three functions. The functions consist, for 
example, in the following ones: “fiscal or extractive capacity”, “legal capacity”, “military or 
coercive capacity”, “administrative capacity” (Akbar and Ostermann, 2015; Hanson and Sigman, 
2013; Hendrix, 2010; Lindvall and Theorell, 2016; Soifer, 2015). Conceptualized this way, state 
capacity is oriented toward outcomes, and not means. This conceptualization of state capacity 
oriented towards outcomes is limitative, both theoretically and empirically. It first neglects that 
developing one specific functional capacity certainly requires for a state to make political choices. 
Theoretically, even a weak state can develop strongly one specific function if all its means are 
invested toward this outcome. Conversely, a weak functional capacity may result from a lack of 
state capacity to develop this specific function as much as from a non-prioritization of this function 
despite resources being sufficient to develop this function. Empirically, functional capacity is at 
least partly measured by outcomes and does not consider that the strength of state capacity also 
relates to the “range of government capacities” (Lindvall and Theorell, 2016). 
State capacity is here conceptualized on the basis of the framework of Lindvall and Theorell 
(2016), as a “form of political power […] vis-à-vis a population within a restricted territory”. This 
corresponds to the “ability to coerce, cajole, and persuade in order to make members of society 
conform to laws and directives”. It differentiates between means and ends, as this power requires 
resources to be projected (through policy instruments, to reach policy outcomes). Resources 
consist in the dimension of state capacity that can be observed and from which state capacity can 
be inferred. These resources include three types: money, human capital and information. These 
three types of resources have also been recognized as important for or as defining state capacity 
by different authors (Lee and Zhang, 2017; Soifer, 2015; Kurtz and Schrank, 2012; Skocpol, 1985). 
112 
 
In the context of our study, state capacity corresponds to the ability to produce knowledge about 
the implications of policy adoption and to the expected ability to enforce the policy if adopted.  
The challenge consists in the cost the implementation of the diffused policy would entail 
nationally, considering domestic conditions and constraints. The challenge is strong when the cost 
of implementation is high, for instance when it would require high investments or new 
infrastructures or when it would result in an important loss of resources. The challenge is weak 
when the cost of implementation is low, as no or few additional economic, material or human 
resources are needed to comply with the new policy and there is no or little loss of resources 
associated with the policy. It could be, for example, because the policy is already (or almost) 
implemented or because it is not relevant for the country. The challenge may be domestic (if the 
cost comes from its implementation within the borders of the country) or transboundary (if the 
cost comes from whether other countries will implement the policy). 
The main argument is that stronger state capacity limits the adoption of diffused policies that 
represent a strong domestic challenge for the country. Correlatively, weak state capacity does not 
limit diffusion, and therefore leads to extended diffusion. Two causal mechanisms are at play. 
First, before adopting nationally a policy diffused from abroad, a state with strong state capacity 
has, thanks to its resources, a stronger ability than a weak state to assess whether (and to which 
extent) the implementation of the policy would entail a domestic challenge. It is therefore less 
permeable to policy entrepreneurs who would advocate for the adoption of a policy and, if the 
policy does represent a strong domestic challenge, diffusion is likely to be restrained. A second 
causal mechanism is also at play. Since strong state capacity additionally enables the enforcement 
of an (eventually) diffused policy by the state, stakeholders that would be directly affected (now 
or possibly later) by the adoption of the policy (because it represents a strong domestic challenge) 
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are likely to put pressure on the state to prevent the adoption of more restrictive regulations, which 
may also limit diffusion. Finally, when state capacity is strong and the domestic challenge is weak, 
the policy is adopted extensively under diffusion pressures (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Representation of the Argument on the Effect of State Capacity, Domestic 
Challenge, and Stakeholder on the Adoption of Diffused Policies 
 
 
The core hypotheses of this paper focus on the impact of the strength of state capacity and the 
strength of the domestic challenge associated with the diffused policy on its adoption (argument 
sketched in Figure 2). The three core hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis 1.1. When state capacity is strong, and the domestic challenge is strong, 
the adoption of a diffused policy is limited. 
Hypothesis 1.2. When state capacity is strong and the domestic challenge is weak, 
the adoption of a diffused policy is extensive. 
Hypothesis 1.3. When state capacity is weak, the strength of the domestic challenge 
does not influence the adoption of a diffused policy, which is extensive. 
A complement to the main argument considers an additional factor: the arena in which the 










cost comes from its implementation within borders) and not transboundary (i.e. the cost comes 
from whether other countries will implement the policy). If the challenge is transboundary, the 
repertoire of actions a state with strong capacity may and would want to undertake varies. It first 
tries to influence the standardization of the policy (at the international level) to weaken the 
transboundary challenge entailed by the policy. If it is successful in influencing the standardization 
of the policy, then adopting the “diffused policy” is less challenging and will likely take place. If 
the standardization step could not be influenced successfully, then the adoption of the diffused 
policy is likely to be blocked, regardless of state capacity. The mechanism behind this blocking 
effect is that stakeholders likely to be affected by a new international standard pressure countries 
(with weak or strong state capacity) not to adopt it, to limit its diffusion abroad. Additionally, for 
strong state capacity, another causal mechanism intervenes: since these states may expect the 
signal given by their national regulations to influence policies of other countries, they make sure 
not to adopt a policy representing a transboundary challenge for them (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Representation of the Effect of Transboundary Challenges on the Adoption of 
Diffused Policies 
 
* Only states with strong capacity may influence this international position, but all states (weak or strong) faced with 
a transboundary challenge may make decision consequently to it. 
 
The complementary hypotheses address the effect of the strength of a transboundary challenge on 

















Hypothesis 2.1. When a diffused policy entails a strong transboundary challenge, a 
state with strong capacity will first intend to influence the standardization at the 
international level. 
Hypothesis 2.2. When a diffused policy that entails a strong transboundary challenge 
was successfully modified at the standardization step (in order to weaken the 
challenge), the national adoption of a diffused policy is extensive, regardless of state 
capacity.  
Hypothesis 2.3. When a diffused policy that entails a strong transboundary challenge 
was not modified at the standardization step, the national adoption of a diffused 
policy is limited, regardless of state capacity. 
1.4. Alternative Explanations 
The diffusion literature proposes different explanations for the adoption of diffused policies. Four 
key ones suggest different expectations in relation to the argument of this paper.   
First, one dominant explanation to explain diffusion is that ideas travel through transnational 
networks of actors, epistemic communities or advocate coalitions that update their knowledge, 
develop their expertise or learn with one another (James and Lodge, 2003: 186; Stone, 2012: 487-
488). Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005: 118) argue that it is this “sociology of knowledge rather than 
interest politics that is best placed to explain the diffusion of regulatory authorities in Latin 
America”. This theory focuses mostly on the spread step of the diffusion process, more than on 
adoption. However, its main expectations would be that countries participating in the same 
transnational networks and from the same region would adopt similar diffused policies within a 
same sector. In this framework, learning and expertise could also explain divergence if countries 
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adapt diffused policies to their most pressing need (i.e. when domestic challenges are stronger), 
which would contradict the argument of this paper.  
A second dominant explanation for the adoption of diffused policies is the pressures exerted by 
international organizations on countries. They may take the forms of sanctions or conditional aid, 
and are considered as a mechanism of leverage or coercion (Stallings, 1992; Henisz et al., 2005). 
Henisz et al. (2005) as well as Murillo (2009) found that external fiscal pressures were key 
determinants of the adoption of privatization reforms and the establishment of regulatory 
authorities in the electricity and telecommunication sectors. Armada et al. (2001) also argued that 
pressures from the World Health Organization, the World Bank and transnational corporations 
have favored the neoliberal reforms of the health and social security sectors in Latin America. The 
expectations of this theory is that states more dependent on aid and more sanctioned by these 
international organizations will be pushed to adopt specific diffused policies. This could suggest 
that weaker states adopt diffused policies, as our argument suggests. However, it would not explain 
the different levels of adoption in strong states that depend less on international organizations. 
Third, some authors suggest national variations in policy diffusion may be explained by the 
ideology of domestic governments, political dynamics, the influence of partisan coalitions, 
political competition, and electoral incentives (Boix, 1998; Murillo, 2009; Linos, 2013; Orihuela, 
2014). The expectations is that the nature of the policy diffused and the government ideology will 
influence whether or not it is adopted domestically.  
Fourth, as to the role of state capacity, some authors have argued that weak state capacity may 
limit what is diffused (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 354). Nicholson-Crotty and Carley (2016: 81) 
make the “argument that, for the same reasons they might prefer adoption information from states 
with which they share demographic and ideological characteristics, lawmakers may place greater 
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weight on effectiveness information from states that share similar implementation capacities or 
environments.” This argument contradicts the expectations of our argument for the adoption step, 
since we believe weak state capacity favors more extensive policy diffusion, and not the other way 
around.  
2. The Diffusion of Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines 
This paper tests these hypotheses through the case of the diffusion of drinking-water quality 
guidelines. This case allows to easily separate the two final steps of the policy diffusion process. 
The first of these is the adoption of “international norms” at the national level and, for our case 
study, consists in the adoption of national drinking-water quality regulations by countries. The 
second step is the implementation of diffused policies and, in our case study, refers to established 
policies to control drinking-water quality and the actual quality of drinking water. This paper 
intends to disentangle diffusion mechanisms at the adoption stage. In order to do so, it focuses on 
the one hand on the evolution of WHO drinking-water quality guidelines and, on the other hand, 
on the national regulations of Latin American countries for drinking water quality.  
The study of the diffusion of the WHO drinking-water quality guidelines has another key 
advantage: it allows to consider partial, non- and (almost) complete adoption in different countries 
of a single policy diffused through essentially the same networks.  
2.1. WHO Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines as a Source for Diffusion 
The WHO Drinking-Water International Standards and Guidelines were from the outset developed 
outside of Latin America, more specifically from a European and a North American perspectives. 
In the words of the World Health Organization itself in 1958, it is “the great increase in travel, 
especially air travel, where common carriers must be watered at many points in the world, and the 
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traveller must be furnished with acceptable drinking-water that will not produce unfavourable 
effects on his health” that highlighted the importance and motivated the definition of international 
standards or criteria for drinking-water quality (WHO, 1958). The original standards published by 
the WHO in 1958 were revised in 1963 and 1971. In parallel to the revision of international 
standards, stricter European standards for drinking-water quality were defined in 1961 and 1970.  
From the outset, the international standards for drinking-water quality were influenced by 
European incentives. The regional office for Europe of the WHO indeed played an active role in 
the development of the first edition of the WHO Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines published in 
1984 that pursued the clear objective to replace (and unify) European and International Standards.     
According to Galal-Gorchev and others, “the philosophy and content of [the WHO 1984] 
Guidelines constituted a drastic departure from the old International standards” (Galal-Gorchev 
et al., 1993: 335). The change from “standards” to “guidelines” denoted the advisory nature of the 
document, through which the WHO intended to guide states in their definition of drinking-water 
quality standards adapted to their national contexts and cost-benefit considerations. The 1984 
Guidelines included updated health-based quantitative guideline values according to the evolution 
of scientific research. Microbiological criteria remained important; and most physical-chemical 
standards were integrated in the 1984 guidelines. An important modification is that a number of 
substances and contaminants were also added to the list of guidelines. In terms of chemical 
substances which may affect health, we can note three main changes. First, among chemicals that 
were listed in previous standards, manganese and cadmium saw their guideline lowered (i.e. 
became more restrictive). Second, the 1984 Guidelines were marked by the introduction of some 
organic chemicals coming from industrial sources and human dwellings: benzene, carbon 
tetrachloride, 1,2-dichloroethane, 1,1-dichloroethene, edetic acid, tetrachloroethene, and 
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trichloroethene. Third, as for chemicals coming from agricultural activities, nitrite was added, as 
well as some pesticides: Aldrin and dieldrin, chlordane, 2,4-D, heptachlor and heptachlor epoxide, 
hexachlorobenzene, lindane, methoxychlor and pentachlorophenol.  
The second edition of the WHO Guidelines was published starting in 1993 and amended in 1998, 
a little less than ten years after the first one. The list of coordinators and sponsors, all from Western 
Europe and North America, indicated from which perspective it was built, once again. This second 
edition updated and significantly added to the list of health-based guidelines set for chemicals in 
three main ways. First, as for naturally occurring chemicals, several were added to the list (barium, 
boron, molybdenum and uranium), and the guideline for arsenic was significantly lowered. 
Second, many chemicals from industrial sources and human dwellings saw their guideline lowered 
(cadmium, cyanide) or were added to the list. Third, a health-based guideline was introduced for 
more than 25 additional pesticides used in agricultural activities (WHO, 1993; 1998).   
The third edition of the WHO Guidelines was again published about ten years after the preceding 
ones, in 2004-2005. In terms of guideline values, there were no major changes to the second 
edition. The main difference was certainly the priority given to some chemicals over others: “There 
has been increasing recognition that only a few key chemicals cause large-scale health effects 
through drinking-water exposure. These include fluoride and arsenic. Other chemicals, such as 
lead, selenium and uranium, may also be significant under certain conditions” (WHO, 2004: xvii). 
The 2008 addendum of these guidelines added nitrate among the chemicals that may “cause large-
scale health effects through drinking-water exposure” (WHO, 2008). In 2011, the fourth edition of 
the WHO Guidelines was published, and it highlighted the same key chemicals, also adding to the 
significant list iron and manganese; not for their health effects but rather for “their effects on 
acceptability” (WHO, 2011: 29).  
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Over three decades, the WHO Drinking-Water Guidelines have developed by first expanding the 
scope of parameters listed and second targeting the most important ones for health concerns.  
2.2. National Drinking-Water Quality Regulations in Latin America 
Important reforms of drinking water services occurred in Latin American countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Probably the most visible of these reforms was the introduction of private participation 
in the sector, because it was heavily debated and protested against. Some epic reversals also took 
place in Cochabamba (Bolivia) and Tucumán (Argentina) (Simmons, 2016; De Gouvello and 
Fournier, 2002). Yet, these privatization processes were only one dimension (albeit important) of 
the water reforms adopted during these decades in Latin America. The water sector was also 
transformed by decentralization and “insulating reforms” more generally (which were not limited 
to privatization and also included corporatization and the establishment of independent regulatory 
agencies) (Herrera and Post, 2014). It is in this broader context of reforms that the drinking-water 
quality regulations were adopted by Latin American countries.  
While over these decades (or earlier) the provision of water services was decentralized to the local 
or regional/ provincial level in most Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), the adoption of 
drinking-water standards remained a responsibility of the national tier of government. Some 
subnational units also adopted standards (for instance in federal Argentina), but the national 
regulation remained valid as the overarching framework. Therefore, while the sector was mostly 
under the responsibility of subnational units, drinking-water quality standards had the specificity 
of being defined at the national level. This was part of a more general characteristic of the adoption 
of drinking-water quality regulations: these essentially took place in governmental instances 
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distinct from the ones responsible for the sector, so rather in the ministries of Health or 
International Affairs than in the ministry of Public Works.  
As the water sector was mostly decentralized, it entered a wave of corporatization and privatization 
reforms, and was encouraged to establish regulatory agencies. Drinking-water quality standards 
were only one component among others that had to be regulated by these agencies, and were 
legally established through different instruments than other regulated dimensions like pressure, 
continuity, management of service claims, etc. Indeed, Foster (2005: 22) states that “the general 
tendency has been to define quality-of-service parameters in lower-level legal instruments (such 
as concession contracts) rather than in the general sector law.” Yet, drinking-water quality 
standards, probably because they were recognized as a health matter, were established 
independently from other service quality standards and in higher-level legal instruments (often 
through decrees), even when they were also part of concession contracts. Their development was 
influenced by the revision cycles of the WHO guidelines (and the diffusion of these), as almost all 
national regulations directly refer to the most recent available version of the WHO guidelines.  
In this context, during the 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries adopted or updated 
their standards for drinking-water quality, often more than once. The national regulations in force 
between 1980 and 2011 in the 16 main Latin American countries17 are listed hereafter (with their 
respective year coming into force)18: 
                                                          
 
17 Paraguay is excluded from this analysis because it has a complex settings of regulations related to drinking-water 
quality, in which regulations are set by three different institutions and are not the same nation-wide. 
18 These national regulations were identified (and further accessed) through extensive research in the Virtual Library 
of Sustainable Development and Environmental Health of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), 
governmental online documentation, contacts with governmental agencies/ ministers in charge of these regulations, 
PAHO officials and academics, as well as extensive review of references to other regulation in each regulation found 
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- Argentina: Código Alimentario (1994), modified in 2007 (Resolución Conjunta 
68/2007 y 196/2007); 
- Bolivia: Norma Boliviana 512 (1985), revised in 1997, 2005 and 2010;  
- Brazil: Portaria BSB No 56 (1977), updated in 1990 (Portaria 36-GM), 2001 
(Portaria MS 1469), 2004 (Portaria 518) and 2011 (Portaria 2914); 
- Chile: Norma Chilena 409 (1970), revised in 1984 and 2006; Decreto 735 del 
Ministerio de Salud Pública (1969), modified in 1984 (Decreto 10), 2007 (Decreto 
131) and 2010 (Decreto 76). 
- Colombia: Decreto 2105 del Ministerio de Salud (1983), updated in 1994 (Norma 
Técnica Colombiana 813), 1998 (Decreto 475) and in 2007 (Resolución 2117 del 
Ministerio de la Protección Social y del Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y 
Desarrollo Territorial); 
- Costa Rica: Decreto 25991-S (1997), revised in 2005 (Decreto Nº 32324); 
- Ecuador: Norma Técnica Ecuatoriana 1108 (1984), revised in 2005, 2006, 2010 and 
2011; as well as Reglamento Técnico Ecuatoriano 023 (2008) and the Código de 
práctica ecuatoriano 5 (1992)19; 
- El Salvador: Norma Salvadoreña Obligatoria 130701 (1998), revised in 2006 and 
2009;  
- Guatemala: Norma Guatemalteca Obligatoria 29.001 (1985), revised in 2000 and 
2010;  
- Honduras: Norma Técnica Nacional para la calidad del Agua Potable/ Acuerdo No. 
084 (1995), renewed in 2005 (Reglamento de calidad del servicio, ERSAPS); 
- Mexico: Reglamento de la ley general de salud en materia de control sanitario de 
actividades, establecimientos, productos y servicios (1988); Norma oficial mexicana 
127-SSA1-1994 (1996), revised in 2000; 
- Nicaragua: Acuerdo Ministerial No.65-94 (1994); 
- Panama: Resolución 027 del Ministerio de Salud (1994) followed by Resolución 248 
del Ministerio de Salud (1996) and then derrogated by the Reglamento Técnico 
DGNT-COPANIT 23-395-99 (1999), complemented in 2003 (Resolución 507 del 
Ministerio de Salud); 
- Peru: Reglamento de los requisitos oficiales físicos, químicos y bacteriológicos que 
deben reunir las aguas de bebida para ser consideradas potables (1946), updated in 
                                                          
 
and of reports and literature listing some of these norms (Bastos et al., 2004; García and Iannacone, 2014; Mella, 
2006; Pinto, 2006; Pinto et al., 2005; 2012; Solsona, 1999; Truque, 2005).  
19 In Ecuador the national drinking-water regulations were twice changed within a year of their adoption (in 2006, 
following the 2005 regulation, and in 2011, following the 2010 regulation).  
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1969, and followed by the Reglamento de la Calidad del Agua para Consumo 
Humano/ DS N° 031-2010-SA (2010); 
- Uruguay: Normas de Calidad de Aguas Potables de Obras Sanitarias del Estado 
(1976), revised in 1986, 2006 and 2012; and the Reglamento Bromatológico 
Nacional (1994), revised in 2011 (Decree 110-2011 and Decree 375-2011) to 
encompass Norma UNIT 833:2008 (Agua Potable – Requisitos); 
- Venezuela: Ley orgánica del ambiente sobre clasificación de las aguas (1978), 
modified in 1995 (Normas para la clasificación y el control de los cuerpos de agua 
y vertidos o efluentes líquidos); and more specifically, Normas sanitarias de calidad 
del agua potable (1992), updated in 1998. 
As stands out from the above list, the only country that did not adopt or renew definitively its 
standards in the 1980s and 1990s was Peru. It did adopt a technical norm in 1987, but the latter 
was only mandatory until March 1991 when a Supreme Decree (Decreto Supremo N° 006-91-
ICTI) established that all technical norms were no longer mandatory. Therefore in 1991, the valid 
regulation for drinking-water quality remained the one originally adopted in 1946, which had been 
updated in 1969 but then was not updated again until 2010 (CEPIS, 2004). In the 1990s and early 
2000s updates of the national drinking-water quality regulation were proposed by the Dirección 
General de Salud Ambiental but were not approved. 
3. Analytical Framework, Methodology and Data Sources 
3.1. Challenges of Drinking-Water Quality Guidelines 
The operationalization of the hypotheses to the case of the diffusion of the WHO drinking-water 
quality guidelines to national regulations requires a clear understanding of how the substances for 
which a guideline is set by the WHO may be encountered in drinking water.  
This study focuses precisely on chemical substances for which the WHO set a health-based 
guideline for drinking-water quality. Chemicals are used for the analysis because, after 
microbiological substances (which guidelines mostly consist in no detectable presence in water), 
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these are the substances in drinking-water associated with the highest health risk because of “their 
ability to cause adverse health effects after prolonged periods of exposure” (WHO, 1993).  Health-
based guidelines for chemical substances in water have evolved over the years, especially starting 
in the 1990s, and the number of chemical substances has increased significantly with the 
development of scientific knowledge and research.  
The list of chemicals for which the WHO has set a health-based guideline in drinking-water at 
least once since 1984 includes over 100 substances (see Appendix 1). Their presence in water may 
come from different sources: natural occurrence (in soil and groundwater), industrial sources and 
human dwellings, agricultural activities, drinking-water treatment by-products, water pipes 
(through corrosion). The main stakeholder that could be affected by a new drinking-water 
regulation of one chemical depends on the source of its presence in water, but also on the level of 
the challenge. Indeed, if the challenge is likely to be transboundary (for instance regarding 
exportation of drinking-water components or other water products), then stakeholders acting in 
this international arena are the main stakeholders potentially affected.  Table 1 summarizes the 
interrelations between the level of challenge, the nature of the challenge, the source of presence in 
water and the main stakeholder likely to be affected.  




Nature of Challenge Source of Presence 
in Drinking Water  
Main Stakeholder 
Domestic Drinking-water treatment 
(contamination prior to 
treatment) 
Natural Water providers 
(producers) 
Agricultural  Farmers 
Industrial  Industries 
Drinking-water contamination 
in distributive network 
Water pipes Water providers 
(distributors) 
Transboundary Exportations associated to 






3.2. Case Selection and Methodology  
3.2.1. Choice of Parameters 
The guidelines used for the main analyses include those for arsenic, lead and agricultural 
pesticides. These chemicals were chosen for the analysis because they have been officially 
recognized to be important for health by the WHO, were modified in the 1993 WHO Guidelines 
and, from then on, were not further modified until 2011. The domestic challenge associated with 
arsenic and lead could also be clearly identified, and varied in strength across Latin American 
countries studied. Moreover, the presence of these chemical substances in water came from three 
types of sources (respectively natural, pipes and agriculture), which diversifies the analysis.  
For the complementary analysis (on the impact of the strength of a transboundary challenge), the 
guideline for copper is analyzed, which also meets the above criteria. Its presence in water comes 
from water pipes, like lead. 
The guidelines for each type of chemicals are analyzed separately because they are from different 
sources and that each source is represented very unevenly. In this respect, whereas there are 26 
agricultural pesticides for which a WHO health-based guideline was defined in 1993 and 
maintained until 2011, there is only one substance that corresponds to each of the two other sources 
retained for analysis: arsenic (for natural presence) and lead (for water pipe contamination). If 
studied together, the importance of these latter chemicals would risk to fade away, which would 
be substantially problematic as they are among the few most important chemicals for which 
presence in drinking water represents a health concern, according to the WHO (WHO, 2004).    
3.2.2. Geographical Focus and Choice of Case Studies 
The study explores, first, the diffusion of the WHO guidelines in the national regulations of 16 
Latin American countries through a cross-country comparison of process-tracing clues. Second, it 
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develops thorough process-tracing analyses evidencing the causal mechanisms in two case studies: 
Bolivia and Chile. 
The region under study, Latin America, has experienced various water reforms in a relatively short 
period of time (the 1990s and 2000s), and includes states with different state capacity levels, 
geographical realities and productive activities. Comparing countries within a region allows to 
control for other factors, such as the fact that similar multinationals may be involved in the 
countries, and that the same supranational or international organizations are potentially influencing 
them. More specifically for this study, the focus on countries from a same region limits differences 
of diffusion mechanisms that could entail differences of outcomes. Indeed, the WHO drinking-
water quality guidelines were promoted over all Latin America by the Pan-American Health 
Organization (regional office of the WHO) in similar ways, especially through the same 
documentation and through events where representatives from all countries for the region were 
invited. Besides, this comparison across the region also includes positive and negative cases, which 
allows to test not only the mechanisms leading to adoption, but also those resulting in the non-
adoption of diffused policies.  
The two case studies were chosen in order to analyze the process in one country with weak state 
capacity (Bolivia) and one with strong state capacity (Chile). The introduction of new standards 
for the four types of chemicals (arsenic, lead, pesticides and copper) presents strong (or at least 
medium) levels of challenge in each country. In Bolivia, whereas the standards for arsenic, lead 
and pesticides represent strong (or medium-level) domestic challenges, copper does not consist in 
a strong transboundary challenge. In Chile, the standards for the analyzed chemicals may be 
classified as strong (or medium-level) domestic challenges for arsenic, lead and pesticides, and as 
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strong transboundary challenge for copper. Given these within-case differences, the process 
tracing in each of these two cases allows to explore different causal pathways (Seawright, 2016).  
3.3. Data Sources 
3.3.1. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the compliance of national regulations with the 1993 WHO Guidelines 
(which remained stable until at least 2011, the end year of the period studied). It was computed for 
each chemical independently, by year and country. The limit value fixed in a national regulation 
complies with the WHO guideline for a specific parameter when it is equal or lower than the WHO 
guideline and when the limit value is mandatory. Otherwise, if the limit value is higher than the 
WHO guideline or qualified as recommended (rather than mandatory) or if there is no limit value 
for this parameter, it is noncomplying.  
The data for this variable came from systematic analyses of official documents. The 1984, 1993, 
2004 and 2011 WHO Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality (and their complementary documents 
and addenda) were systematically reviewed and the health-based guideline values were compiled 
for all parameters. Second, a systematic analysis of national regulations for drinking-water quality 
was conducted and the national limit values for all chemical substances of the study were compiled 
for each national regulation. National documents systematically analyzed and compiled consist in 
all regulations for drinking-water quality that were in force in the 16 Latin American countries 
studied between 1980 and 2011 (listed in section 2.2).  
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
The main independent variables are the strength of state capacity, and the strength of challenge. 




State capacity considers the existing resources to support policy enforcement, including money, 
human capital and information (Lindvall and Theorell, 2016). Measures of GDP per capita (for 
availability of financial resources) and government effectiveness (for the strength of human capital 
and availability of information) are indicative of state resources. Bolivia and Chile, the two case 
studies, are respectively weak and strong on both measures of state capacity (World Bank, 2016; 
2017). For the comparative insights presented for 16 Latin American countries, GDP per capita 
data is originally used; replications of the cross-country comparisons with alternative measures of 
state capacity (government effectiveness and adult literacy rate) are also presented in Appendix 4.   
 “Source of challenge” is a categorical variable coded on the basis of the description of chemicals 
done by the WHO (see for instance: WHO, 2004). The complete list of categories is: natural, 
mining, industrial, agricultural non-pesticide, agricultural pesticide, water pipes and others.  
“Strength of challenge” is constructed on the basis of what is the source of the challenge for 
encountering a specific chemical in drinking water.  
- If the (domestic) challenge comes from the natural presence of this chemical in groundwater, 
then domestic challenge is coded as strong when natural presence in groundwater is 
documented in a country and weak if not. The codification for arsenic is based on data 
compiled and reported by Bundschuh et al. (2008; 2011). 
- If the (domestic) challenge comes from contamination through water pipes, then the domestic 
challenge is strong if it was reported that the chemical was used in the construction of water 
pipes in at least one city of the country (for pipes themselves or welding); and weak if not. 
The sources used to code the variable for lead are listed in Appendix 2.  
- If the (domestic) challenge comes from the use of this chemical as an agricultural pesticide, 
then the domestic challenge is defined as the weight of this pesticide (active ingredient) used 
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by area of arable land and permanent crops. Data on pesticides use has been computed from 
annual data on pesticides and lands from the FAOSTAT database but was not available by 
pesticide.  
- If the (transboundary) challenge comes from the exportation of a chemical (potential 
contaminant of drinking water abroad), the level of challenge is strong if the country is a 
producer and exporter of the chemical products; and weak if not. The codification for copper 
was based on USGS reports (see list in Appendix 2). 
3.3.3. Causal Pathways in Bolivia and Chile 
The process-tracing approach used to identify causal pathways in two countries (Bolivia and Chile) 
was based on qualitative sources. A systematic review of all archival documentation from national 
institutes developing technical standards (Instituto Boliviano de Normalización y Calidad—
IBNORCA in Bolivia and Instituto Nacional de Normalización—INN in Chile) was realized. This 
process-tracing approach was also informed by over thirty interviews that were conducted in both 
countries (with representatives and officials of government institutions, international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations who participated or oversaw the process of adoption of 
drinking-water quality regulations) (see Appendix 3 for details on interviews).  
4. When Facing a Domestic Challenge: the Blocking Effect of State Capacity on Diffusion 
The analysis first focuses on the diffusion of WHO drinking-water guidelines for chemicals for 
which the adoption of a national drinking-water standard may be challenging domestically. 
Adopting a drinking-water standard may represent a domestic challenge for arsenic if it is naturally 
present in water sources, for lead if it has been used decades ago in the construction of water pipes; 
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and for agricultural pesticides if they are heavily used in agriculture and therefore likely to 
contaminate water sources.  
4.1. Diffusion of the Arsenic Guideline to Latin American Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
This section analyzes the compliance of Latin American regulations with the WHO guideline for 
arsenic, whose significance for health and drinking-water treatment is uncontested and evident, 
and which is naturally present in many Latin American waters.  
Arsenic is clearly one of the most important and significant change in WHO guidelines over the 
last decades. Originally, in 1958, it was one of the few chemicals for which a limit was 
recommended in the WHO International Standards for Drinking-Water, for health concerns 
(carcinogenicity). This maximum allowable concentration was of 0.2 mg/L. In 1963, the following 
WHO International Standards lowered this value to 0.05 mg/L, which was maintained in the 1971 
International Standards and also in the 1984 WHO Guidelines (WHO, 1963; 1971; 1984; 2004).  
In 1993, following a revealed crisis of arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh from drinking water 
(coming from ground waters), the WHO Guidelines suggested a provisional guideline of 0.01 
mg/L. The guideline was provisional because the WHO acknowledged that health concerns would 
suggest a lower guideline (less than 0.001 mg/L) but that the limit for practical quantification was 
of 0.01 mg/L. Because of scientific uncertainties on arsenic carcinogenicity between 0.001 and 
0.01 mg/L, and also considering practical quantification limit and practical removal difficulties, 
the guideline was maintained at 0.01 in the 2004, 2008 and 2011 Guidelines. Arsenic was also 
identified as one of the few priority chemicals for drinking-water quality by the WHO starting in 
2004 (WHO, 1993; 2004; 2008). 
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Arsenic is a naturally occurring chemical whose health effects have been widely documented, 
including in Latin America. As early as in the 1950s and 1960s, research in Argentina and Chile 
were conducted on the impact of arsenic on health. The presence of arsenic in groundwater sources 
is not totally mapped yet in Latin America, but it is increasingly documented. Presence of arsenic 
has clearly been identified in waters of nine Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay (Bundschuh et al., 2008; 2011).  
Table 2 summarizes the changes in Latin American regulations for the limit value of arsenic, since 
the change of the WHO guideline in 1993 from a limit value of 0.05 to 0.01 mg/L. It also includes 
information on whether there is a documented presence of arsenic in ground water sources in the 
national territory and a measure of the level of state capacity (namely GDP per capita, but this 
table is replicated in Appendix 4 with two alternative measures of state capacity). 
Table 2. Natural Presence of Arsenic in Ground Waters, State Capacity and Drinking-Water 
Quality Regulations 
Country  Documented Natural 
Presence of Arsenic 
in Ground Waters 
State 
Capacity*  
1: weak, 2: 
medium, 3: strong 
Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Arsenic 
in Drinking Water (Year Regulation Adopted) 
Direct change of 
limit value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Argentina X 3  X (2007)  
Venezuela  3 X (1998)   
Brazil  3 X (2001)   
Uruguay X 3  X (2011)  
Mexico X 3   X (2000) 
Chile X 3  X (2007)  
Costa Rica  2 X (2005)   
Colombia  2 X (1998)   
Panama  2 X (1999)   
Ecuador  2 X (2005)   
Peru X 2  X (2010)**  
El Salvador X 1 X (1998)   
Guatemala X 1 X (2000)   
Honduras  1 X (1995)   
Bolivia X 1 X (2005)   
Nicaragua X 1 X (1994)   
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* Strong state capacity here defined as average GDP per capita in 1993 over 7000 US$, medium as between 2500 and 
7000 US$ and weak as less than 2500 US$ (2010 constant US$). Countries are in order from strongest to weakest. 
** In Peru, the number of years of the postponing period was not clearly defined. 
 
Overall, Table 2 suggests that when arsenic was naturally occurring in the ground waters of a 
country, strong state capacity limited the diffusion of the 0.01 guideline (postponing it for at least 
10 years when adopting it), but weak state capacity did not (incorporating it relatively quickly in 
national regulations). 
More specifically, Table 2 shows that all countries where there is no documented natural presence 
of arsenic in groundwater sources have adopted the 0.01 mg/L value directly, at the latest in 2005, 
this is to say right after the 2004 WHO Guidelines confirmed the 0.01 limit value and identified 
arsenic as a priority chemical for drinking-water quality. The case of Ecuador is particularly worth 
noting, as the 2005 regulation was changed in 2006 and followed by various updates (in 2008, 
2011 and 2012), but in all of these regulations, the limit value of 0.01 mg/L for arsenic was always 
maintained despite limit values for other substances were changed or included and removed from 
a regulation to another. 
Table 2 also suggests strongly that where natural presence of arsenic in ground waters is 
documented, countries reacted differently according to their level of state capacity. Where state 
capacity was weak (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), the limit value of 0.01 mg/L was 
adopted directly, at the latest in 2005. Where state capacity was strong or medium, the 0.01 mg/L 
put forward by the WHO since 1993 was included in national regulations only after arsenic had 
been identified as a priority by the WHO in 2004 but with a delay for entering into force of ten 
years (Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay) or simply not adopted (Mexico). The 2000 drinking-water 
quality regulation in Mexico adopted 0.02 mg/L as a limit value, to be reached progressively over 
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five years, and further proposals to update the drinking-water quality regulation after 2000 have 
not been adopted. 
4.2. Diffusion of the Lead Guideline to Latin American Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
This section analyzes the diffusion of the WHO drinking-water guideline for lead to Latin 
American national regulations. Levels of lead exceeding the WHO guideline have significant 
negative effects on health; its presence in drinking water comes mainly from pipes corrosion.  
Lead is found in drinking water “primarily from household plumbing systems containing lead” 
(WHO, 1993) and is one of the “few key chemicals [that may] cause large-scale health effects 
through drinking-water exposure” (WHO, 2004). The WHO health-based guideline was fixed at 
0.05 mg/L in 1984, which already represented an important decrease relative to the WHO drinking-
water standards of 1971 (when the limit for lead was of 0.10 mg/L). In 1993 it was further lowered 
to 0.01 mg/L, and has been maintained at this level in the following editions of the WHO 
Guidelines (WHO, 1971; 1984; 1993; 2004). 
In many Latin American countries, lead pipes have been used in the distribution system decades 
ago and have not been replaced or only partly been replaced. In some places, pipes are not made 
of lead themselves, but the welding to join them (for instance for pipes of galvanized iron) was 
made with lead. In both of these situations, the drinking water is likely, especially as pipes get 
older and increasingly corrode, to be contaminated by lead.   
Table 3 documents the changes in Latin American regulations regarding the limit value of lead 
since the WHO guideline changed in 1993 from 0.05 to 0.01 mg/L. It also indicates whether it was 
documented that at least one of the main cities of the country had lead water pipes or lead welds 
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in water pipes (see Appendix 2 for sources) and a measure of state capacity (namely GDP per 
capita, but this paper is replicated with two alternative measures of state capacity in Appendix 4).  
Table 3. Lead in Water Pipes, State Capacity and Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
Country Lead Water Pipes or 
Welds in at Least 
One Main City 
State 
Capacity*  
1: weak, 2: 
medium, 3: strong 
Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Lead in 
Drinking Water (Year Regulation In Force) 
Change of limit 
value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Argentina X 3   X 
Venezuela X 3 X (1998)   
Brazil  3 X (2003)   
Uruguay X 3  X (2011)  
Mexico  3 X (2000)   
Chile X 3   X 
Costa Rica X 2 X (2005)   
Colombia  2 X (1994)   
Panama X 2 X (1999)   
Ecuador  2 X (2005)   
Peru  2 X (2010)   
El Salvador X 1 X (1998)   
Guatemala  1 X (2000)   
Honduras  1 X (1995)   
Bolivia X 1 X (1997)   
Nicaragua  1 X (1994)   
* Strong state capacity here defined as average GDP per capita in 1993 over 7000 US$, medium as between 2500 and 
7000 US$ and weak as less than 2500 US$ (2010 constant US$). Countries are in order from strongest to weakest. 
Overall, Table 3 suggests that when there were lead water pipes or lead welds in water pipes in at 
least one main city, strong state capacity limited the diffusion of the 0.01 mg/L guideline in three 
out of four cases (in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, but not Venezuela). Besides, in all cases where 




4.3. Diffusion of Pesticides Guidelines to Latin American Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
This section compares the drinking-water quality standards adopted for agricultural pesticides by 
Latin American countries, following the WHO guidelines for these substances. The use of these 
pesticides in agricultural activities may contaminate water sources.  
The inclusion of heath-based guidelines for pesticides used in agriculture has been one significant 
source of changes in WHO drinking-water guidelines over the years. The first edition of the WHO 
guidelines in 1984 only included guidelines for eight pesticides. Its second edition, in 1993, added 
more than 20, and its amendment in 1998 five more. The 1998 amendment as well as the following 
editions of the guidelines changed some limit values and did some minor changes to the list of 
pesticides included (as scientific knowledge evolved and mostly as data on the levels of possible 
contamination of drinking water by pesticides could be compared to health-risky levels).   
The use of agricultural pesticides in Latin American countries has generally been increasing over 
the last decades. According to the limited data available from the FAOSTAT database, the average 
use of all pesticides use over the period vary from a country to another. Unfortunately, data on 
pesticide use available is not disaggregated by pesticide, so one cannot distinguish between which 
pesticide is a stronger domestic challenge for a country than another. Together with the available 
data, various studies, including from the early 1990s, documented that pesticide use was an 
important issue across Latin America, and that its prevalence was increasing (Bellotti et al., 1990; 
Schreinemachers and Tipraqsa, 2012). This suggests that the overall challenge associated with 
pesticides in Latin American countries is medium or strong in all countries.  
Even if there is one WHO guideline for each pesticide (i.e. 26, considering all pesticides for which 
a guideline was set in 1993 and not modified in 2004), Latin American countries have adopted 
national drinking-water quality standards for pesticides almost always at a single time (for a few 
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or more of the pesticides listed by the WHO). This can be observed in Graph 1, which shows the 
proportion of WHO pesticide guidelines adopted by each country over the years.  
Graph 1. Proportion of the 1993 WHO Pesticides Guidelines Included in Latin American 
National Regulations Over Time, 1993-2011 
 
 
Graph 1 evidences that countries adopted very different proportions of these pesticide guidelines. 
While some countries (like Bolivia, Peru and El Salvador) have almost adopted them all, some 
others (like Argentina) have barely adopted any. 
Graph 2 explores the relationships between the strength of state capacity and the adoption of 
drinking-water quality standards for pesticides (in a context, as detailed above, where the strength 
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of the domestic challenge for pesticides is average or high). It reports the proportion of the 1993 
WHO pesticides guidelines included in Latin American national regulations by 2011.  
Graph 2. Proportion of the 1993 WHO Pesticides Guidelines Included in National Drinking-
Water Quality Regulations, 2011 
 
 
Graph 2 suggests that, as state capacity increases, in a context where the domestic challenge is 
medium or strong, the adoption of diffused standards for pesticides weakens. However, the 
proportion of pesticide guidelines adopted nationally could be misleading, as it would be arguably 
redundant to monitor the quantity of a pesticide in drinking water if the pesticide is banned in the 
country. Moreover, strong states are perhaps more likely to have banned the most dangerous 
pesticides through other legislations, which would bias the data compiled. To explore this 
hypothesis, Graph 3 shows the percentage of pesticides that have been banned nationally or for 
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which there was a national standard complying with the WHO guideline, among all those for which 
the WHO had set a guideline, by country.  
Graph 3. Proportion of the 1993 WHO Pesticides Guidelines Included in National Drinking-
Water Quality Regulations or for which the Pesticide is Banned, 2011 
 
 
Overall, Graph 3 suggests the same relationships as Graph 2, i.e. that stronger state capacity limits 
the diffusion of pesticide standards (in a context where the domestic challenge is average or 
strong). 
Table 4 summarizes the main variations in variables noted through the comparative insights for 
the 16 Latin American countries under study regarding the diffusion of WHO guidelines for 
arsenic, lead and pesticides. The next two subsections trace the process of these changes in two 
countries (Bolivia and Chile) to identify the causal mechanisms at play.  
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Table 4. Summary of Variables for the Diffusion of WHO Guidelines for Arsenic, Lead and 





Diffusion of WHO Guidelines 
Arsenic  Lead  Pesticides 
Strong Strong - - - 
Strong Weak + + + 
Weak Strong + + N/A 
Weak Weak + + N/A 
 
4.4. Tracing the Process of the Changes in Arsenic, Lead and Pesticides Limit Values in Bolivia 
The Bolivian regulation of drinking-water quality is the Norma Boliviana 512 (NB 512). It was 
originally established in 1985, and then revised in 1997 and 2005. Considered as a technical 
regulation, it was developed (and has been revised) by a technical instance20 but nevertheless was 
officialised through governmental approval.  
The 1985 and 1997 versions of the NB 512 included few parameters, and no pesticides. In both of 
them the limit value for arsenic was set at 0.05 mg/L (WHO arsenic guideline of 1984). As for 
lead, whereas its limit value was of 0.10 mg/L in 1985 (corresponding to the 1971 WHO 
standards), it was lowered to 0.01 mg/L in 1997 (coherent with the WHO 1993 guideline).  
In 2005 the revision of the NB 512 came with many changes, among which the lowering of the 
limit for arsenic to 0.01 and the inclusion of pesticides limit values (referring to the WHO). The 
2005 NB 512 was reconfirmed in 2007 after the change of government. 
4.4.1. The adoption of the NB 512 in 1985 
The process of adoption of the NB 512 in 1985 could not be documented, as no archival 
documentation of the latter was available, and it wasn’t possible to identify (to eventually 
                                                          
 
20 In 1985, it was the Dirección General de Normas y Tecnología of the Ministro de Industria, Comercio y Turismo; 
from 1997 on it was the Instituto Boliviano de Normalización y de Calidad. 
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interview) participants in the process. Yet, the manager of a water provider in the 1980s was very 
straightforward about the setting of this regulation: “All these regulations [like the Norma 
Boliviana 512] were, in a certain way, a copy of those of the World Health Organization. Then, 
we worked, and we had advisers from the World Health Organization. When I was manager, I had 
a permanent adviser from the World Health Organization” (author’s translation, see Appendix 5).  
4.4.2. The revision of the NB 512 in 1997 
The 1997 revision of the NB 512 was developed by a technical committee, which included the 
Association of Enterprises of Drinking Water and Sanitation (Asociación de Empresas de Agua 
Potable y Saneamiento – ANESAPA), the Bolivian Association of Sanitary Engineering 
(Asociación Boliviana de Ingenieria Sanitaria – ABIS) and the Office for Basic Services 
(Dirección de Servicios Básicos). The process did not include much socialization and diffusion, as 
it was considered to address technical specifications. The more restrictive limit value for lead was 
not given particular attention, despite the fact that a higher limit value was allowed in the 
concession contract for drinking-water services and sanitation, which was enacted a few months 
prior to the NB 512, and in the regulation of the 1992 Environmental Law (Ley del Medio 
Ambiente) that defined quality parameters for water sources for human use (Superintendencia de 
Aguas, 1997; Bolivia, 1995; Interview with independent consultant).  
4.4.3. The revision of the NB 512 in 2005 
The revision of the NB 512 that led to the adoption of the regulation in 2005 included the work of 
a technical committee in 2002, in which participated academics, water providers and governmental 
instances related to the issue. Originally, the project of regulation included the integration of limit 
values for pesticides but not the lowering of the limit of arsenic. It maintained the lead limit value 
(which had been lowered in the past revision). Some of the observations made by participants to 
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this committee in January 2002 concerned pesticides: noting the limit values proposed may not be 
achievable in the country, that the most used pesticides should be mentioned explicitly, and that 
some pesticides should be further restricted. Yet it was apparently little discussed and definitively 
it was decided to maintain the pesticides limit values in the regulation. Similarly, for lead, two 
water providers noted they would prefer to increase the limit value, but it remained restrictive as 
in the 1997 revision (IBNORCA archives). 
The proposed NB 512 was revised again by a smaller technical committee in 2004 before being 
published in 2005.  It is at this step that it was decided that the arsenic limit value would be lowered 
and the pesticide limit values would refer to the WHO guidelines. According to an interviewee 
who participated actively in the revision of the regulation, the extent to which pesticides were 
likely to be encountered in drinking water was unknown (and was not planned to be studied further 
in a short-time perspective). As for arsenic, it was not reported that any discussion took place 
regarding whether it was an upcoming challenge. (IBNORCA archives)  
It was further evidenced that the applicability of the new NB512 had not been studied prior to its 
adoption when, in 2010, some water providers wrote to the Ministry of Water to complain that 
they couldn’t comply with the NB512 (IBNORCA archives). A interviewee in charge of the 
laboratory of one of the main water providers in Bolivia mentioned that the first time the 
laboratories of water providers were consulted regarding the applicability of the limit values was 
in 2010, in preparation of the second edition of the Reglamento Nacional para el Control de la 
Calidad del Agua para Consumo Humano (implementing the NB512).  
Overall, according to the information of the Bolivian processes that could be located, it seems that 
the domestic challenges were not documented during the process of revising regulations, and 
although a few actors did mention some of the limit values may not be achievable in the country, 
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neither the lack of information or these advices impeded the inclusion of these more restrictive 
limit values for arsenic, lead and pesticides. This is in line with hypothesis 1.3, according to which, 
the strength of the domestic challenge does not limit the adoption of a diffused policy when state 
capacity is weak. The analysis suggests that the causal mechanism is indeed that, as domestic 
challenges are not documented by governmental instances and stakeholders do not put pressure to 
prevent the adoption of more restrictive regulations, the diffused policy is adopted extensively 
without much preoccupation. 
4.5. Tracing the Process of the Evolution of Pesticides, Arsenic and Lead Limit Values in Chile 
The Chilean regulation of drinking-water quality is the Norma Chilena 409 (NCh409), which was 
originally established in 1970 and had revisions adopted in 1984 and 2007. The regulations were 
prepared by a technical institute (the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Tecnlógicas y 
Normalización originally, then the Instituto Nacional de Normalización), and then officialised by 
the Ministerio de Obras Públicas (in 1970) and the Ministerio de Salud (in 1984 and 2007). The 
change of ministry officialising the regulation was not pointless. Indeed, a supreme decree of the 
Health Ministry adopted in 1969 (DS735/69) was competing with the Public Works Ministry 
regulation of 1970 until 1984, when both were harmonized and merged. 
4.5.1. The contentious limit value for arsenic 
One (apparently the most) contentious issue between the Norma Chilena 409 of 1970 and the 
Health Ministry’s Supreme Decree of 1969 was precisely the limit value of arsenic (Interview with 
civil servant from Health Ministry). Whereas the decree set this value at 0.05 mg/L (like the WHO 
standards of 1963) the NCh409/Of70 set it at 0.12. The revised version of the NCh409 in 1984 
changed to a limit value of 0.05 for arsenic. In 2007, the last revision adopted a limit value of 0.01, 
to be effective 10 years after the promulgation of the regulation (i.e. in 2017).  
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During the revision process of the NCh409 in 1978-1983, the limit value for arsenic was highly 
discussed. SENDOS and EMOS (main water providers) wanted the limit value to, respectively, 
stay at 0.12 or be at 0.10 (INN Ruta Digital NCh409). An interviewee who participated in the 
process recalled: “I remember that SENDOS was the most preoccupied. It said: ‘How will I comply 
with this? Arsenic, how do I comply?’” (author’s translation, see Appendix 5). The Health Ministry 
insisted on the limit value to be at 0.05. The disagreement was so important that the Health 
Ministry stopped participating in the meetings and the revision process was interrupted in June 
1983. The revision process was resumed in December 1983 following a letter from SENDOS 
which stated that it was finally agreeing for the limit value of arsenic to be 0.05, which was required 
for them to get project funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (INN Ruta Digital 
NCh409).  
The revision process of the NCh409, which took place from 1998 until 2004, was also suspended 
because of a disagreement at least partly on the limit value for arsenic (in Novembre 1999). The 
Health Ministry stood firm in the process. One civil servant from the Health Ministry narrated: “I 
would say that what influenced a lot the 2005 revision was that the Health Ministry had its own 
regulation [Reglamento] and it started to implement it and sanction […]. Then came a moment 
when we said: ‘OK, let’s find an agreement’… As well as there were other parameters that the 
Health Ministry wanted to integrate in the national standards [Norma]” (author’s translation, see 
Appendix 5). To resolve the disagreement, the Health Ministry and the Superintendencia de 
Servicios Sanitarios conducted bilateral discussions of which the results were later presented to 
the committee. The bilateral proposition they reach suggested a limit value of 0.01 for arsenic with 
a delay of 10 years to enter into force, which was the value then accepted by the committee and 
promulgated in the revised regulation (INN Ruta Digital NCh409).   
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4.5.2. Downplayed Limit Values for Pesticides 
As for pesticides, none were included in the regulations up to 1984, in which nine were included 
but with recommended (not mandatory) limit values: aldrin and dieldrin, chlordane, 2,4-D, endrin, 
fenoprop, heptachlor (& heptachlor epoxide), hexachlorobenzene, lindane and methoxychlor; four 
of these were prohibited in the country in 1987, two later on (in 1998 and 2002).  In the NCh409 
of 2007, four pesticides had limit values: 2,4-D, lindane (prohibited in 1998), methoxychlor and 
pentachlorophenol (prohibited in 2004).  
In the revision process of 1978-1983, the committee decided in June 1982 to remove the limit 
values for pesticides of the NCh409 to put it in an appendix and as recommended instead of 
mandatory. This was how pesticides ended in the revised NCh409 adopted in 1984.  
In the 1998-2004 revision process, the inclusion of pesticides was discussed and apparently a 
contentious issue. At some point the CONAMA informed it considered inconvenient to add more 
pesticides to the NCh409, also mentioning that the technique for detection would imply costs to 
water providers. It suggested to better document the use and presence in water of pesticides before 
adding them to the NCh409. An interviewee who participated in the process recalled that a study 
indeed documented further the pesticide-removal capacity and the presence of pesticides in the 
country, to balance it with the cost these treatments would imply: 
“As for the organic parameters, there were changes in the pesticides […]. Chile did 
not copy the guidelines of the World Health Organization (poor countries do so), 
but rather there was a real study that was conducted to assess what we would be 
able to accept. […] This study analyzed what treatments could achieve and the 
removal of parameters […] and there was also a study to know which organic 
parameters we have in our country. Why? Because the list of the World Health 
Organization is enormous. If you accept all of it, there is no purse that can afford 
the monitoring” (author’s translation, see Appendix 5).  
The Health Ministry-SISS bilateral agreement mentioned here above proposed the inclusion of six 
agricultural pesticides: four that ended up in the revised NCh409 as well as aldicarb and 
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carbofurane. After consultation with the Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero, the committee excluded 
these latter two, as they were not considered persistent in water (INN Ruta Digital NCh409). 
4.5.3. The Overlooked Limit Value for Lead 
As for lead, the limit value in the NCh409 of 1984 was set to 0.05 mg/L and maintained at this 
level in the 2007 revision, despite the fact that WHO lowered its guideline to 0.01 mg/L in 1993.  
The limit value was decided to be set at 0.05 in 1984 following a specific analysis for this 
parameter. First, the draft regulations of 1978 and 1981 suggested to maintain the 0.10 mg/L limit 
value that was existing in the previous regulation. After observations were raised on this specific 
value, the technical committee resolved on May 31, 1983 to fix the limit value at 0.05 mg/L 
considering four points: 1) the guideline set by the WHO; 2) the absence of data on lead analyses 
in water (generally in Chile); 3) specific analyses of water did not find lead; and 4) in 1981 the 
national office in charge of drinking-water services (Servicio Nacional de Obras Sanitarias – 
SENDOS) had conducted lead analysis in all water services and did not find any (INN Ruta Digital 
NCh409).  
In the process of revision of the NCh409 which concluded in 2007, lead was not reported to be 
parts of the contentious issues. However, the limit was maintained higher than the WHO guideline 
and a representative from a water provider mentioned it was well known that an upcoming issue 
in the sector would be to deal with lead, since in many city areas the distributive system was built 
of water pipes getting old with welds containing lead (INN Ruta Digital NCh409; Interview with 
a water provider’s representative).  
Overall, both the limit value for arsenic and the inclusion of pesticides in the Chilean drinking-
water-quality regulation were contentious. They were debated and the opinion of stakeholders 
(water providers and agricultural sector) weighted heavily in the decision. The WHO guidelines 
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were definitely giving a diffusion pressure, but that was dealt with nationally. Especially in the 
case of arsenic, the strength of the domestic challenge made no doubt to the deciders in Chile, and 
stakeholders did influence the regulations finally adopted. For pesticides, the potential cost that 
would have been required for the monitoring of the presence of pesticides in drinking water seemed 
the most determinant in explaining the adoption of only a very limited number of limit values. As 
for lead, indications of specific debates or direct pressures from water providers for its non-
inclusion were not found, but it made no doubt to one of the participant of the process that the fact 
that it represented a challenge domestically influenced the non-diffusion of the most restrictive 
1993 WHO guideline. In the 1984 process, when changing the standard wasn’t a domestic 
challenge (according to documentation), the 1984 WHO guideline was adopted. Therefore, the 
analysis of the adoption processes in Chile suggests that hypothesis 1.1, which states that a strong 
domestic challenge leads strong states to limit policy diffusion, is confirmed, as well as hypothesis 
1.2, which states that if the domestic challenge is weak, than adoption is extensive. 
The analysis highlights two causal mechanisms. First, the adoption of diffused policies is limited 
when state instances document that the standard would not be a challenge domestically, and 
extensive if documentation concludes it isn’t. Second, the adoption of diffused policies is limited 
when a stakeholder that would bear the cost of the new measures put pressure on the state to 
prevent the adoption of more restrictive regulations. 
5. When Facing a Transboundary Challenge: Another Arena of Action for Strong States 
This section intends to assess the impact of a transboundary challenge on diffusion. To do so, it 
traces, through qualitative insights, the processes of adoption of drinking-water regulations for 
copper in 16 Latin American countries following the change of the WHO guideline in 1993. Then, 
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through a within-case approach, it analyses the decision-making process and the causal pathways 
behind the adoption of national drinking-water standards for copper in two case studies where the 
strength of the transboundary challenge differs: Bolivia and Chile. 
5.1. The Transboundary Nature of the Challenge Associated with a Drinking-Water Standard for 
Copper 
Although both lead and copper have the same potential source of contamination of water (through 
corrosion of water pipes), the challenge associated with a drinking-water standard for copper is 
(contrary to lead, studied in section 4.2) not only domestic, but also transboundary. Indeed, lead is 
not used anymore to produce water pipes, although it has been used widely a few decades ago. 
Therefore drinking water of various (but not all) countries passes through lead water pipes, and 
the limit value for lead in drinking water represents a domestic-only challenge. However, water 
pipes sold on the international market over the last decades are mostly made of steel (including 
iron and nickel), copper and plastic (Lazich and Burton, 2007). The challenge associated with 
establishing a limit value for copper in drinking water has consequently a transboundary dimension 
that the lead one does not.  
5.2. Comparative Insights on the Adoption of National Drinking-Water Standards for Copper in 
Latin America 
The guideline for copper in the 1984 WHO Guideline was of 1.0 mg/L, based on laundry and 
staining properties, not specifically on health. In 1993, a health-based guideline was provisionally 
set at 2 mg/L and was further confirmed in the 2004 and 2011 WHO Guidelines. The 1993 
guideline was less restrictive than the one of 1984, but at the same time directly associated with 
health (rather than only to laundry and other staining properties as in 1984). This modification 
contrasted with the others made in the 1993 WHO guidelines, which mostly integrated new 
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chemical health-based guidelines (like for pesticides) or modified existing guidelines to make them 
more restrictive (like for arsenic and lead) (WHO, 1984; 1993; 2004). 
All Latin American countries adopted at least one drinking-water quality regulation post-1993 
(after the change of the WHO guideline) and all of these regulations complied with the less 
restrictive guideline of 1993 for copper (2.0 mg/L). Interestingly however, some maintained a 
more restrictive guideline posterior to 1993, of 1.0 mg/L (the 1984 WHO guideline) or 1.5 mg/L 
(the 1971 WHO standard) (see Table 5).   
Table 5. Copper Production, State Capacity and Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
Country Copper 
Producers  
(1990 Mineral Rents  
as % of GDP) 
State 
Capacity*  
1: weak,  
2: medium,  
3: strong 
Adoption of Limit Value for Copper in Drinking 
Water post-1993 (Year in Force) 
Inferior to 1.5 mg/L 
maintained 
2.0 mg/L as  first 
regulation 
Increased to 2.0 
from 1.0 or 1.5 
Argentina  3 X (1994, 2007)   
Venezuela  3 X (1998)   
Brazil X (0.65%) 3   X (2003) 
Uruguay  3 X (1994, 2006)   
Mexico X (0.62%) 3   X (1996, 2000) 
Chile X (10.02%) 3   X (2007) 
Costa Rica  2  X (1997, 2005)  
Colombia  2 X (1994, 1998, 2007)   
Panama  2  X (1999, 2003)  
Ecuador  2 X (2005, 2006)   
Peru X (5.96%) 2   X (2010) 
El Salvador  1 X (1998, 2006, 2009)   
Guatemala  1 X (2000)   
Honduras  1  X (1995)  
Bolivia  1 X (1997, 2005)   
Nicaragua  1  X (1994)  
* Strong state capacity here defined as average GDP per capita in 1993 over 7000 US$, medium as between 2500 and 
7000 US$ and weak as less than 2500 US$ (2010 constant US$). Countries are in order from strongest to weakest. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the chronology of adoption of Latin American regulations suggests that 
the limit value they set for copper is largely determined by the year of the first adoption of a 
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national regulation and the extent to which copper is associated with a transboundary challenge 
for the country.  
On the one hand, some Latin American countries have adopted drinking-water regulations prior to 
1993, and some have only adopted their first drinking-water quality regulation after 1993. For the 
latter, the limit value of 2.0 mg/L was adopted, which was the most recent WHO guideline for 
copper at the time of adoption (see Table 5). 
On the other hand, for countries that had a drinking-water quality guideline prior to 1993, the 
guideline for copper was not necessarily modified. All countries that were not copper producers, 
i.e. for which copper was not a transboundary challenge, have maintained in their post-1993 
regulations a more restrictive limit value. Besides, all countries that were copper producers in 1993 
have changed the limit value for copper in their first drinking-water quality regulation post-1993 
(see Table 5). 
5.3. Tracing Process of Drinking-Water Regulations for Copper in Bolivia and Chile 
To analyze the causal pathways leading to the adoption (or not) of drinking-water quality 
regulations for chemical representing a transboundary challenge, this section traces the process of 
the adoption and revision of limit values for copper in national drinking-water regulations in two 
case studies: Bolivia and Chile. Generally the committees and processes were the same ones that 
developed drinking-water regulations for other parameters, including for lead (see sections 4.4 and 
4.5 for the description of these committees and processes). Therefore this section only presents the 
specificities of the decisions made on the limit value for copper.  
In Bolivia, the limit value for copper was set at 0.05 mg/L in 1997 (significantly lower than the 
WHO guideline) and then at 1.0 mg/L in 2005. The limit value in the NB 512 of 1997 took up the 
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value of the regulation of the 1992 Environmental Law (Ley del Medio Ambiente) that defined 
quality parameters for water sources for human use. As the NB 512 was considered to be a 
“technical regulation” the process was not much socialized nor diffused. The limit value for copper 
was not particularly discussed, although it was more restrictive than the concession contract for 
drinking-water services and sanitation in La Paz and El Alto, which was enacted a few months 
prior to the NB 512 (Superintendencia de Aguas, 1997; Bolivia, 1995; Interviews with civil servant 
from Health Ministry and worker from water provider).  
In Chile, the limit value of 1.0 mg/L was included in the NCh409 of 1985 and was increased to 
2.0 mg/L in the 2007 revision of the regulation. The limit value was fixed at 1.0 mg/L in the 1985 
edition without major discussion. It was fixed early in the process, in the draft regulation of 
November 25, 1981, and was not reported to be contested. However the WHO fixed in 1993 and 
confirmed in 2004 a health-based guideline for copper in drinking water at 2.0 mg/L. Although 
lower, the 1984 WHO guideline was not a health-based guideline, and therefore did not link health 
to the presence of copper in drinking water. This association was however made by the WHO 
starting in 1993, and a technical commission was created in Chile specifically to assist the 
government in its negotiations with the WHO, foreign countries and other international 
organizations about the revision of the “WHO drinking-water quality guidelines” and specifically 
the negotiations regarding copper and drinking water (Chile, 1997; 2000; INN Ruta Digital 
NCh409). 
In the Chilean process of revision of the NCh409 that started in 1998 and concluded in 2005 with 
its adoption, copper was one of the specific parameters on which there was disagreement between 
the Health Ministry and the INN technical committee, which led to a suspension of the process in 
November 1999. As the process resumed in 2000, the limit value considered for copper was of 1.0 
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mg/L, as a result of bilateral discussions between the Health Ministry and the Superintendencia de 
Servicios Sanitarios. But this value did not stand and was finally not adopted in the regulation. 
Indeed in July 2004 the Chilean Commission of Copper (Comisión chilena del Cobre – 
COCHILCO) objected it arguing that the limit value of 1.0 mg/L would give the signal that the 
scientific view previously expressed by Chile to the WHO had changed. It also stated that this 
change of view could influence changes for a more restrictive guideline (of 1.0 mg/L) to be adopted 
by the WHO and European Union and have economic consequences (on the pipes market and on 
the cost of reducing copper in drinking water worldwide). Following this representation and 
discussion within the committee, the limit value adopted was finally that of 2.0 mg/L (INN Ruta 
Digital NCh409). 
Overall, the processes of decision-making for regulation for copper in drinking water in Bolivia 
and Chile suggest that whereas in a country where the policy diffused represents a weak 
transboundary challenge, a most restrictive policy may be adopted or maintained, the situation is 
completely different in a country where the policy diffused entails a strong transboundary 
challenge. Indeed, then only the less restrictive (modified) policy is likely to be adopted. Moreover, 
the Chilean case suggests that, when state capacity is strong, there can be pressure from 
stakeholders toward the state, in order to develop knowledge and try to influence the international 
standardization of the policy.  
Conclusion 
By analyzing positive and negative cases of diffusion, this paper sheds light on the varying 
adoption patterns of non-politicized policies diffused by international actors. Its main finding 
suggests that stronger state capacity limits the adoption of diffused policies that represent a strong 
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domestic challenge for the country. International influences weigh heavier where state capacity is 
weaker and may, in these cases, lead to the adoption of more ambitious policies than if the policy 
was only developed nationally (and therefore constrained by the weak capacity of the state). 
Conversely, when state capacity is strong, policy adoption is likely to be cautious and informed by 
national constraints, and therefore less likely to be influenced strongly by foreign entities or ideas.  
This main result originally contributes to the diffusion literature by, first, comforting and 
complementing the argument that policy diffusion depends on the extent of pressures exerted by 
international organizations on countries. The results are coherent with the expectation that the 
adoption of diffused policies is more extended in weak states (likely to be more dependent on 
international organizations), but they also suggest that external pressures do not explain all 
variations. Indeed, strong states also adopt diffused policies, but they tend to do so when the 
domestic challenge is weak. Nevertheless, it remains that it is only in weak states that otherwise 
cautious policy development may be ambitious under international influences. Whether this 
“ambitious” policy development goes beyond mere window dressing then depends on the 
implementation process (which is analyzed in this dissertation’s third paper).  
The main argument of this paper also suggests that it is important for the diffusion literature to 
distinguish the adoption step from the spread one. Indeed, actors that may be important for the 
spread (like policy entrepreneurs, expert networks, etc.) are not necessarily decisive at the time of 
adoption. Strong states appear less permeable to policy entrepreneurs than weak states, in this 
sense, given that they assess the strength of the domestic challenge entailed by a diffused policy 
before its adoption.  
Additionally, this paper highlights the importance of a dimension of diffused policy that has been 
largely overlooked: the level of the challenge. A policy entailing a challenge that is essentially 
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domestic (i.e. that countries are only affected whenever it is implemented within their own borders) 
has very different implications than one where the challenge would be transboundary (i.e. countries 
care whether others implement the said policy). This distinction has not been made in the diffusion 
literature, yet this variable has consequences for the study of diffusion processes. Indeed, if the 
challenge that a diffused policy poses is transboundary (rather than domestic), then analyzing the 
spread and adoption steps of the diffusion process is not sufficient to understand key dynamics. 
Studying the standardization step of policy diffusion is then central to the analysis. This is because 
strong states also have the possibility to influence international policy if they have an interest in 
the impact international influences may have in other countries. In this case, and if they are 
successful in changing the international policy, diffused policies may be largely adopted. But the 
reason for this extensive adoption would be that the policy was modified prior to diffusion, to 
lessen the transboundary challenge it was embodying for some states.   
More generally, this paper contributes to the institutionalist literature by the definition of state 
capacity it is based on. It underlines the relevance to compare and measure state capacity on the 
basis of its resources (required to project its power), rather than on its ends or outcomes (which 
depend on the political choices that were made by the state). This definition allows to conceptually 
and empirically dissociate state capacity from the political choices that are made to develop 
specific functional capacities. 
Substantively, this paper also contributes to the understanding of the development of the water 
sector in Latin America, and more specifically of one dimension of water reforms (the adoption of 
drinking-water standards) that had been little documented. This study outlines that these standards 
are one piece of the regulatory framework that was influenced by unique dynamics, distinct from 
those of water reforms generally. For instance, their development involved actors from outside the 
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sector and was strongly influenced by the World Health Organization’s guidelines. This paper 
evidences that water reforms, like reforms in other policy sectors, are not a homogeneous whole. 
Their understanding therefore calls for the necessary disaggregation of dynamics and actors on an 
issue-per-issue basis, which is what this paper has done for the adoption of drinking-water 
standards. These issues, less salient than strongly politicized ones (like privatization reforms), are 





Akbar, Nafisa and Susan L. Ostermann. 2015. “Understanding, Defining, and Measuring State 
Capacity in India.” Asian Survey 55 (5): 845-861. 
Armada, Francisco, Carles Muntaner and Vicente Navarro. 2001. “Health and Social Security 
Reforms in Latin America: The Convergence of the World Health Organization, the World Bank, 
and Transnational Corporations.” International Journal of Health Services 31(4): 729-768. 
Bastos, Rafael K. X., Leo Heller, Paula D. Bevilacqua, Valter L. Pádua and Cristina C. S. Brandão. 
2004. “Legislação sobre controle e vigilância da qualidade da água para consumo humano. A 
experiência brasileira comparada à Panamericana”. Paper presented at the 29th Inter-American 
Congress of Sanitary Engineering and Environmental Sciences (AIDIS), San Juan, Puerto Rico.  
Beck, Nathaniel, Katz, Jonathan N., and Richard Tucker (1998). “Taking Time Seriously in Binary 
Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 42(4): 1260-1288. 
Bellotti, A. C., C. Cardona and S. L. Lapointe. 1990. “Trends in Pesticide Use in Colombia and 
Brazil.” Journal of Agricultural Entomology 7(3): 191-201.  
Boix, Carles. 1998. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic 
Economic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bolivia. 1995. Decreto Supremo Nº 24176. Anexo 4. Reglamento en materia de contaminación 
hídrica. December 8. 
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding Interaction 
Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14 (1/ Winter): 63-82. 
Braumoeller, Bear F. 2004. “Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms.” 
International Organization 58 (4/ Autumn): 807-820. 
Bundschuh, Jochen, Alejo Pérez Carrera and Marta Litter (eds). 2008. Iberoarsen. Distribución 
del arsénico en las regions Ibérica e Iberoamericana. Argentina: Programa Iberoamericano de 
Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo (CYTED).  
Bundschuh, Jochen et al. 2011. “One century of arsenic exposure in Latin America: A review of 
history and occurrence from 14 countries”. Science of the Total Environment 429: 2-35.   
CEPIS – Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente. 2004. Normas 
sobre la calidad del agua para consumo humano en el Perú: Estudio jurídico-legal. Lima: Pan-
American Health Organization/ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.  
Chile, Ministerio de Minería. 1997. Decreto 215 – Prorroga Funcionamiento de Comisión Técnica 
Asesora creada por Decreto No296, de 1993. November 6. 
Chile, Ministerio de Minería. 2000. Decreto 125 – Renueva funcionamiento de la Comisión 
Técnica Asesora del Presidente de la República, en las negociaciones con la Organización 
156 
 
Mundial de la Salud (OMS), creada por Decreto nº 296 de 1993, y modifica números que indica. 
June 20. 
Dawson, Jeremy F. 2014. “Moderation in Management Research: What, Why, When, and How.” 
Journal of Business and Psychology 29 (1/ March): 1-19. 
Dargent, Eduardo, Gabriela Lotta, José Antonio Mejía and Gilberto Moncada. 2018. ¿A quién le 
importa saber? La economía política de la capacidad estadística en América Latina. Washington: 
Inter-American Development Bank.  
de Gouvello, Bernard and Jean-Marc Fournier. 2002. “ Résistances locales aux « privatisations » 
des services de l’eau : les cas de Tucuman (Argentine) et Cochabamba (Bolivie).” Autrepart (21) : 
69-82. 
Dobbin, Frank, Beth Simmons and Geoffrey Garrett. 2007. “The Global Diffusion of Public 
Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?” Annual Review of Sociology 
33: 449-472. 
Dolowitz, David and David Marsh. 1996. “Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy 
Transfer Literature.” Political Studies XLIV: 343-351. 
Dunlop, Claire A. 2009. “Policy transfer as learning: capturing variation in what decision-makers 
learn from epistemic communities.” Policy Studies 30(3): 289-311. 
Galal-Gorchev, Hend, Guntis Ozolins and Xavier Bonnefoy. 1993. “Revision of the WHO 
guidelines for drinking-water quality.” Annali dell’Istituto Superiore di Sanità 29 (2): 335-345. 
Garcia, Leisy and José Iannacone. 2014. “Pseudomonas aeruginosa un indicador complementario 
de la calidad de agua potable: análisis bibliográfico a nivel de Sudamérica”. The Biologist 12 (1): 
133-152. 
Guzman, Andrew T. and Katerina Linos. 2014. “Human Rights Backsliding.” California Law 
Review 102 (3): 603-654. 
 
Hanson, Jonathan K. and Rachel Sigman. 2013. “Leviathan's Latent Dimensions: Measuring State 
Capacity for Comparative Political Research.” Manuscript, September.  
Hendrix, Cullen S. 2010. “Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the 
study of civil conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 47 (3/ May): 273-285. 
Henisz, Witold J., Bennet A. Zelner and Mauro F. Guillén. 2005. “The Worldwide Diffusion of 
Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977-1999.” American Sociological Review 70(6): 871-
897. 
Herrera, Veronica and Alison E. Post. 2014. “Can Developing Countries Both Decentralize and 
Depoliticize Urban Water Services? Evaluating the Legacy of the 1990s Reform Wave.” World 
Development 64 (December): 621-641. 
157 
 
James, Oliver and Martin Lodge. 2003. “The Limitations of ‘Policy Transfer’ and ‘Lesson 
Drawing’ for Public Policy Research.” Political Studies Review 1: 179-193. 
Jordana, Jacint and David Levi-Faur. 2005. “The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin 
America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order.” The Annals of the 
American Academy 598 (1): 102-124. 
 
Karch, Andrew. 2007. “Emerging Issues and Future Directions in State Policy Diffusion 
Research.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 7 (1, Spring): 54-80. 
Kurtz, Marcus J. and Andrew Schrank. 2012. “Capturing State Strength: Experimental and 
Econometric Approaches.” Revista de Ciencia Política 32(3): 613-621. 
Lazich, Robert S. and Virgil L. Burton. 2007. "Pipe Demand, 2004" Market Share Reporter. 
Detroit: Gale. In: Business Insights: Essentials. 
Lee, Melissa M. and Nan Zhang. 2017. “Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State 
Capacity.” The Journal of Politics 79 (1/ January) : 118-132. 
Lindvall, Johannes and Jan Theorell. 2016. “State Capacity as Power: A Conceptual Framework”. 
Paper presented at the Annual Congress of the American Political Science Association, September 
3. 
Linos, Katerina. 2013. The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family, and 
Employment Laws Spread Across Countries. Oxford University Press. 
Luna, Juan Pablo and Sergio Toro Maureira. 2014. “State Capacity and Democratic Governance 
in Latin America: A Survey Data‐Based Approach to Measurement and Assessment.” 
AmericasBarometer Insights (number 102). 
Luna, Juan Pablo and Hillel David Soifer. 2015. “Surveying State Capacity.” AmericasBarometer 
Insights (number 119). 
Luna, Juan Pablo and Hillel David Soifer. 2017. “Capturing Sub-National Variation in State 
Capacity: A Survey-Based Approach.” American Behavioral Scientist 61 (8): 887-907. 
Marsh, David and J.C. Sharman. 2009. “Policy diffusion and policy transfer.” Policy Studies 30 
(3, June): 269-288. 
Mella, Sergio. 2006. “Estudio comparativo de normas de calidad de agua potable en distintos 
países de América”, Ciencias 6 (4), URL: 
http://www.ub.edu.ar/revistas_digitales/Ciencias/Vol6Numero4/articulos.htm.  
Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2009. Political Competition, Partisanship, and Policy Making in Latin 
American Public Utilities. Cambridge University Press. 
Orihuela, José Carlos. 2014. “Converging Divergence: the Diffusion of the Green State in Latin 
America.” Studies in Comparative International Development 49(2): 242-265. 
158 
 
Pinto, Vivian Gemiliano. 2006. “Análise comparativa de legislações relativas à qualidade da água 
para consumo humano na América do Sul”. Master’s Thesis, Federal University of Minas Gervais.  
Pinto, Vívian Gemiliano, Léo Heller, Rafael K.X Bastos and Valter Lúcio de Pádua. 2005. 
“Discussão comparativa das legislações sobre controle da qualidade da água para consumo 
humano em países do continente americano”. In Associaçao Brasileira de Engenharia Sanitaria e 
Ambiental. Saneamento ambiental Brasileiro: Utopia ou realidade? Rio de Janeiro: ABES 
(Associaçao Brasileira de Engenharia Sanitaria e Ambiental), 1-20. 
Pinto, Vivian Gemiliano, Léo Heller and Rafael Kopschitz Xavier Bastos. 2012. “Drinking water 
standards in South American countries: convergences and divergences”. Journal of Water and 
Health 10 (2): 295-310. 
Schreinemachers, Pepijn and  Prasnee Tipraqsa. 2012. “Agricultural pesticides and land use 
intensification in high, middle and low income countries.” Food Policy 37(6): 616-626. 
Seawright, Jason. 2016. Multi-method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative 
Tools. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shipan, Charles R. and Craig Volden. 2012. “Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and 
Practitioners.” Public Administration Review 72 (6): 788-796. 
Simmons, Erica S. 2016. Meaningful Resistance: Market Reforms and the Roots of Social Protest 
in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research.” 
In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In. New 
York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-37. 
Soifer, Hillel David. 2013. “State Power and the Economic Origins of Democracy.” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 48 (1): 1-22. 
Soifer, Hillel David. 2015. State Building in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Solsona, Felipe. 1999. “Las Guías OMS para la calidad del agua potable y las normas de calidad 
de agua de los países del Mercosur.” Work presented in the workshop Normas de Calidad de 
Aguas para distintos usos en el Mercosur, Rosario (Argentina), September 9-10.  
Stallings, Barbara. 1992. “International Influence on Economic Policy, Debt Stabilization, and 
Structural Reform.” In Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds). The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 41-89. 




Superintendencia de Aguas (Bolivia). 1997. Contrato de Regimen de Bienes Aguas del Illimani. 
La Paz: mimeo. 
Truque B., Paula Andrea. 2005. Armonización de los Estándares de Agua Potable en las Americas. 
Department of Sustainable Development, Organization of American States. URL: 
http://www.oas.org/dsd/publications/classifications/Armoniz.EstandaresAguaPotable.pdf  
UNESCO. 2004. EFA (Education for All) Global Monitoring Report 2003/4 - Regional Overview: 
Latin America and the Caribbean. URL: https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/sites/gem-
report/files/laamcari.pdf   
World Bank. 2017a. “Statistical Capacity Indicators.” The World Bank DataBank. URL: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/statistical-capacity-indicators  
World Bank. 2017b. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” The World Bank DataBank. URL: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/worldwide-governance-indicators 
World Health Organization (WHO). 1958. International Standards for Drinking-Water. Geneva: 
WHO. 
World Health Organization (WHO). 1963. International Standards for Drinking-Water. Second 
Edition. Geneva: WHO. 
World Health Organization (WHO). 1971. International Standards for Drinking-Water. Third 
Edition. Geneva: WHO. 
World Health Organization (WHO). 1984. Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. First Edition. 
Geneva: WHO.  
World Health Organization (WHO). 1993. Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. Second 
Edition. Volume 1. Geneva: WHO.  
World Health Organization (WHO). 1998. Addendum to Volume 1 of Second Edition of Guidelines 
for Drinking-Water Quality. Geneva: WHO.  
World Health Organization (WHO). 2004. Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. Third Edition. 
Volume 1. Geneva: WHO.  
World Health Organization (WHO). 2008. Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. Third Edition 
Incorporating the First and Second Addenda. Volume 1. Geneva: WHO.  
World Health Organization (WHO). 2011. Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality. Fourth Edition. 




Appendix 1. List of Chemical Substances for which the WHO Set a Health-based Guideline 











































From agricultural activities 
Non-pesticides (mg/L) 
Nitrate (as NO3-) 
Nitrite (as NO2-) 
Pesticides used in agriculture (ug/L) 
Alachlor 
Aldicarb 























MCPA [4-(2-methyl-4-chlorophenoxy)acetic acid] 














































Contaminants from pipes and fittings 
Antimony 







Pesticides used in water for public health purposes 
Chlorpyrifos 
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Appendix 3. List of Interviewees 
Most interviewees requested not to be identified when quoted and not to be named. This is what 
explains the format of the list of interviewees listed hereafter and the way references are made to 
interviews in the text. 
 
Bolivia 
Five of the interviewees directly participated in at least one process of revision of the NB512. 
Alejandro Luján, officer for Water and Environmental Health, UNICEF, La Paz, 2014. 
Ana María Romero, Centro Aguas y Saneamiento Ambiental, Cochabamba, 2014. 
Claudia Vargas Vucsanovich, expert on water and sanitation, videoconference interview, 2014. 
Civil servant 1 from Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico (AAPS), Cochabamba, 2014. 
Civil servant 2 from Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico (AAPS), La Paz, 2014. 
Civil servant 1 from Dirección de Planificación, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, 
Cochabamba, 2013. 
Civil servant 2 from Dirección de Planificación, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, 
Cochabamba, 2013. 
Civil servant from Viceministro, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua, Cochabamba, 2013. 
Civil servant from Health Ministry, 1980s-1990s, phone interview, 2016. 
Edwin Astorga, Instituto de Ingeniería Sanitaria, La Paz, 2014. 
Independent consultant on water and sanitation issues, worked on projects of the World Bank in 
Bolivia (among others), La Paz, 2014. 
Oscar Arteaga, Asociación Nacional de Empresas e Instituciones de Servicio de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado, La Paz, 2013. 
Patricia Venegas, principal adviser in policies, PERIAGUA (Programa para Servicios 
Sostenibles de  de Agua Potable y Saneamiento en Áreas Periurbanas), GIZ (German Technical 
Cooperation), La Paz, 2013. 







Ricardo Torres, adviser in Environmental Health, Pan-American Health Organization/ World 
Health Organization, La Paz, 2014. 
Roberto Prada Ramírez, SEMAPA manager 1985-1994, independent consultant on water and 
sanitation issues, Cochabamba, 2014. 
Worker of EPSAS-La Paz, La Paz, 2014. 
Worker of IBNORCA in the 2000s, La Paz, 2014.  
Worker 1 of SEMAPA in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014. 
Worker 2 of SEMAPA in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014. 
Worker 3 of SEMAPA in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 
Chile 
Three of the interviewees directly participated in at least one process of revision of the NCh409. 
Jorge Ale Yarad, civil servant of the Ministerio de Economía in the 1980s (in charge of the 
development of the regulatory framework for the water and sanitation sector), Santiago, 2014. 
Magaly Espinosa, Superintendenta, Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS), Santiago, 
2014. 
Civil servant of the Dirección de Obras Hidraúlicas in the 2000s, Santiago, 2014. 
Civil servant of the Instituto Nacional de Normalización (INN) in the 2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
Civil servant of the Health Ministry in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
Civil servant of the Health Ministry in the 2000s, Santiago, 2014. 
Civil servant of the Servicio Nacional de Obras Sanitarias (SENDOS) in the 1980s, Santiago, 
2015. 
Civil servant 1 of the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in the 2000s, Santiago, 
2014. 
Civil servant 2 of the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in the 2000s, Santiago, 
2015. 
Worker of water provider 1 in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 








Appendix 4. Cross-country Comparisons with Alternative Measures of State Capacity 
As there are many different ways to define and conceptualize state capacity in the literature, there 
are different indicators proposed to measure it. GDP per capita is one of them, has the advantages 
of being easily available over years and “highly correlated with a variety of measures of 
bureaucratic/administrative capacity”. However it may be endogenous to state capacity and could 
be associated to “causal channels other than bureaucratic/administrative capacity” (Hendrix, 2010: 
277).  
Considering these limitations of measuring state capacity with GDP per capita, this appendix 
replicates tables 2 and 3 with two alternative measures of state capacity: government effectiveness 
and adult literacy rate. Government effectiveness is from a scale of -2.5 (weakest) to 2.5 (strongest) 
and adult literacy rate consists in the percentage of the adult population that is literate.  
These two alternative measures are used for the replications because they are available for all 
countries from the sample, for a year relatively close to 1993 (which is the year when the new 
guidelines for arsenic and lead were adopted and diffused) and because they allow to discriminate 
between the 16 Latin American countries compared. Most other measures for state capacity used 
in the literature do not meet these three criteria. For instance, the measure of “regular census 
administration” identifies 12 of the 16 Latin American countries of the sample as strong states in 
1993 (Soifer, 2013). Other measures, like the “reach across territory”, the “infrastructural and 
coercive capacity index”, and the “national statistical capacity” were developed with data available 
from recent years only (Luna and Toro, 2014; Luna and Soifer, 2015; 2017; World Bank, 2017a; 







time (following a path-dependent pattern), but this is not consensual in the literature, as some also 
argue that it may shift quickly (Luna and Soifer, 2017: 890). 
Tables 6 and 7 present the cross-country comparison of the diffusion of the arsenic guideline in 
Latin American drinking-water quality regulations, using respectively government effectiveness 
and adult literacy rate as alternative measures of state capacity to the GDP per capita measure used 
in Table 2.  
Table 6. Natural Presence of Arsenic in Ground Waters, State Capacity (Government 
Effectiveness) and Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
Country  Documented Natural 
Presence of Arsenic 





Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Arsenic 
in Drinking Water (Year Regulation Adopted) 
Direct change of 
limit value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Chile X 1.28  X (2007)  
Uruguay X 0.50  X (2011)  
Argentina X 0.27  X (2007)  
Costa Rica  0.26 X (2005)   
Mexico X 0.07   X (2000) 
Panama  0.03 X (1999)   
Peru X -0.04  X (2010)**  
Brazil  -0.15 X (2001)   
Colombia  -0.19 X (1998)   
Bolivia X -0.19 X (2005)   
Guatemala X -0.50 X (2000)   
Ecuador  -0.63 X (2005)   
Venezuela  -0.72 X (1998)   
El Salvador X -0.73 X (1998)   
Nicaragua X -0.82 X (1994)   
Honduras  -0.86 X (1995)   
 
* Countries are in order from strongest to weakest state capacity. As an indication, double lines separate 
countries with stronger state capacity (with government effectiveness over 0.10) from those with 
medium state capacity (government effectiveness between -0.10 and 0.10) and from those with weaker 
state capacity (government effectiveness below -0.10). 
** In Peru, the number of years of the postponing period was not clearly defined 
Sources: Own elaboration with data on presence of arsenic in ground waters from Bundschuh et al. (2008; 2011) and 







Table 7. Natural Presence of Arsenic in Ground Waters, State Capacity (Adult Literacy 
Rate) and Drinking-Water Quality Regulations 
Country  Documented Natural 
Presence of Arsenic 
in Ground Waters 
State Capacity 
(Adult Literacy 
Rate in 2000)* 
Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Arsenic 
in Drinking Water (Year Regulation Adopted) 
Direct change of 
limit value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Uruguay X 97.6  X (2011)  
Argentina X 96.8  X (2007)  
Chile X 95.8  X (2007)  
Costa Rica  95.6 X (2005)   
Venezuela  92.5 X (1998)   
Colombia  91.6 X (1998)   
Panama  91.9 X (1999)   
Ecuador  91.6 X (2005)   
Mexico X 91.2   X (2000) 
Peru X 89.9  X (2010)**  
Brazil  86.9 X (2001)   
Bolivia X 85.4 X (2005)   
El Salvador X 78.7 X (1998)   
Honduras  75.0 X (1995)   
Guatemala X 68.5 X (2000)   
Nicaragua X 66.5 X (1994)   
 
* Countries are in order from strongest to weakest state capacity. As an indication, double lines separate 
countries with stronger state capacity (adult literacy rate over 94%) from those with medium state capacity 
(adult literacy rate between 88 and 94%) and those with weaker state capacity (adult literacy rate below 
88%). 
** In Peru, the number of years of the postponing period was not clearly defined. 
Sources: Own elaboration with data on presence of arsenic in ground waters from Bundschuh et al. (2008; 2011) and 
on adult literacy rate from the UNESCO (2004).  
 
Tables 6 and 7 show results that are very similar to those of Table 2: countries where state capacity 
was stronger and where it was documented that arsenic was present in ground waters limited the 
diffusion of the 0.01 mg/L limit value for arsenic in their national drinking-water quality 
regulations. Besides, where arsenic was present in ground waters but state capacity was weak, the 
guideline was largely diffused into national regulations. 
Tables 8 and 9 present the cross-country comparison of the diffusion of the lead guideline in Latin 







adult literacy rate as alternative measures of state capacity to the GDP per capita measure used in 
Table 3. They both suggest that the countries with the strongest state capacity faced a challenge 
with the integration of a more restrictive lead limit value in their national drinking-water 
regulations and then tended to block the adoption of this guideline. When state capacity was 
weaker, countries adopted the most restrictive guideline no matter whether it represented a strong 
domestic challenge for them or not. 
Table 8. Lead in Water Pipes, State Capacity (Government Effectiveness) and Drinking-
Water Quality Regulations 
Country Lead Water Pipes or 
Welds in at Least 





Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Lead in 
Drinking Water (Year Regulation In Force) 
Change of limit 
value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Chile X 1.28   X 
Uruguay X 0.50  X (2011)  
Argentina X 0.27   X 
Costa Rica X 0.26 X (2005)   
Mexico  0.07 X (2000)   
Panama X 0.03 X (1999)   
Peru  -0.04 X (2010)   
Brazil  -0.15 X (2003)   
Colombia  -0.19 X (1994)   
Bolivia X -0.19 X (1997)   
Guatemala  -0.50 X (2000)   
Ecuador  -0.63 X (2005)   
Venezuela X -0.72 X (1998)   
El Salvador X -0.73 X (1998)   
Nicaragua  -0.82 X (1994)   
Honduras  -0.86 X (1995)   
 
* Countries are in order from strongest to weakest state capacity. As an indication, double lines separate 
countries with stronger state capacity (government effectiveness over 0.10) from those with medium 
state capacity (government effectiveness between -0.10 and 0.10) and those with weaker state capacity 
(government effectiveness below -0.10). 
Sources: Own elaboration with data on lead water pipes from sources listed in Appendix 2 and on government 







Table 9. Lead in Water Pipes, State Capacity (Adult Literacy Rate) and Drinking-Water 
Quality Regulations 
Country Lead Water Pipes or 
Welds in at Least 





Adoption of 0.01 mg/L Limit Value for Lead in 
Drinking Water (Year Regulation In Force) 
Change of limit 
value 
Change postponed 
for 10 years 
Higher limit value 
maintained 
Uruguay X 97.6  X (2011)  
Argentina X 96.8   X 
Chile X 95.8   X 
Costa Rica X 95.6 X (2005)   
Venezuela X 92.5 X (1998)   
Panama X 91.9 X (1999)   
Colombia  91.6 X (1994)   
Ecuador  91.6 X (2005)   
Mexico  91.2 X (2000)   
Peru  89.9 X (2010)   
Brazil  86.9 X (2003)   
Bolivia X 85.4 X (1997)   
El Salvador X 78.7 X (1998)   
Honduras  75.0 X (1995)   
Guatemala  68.5 X (2000)   
Nicaragua  66.5 X (1994)   
 
* Countries are in order from strongest to weakest state capacity. As an indication, double lines separate 
countries with stronger state capacity (with adult literacy rate over 94%) from those with medium state 
capacity (adult literacy rate between 88 and 94%) and from those with weaker state capacity (adult 
literacy rate below 88%). 
Sources: Own elaboration with data on lead water pipes from sources listed in Appendix 2 and on adult literacy rate 









Appendix 5. Record of Minutes of Interviews Quoted  
Table 10. Excerpts from Interviews Corresponding to Quotes in Text 
Interviewee Quote in Text Original Excerpts from Interviews 
From Section 4.4.1 
Manager of a 
water provider 
in the 1980s 
(Bolivia) 
“All these regulations [like the Norma 
Boliviana 512] were, in a certain way, 
a copy of those of the World Health 
Organization. Then, we worked, and 
we had advisers from the World Health 
Organization. When I was manager, I 
had a permanent adviser from the 
World Health Organization” 
“Todas esas normas [como la NB512] 
son, de alguna manera, una reproducción 
de las de la Organización Mundial de la 
Salud. Entonces, nosotros trabajábamos, 
teníamos asesores permanentes de la 
Organización mundial de la Salud. 
Cuando yo tenía la gerencia, tenía un 
asesor de la Organización Mundial de la 
Salud, asesor permanente mío.”  
From Section 4.5.1 
Participant in 
the committee 
for the 1984 
revision (Chile) 
“I remember that SENDOS was the 
most preoccupied. It said: ‘How will I 
comply with this? Arsenic, how do I 
comply?’” 
“yo me acuerdo que SENDOS él que más 
preocupado estaba. Decía: ‘¿cómo voy a 





“I would say that what influenced a lot 
the 2005 revision was that the Health 
Ministry had its own regulation 
[Reglamento] and it started to 
implement it and sanction […]. Then 
came a moment when we said: ‘OK, 
let’s find an agreement’… As well as 
there were other parameters that the 
Health Ministry wanted to integrate in 
the national standards [Norma].” 
“Yo diría que influyó mucho en la 
revisión de 2005 él que Salud tenía su 
Reglamento y lo empezó a aplicar y 
empezó a sancionar […]. Entonces llegó 
un momento en qué se dijo: “ya bueno, 
tratemos de ponernos de acuerdo”… A 
parte que había otros parámetros que 
Salud le interesaba introducir en la 
norma.” 
From Section 4.5.2 
Participant in 
the committee 
for the 2005 
revision (Chile)  
“As for the organic parameters, there 
were changes in the pesticides […]. 
Chile did not copy the guidelines of 
the World Health Organization (poor 
countries do so), but rather there was a 
real study […] that was conducted to 
assess what we would be able to 
accept. […] This study analyzed what 
treatments could achieve and the 
removal of parameters […] and there 
was also a study to know which 
organic parameters we have in our 
country. Why? Because the list of the 
World Health Organization is 
enormous. If you accept all of it, there 
is no purse that can afford the 
monitoring.” 
“Respecto a los parámetros orgánicos, 
bueno, hubieron cambio en los pesticidas 
[…]. Cuando se hizo esta norma chilena 
no sólo se copió lo de la Organización 
Mundial de la Salud (los países pobres 
[…] copian no más y punto), sino que 
aquí hubo un estudio real […] de que 
éramos capaz de acoger. […] Un estudio 
[…] que vio los tratamientos hasta dónde 
estaban capaz de llegar y la remoción de 
los parámetros […]. Y además […] se 
hizo un estudio de saber qué parámetros 
orgánicos nosotros realmente teníamos 
dentro de nuestro país. ¿Por qué? Porque 
la lista de la Organización Mundial de la 
Salud es una cosa enorme. Si tu acoges 
todo esto, no hay bolsillo que aguante lo 







Paper 3: Global Policies for Window-Dressing or Frame-Shaping? An 
Analysis of Policy Diffusion and Implementation of Drinking-Water Quality 
Standards 
 
Domestic policies are increasingly developed by governments aware of, and potentially influenced 
by, international or foreign policies. In this context, understanding why global policies – or policies 
promoted by transnational and international actors – may (or may not) be implemented and have 
the intended effects “on the ground” requires disentangling the implementation dynamics of 
policies adopted following diffusion.  
The literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer has not yet fully disentangled these dynamics, 
as it originally conceptualized and empirically took for granted that the adoption of a policy was 
the final step of diffusion. The initial focus of the diffusion literature on the mechanisms of 
voluntary learning or lesson-drawing in American states and European countries (where 
institutions and the rule of law are strong) may have influenced this perspective. Yet, as numerous 
studies have increasingly pointed out, many formal institutions and rules, especially in the 
developing world, are neither regularly implemented nor enforced (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 
2007; Levitsky and Murillo 2009). This paper rests on a clear distinction between the adoption of 
a policy diffused and its implementation, in order to analyze thoroughly the latter.  
It argues that policy diffusion can be window-dressing as well as frame-shaping, depending on the 
interaction between three factors: state capacity, foreign capacity support and external pressures. 
External pressures are concrete actions and communications directed toward the implementing 
actors by outsiders (other departments, civil society, politicians, etc.), for the sake of raising 







this paper argues that although strong state capacity favors implementation, it is not sufficient for 
the latter to be extensive. Only when external pressures (favoring implementation) are strong does 
a country with strong state capacity implement extensively a policy adopted following diffusion. 
Otherwise, implementation is only partial, even though its limitations may not be publicly apparent 
(implementation may be window-dressing). As for countries with weak state capacity, 
implementation may also be extensive under external pressures, but only when they can count on 
sustained foreign capacity support. In this case, policy diffusion is clearly frame-shaping. 
However, if there is no foreign capacity support or it is interrupted, implementation will at most 
(under external pressures) be partial and the adoption of a diffused policy will be mere window 
dressing.   
The main contributions of this paper is to show that policy diffusion in weak states can be both 
window-dressing and frame-shaping, depending on political dynamics. To be frame-shaping, it 
needs a sustained foreign capacity support (that can compensate for the weakness of the state) and 
strong external pressures.  This paper also shows that, when state capacity is strong and there are 
not strong pressures from outside the implementing actors, implementation is partial. This 
drastically contrasts with the common view that partial implementation comes from a lack of 
resources. Besides, this partial implementation may not be publicly apparent and rather hidden; 
the resources of the state allow a window-dressing implementation, suggesting diffused policies 
are extensively implemented even if they are only partially. 
The empirical analysis focuses on the implementation of a diffused policy for which adoption and 
implementation are clearly separated: drinking-water quality standards derived from the World 







the South American region, one with weak state capacity (Bolivia) and the other with strong state 
capacity (Chile), and covers more than three decades for each of them. The analysis entails a 
process-tracing approach (as intended by Seawright’s causal pathways) and builds on extensive 
and systematic research in governmental and non-governmental archives conducted in both 
countries, as well as on over 50 interviews with actors involved in the sector in the last three 
decades. Although two countries are analyzed, the causal inference comes essentially from within-
country analysis rather than from cross-country comparison. The empirical contribution of this 
paper also comes from its refinement and its justification of the measurement of drinking-water 
quality (Seawright, 2016).  
The first section of this paper presents the theoretical framework, the argument and the hypotheses. 
The second describes the analytical framework, the variables and data. The third and fourth 
sections present the empirical results in Bolivia and Chile, respectively. 
1. Theoretical Framework, Argument and Hypotheses 
1.1. Policy Transfer and Implementation 
The literature on policy diffusion and policy transfer is very extensive (for literature reviews, see 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007; Karch, 2007; Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009; Shipan and Volden, 2012; Stone, 2012). As this literature developed, it has 
progressively recognized that the implementation of diffused/transferred policies was a dimension 
that had to be considered in the analysis of diffusion (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 354; Evans and 
Davies, 1999: 379; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 6; True and Mintrom, 2001: 30; Karch, 2007: 191; 







have started to clear the way. The few studies that analyze the post-adoption dynamics of diffused 
policies have mostly focused on highly politicized policies, like criminal justice or utility 
privatization, in which not implementing or partially implementing the policy translated into 
modifying the policy itself or its content (Karch and Cravens, 2014; Murillo, 2009; Post, 2014). 
The implementation of diffused policies has not yet been disentangled, as Shipan and Volden 
(2012: 793) recently stated: “implementation may present some of the most important 
opportunities for learning and imitation over time and across governments. Extending the policy 
diffusion literature beyond initial policy adoptions is warranted and long overdue.” 
Whereas the importance of implementation has increasingly been recognized, differences 
articulated regarding its conceptualizations and its explanatory factors have been eclipsed. They 
are nevertheless significant. Conceptually, some considered that implementation was a 
determining part of what can be called a policy transfer. Evans and Devis (1999: 379) specified: 
“Even if a policy is a faithful programmatic copy of the original, it can ultimately only be said to 
have been transferred if it is carried out.” In a train of thought also amalgamating transfer and 
implementation, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 354), as well as Nicholson-Crotty and Carley (2016: 
81) argued that implementation capacities of states may constrain policy transfer. Other scholars 
made the assumption that diffusion does not entail per se that policies be implemented: “even 
when countries sign on [international instruments] as window dressing, they are signaling 
acceptance of new global norms” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007: 453).  
Theoretically, the literature built on implementation studies (Hill and Varone, 2017) and identified 
cultural effects, resources and actors as possible factors explaining the implementation (or non-







(Evans and Davies, 1999: 380), political, bureaucratic and economic resources were identified as 
important to implement the transferred policy. First, empirical studies mostly highlighted that if 
such resources were lacking, transfer might not take place (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 354; 
Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2016: 81). However, it was also recently argued that resources do 
not determine (by themselves) enforcement, but that they rather condition the dependence on state-
society linkages for compensating a lack of internal resources by outside ones (Amengual, 2014).  
As for actors, the literature highlighted that they may influence implementation negatively or 
positively. On one hand, the negative impact of actors has been illustrated in at least two concrete 
examples in the diffusion literature: 1) the non-involvement prior to the adoption of the policy of 
interest groups representing people potentially affected or interplaying once a policy is enacted 
could lead to implementation problems (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 8; 2012: 340); and 2) policies 
diffused by coercion could be “sabotaged by embittered domestic actors during the 
implementation” (Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 282). On the other hand, actors may favor 
implementation of policies (no matter if they were diffused or not) in different ways: whereas 
community groups or civil society may push for a policy to be implemented (Amengual, 2014; 
Dargent and Urteaga, 2016; O’Rourke, 2003;), actors that play a positive role in the adoption stage 
of diffusion (like policy entrepreneurs, policy-network agents or foreign actors) could also be 
interested in the policy to be implemented (True and Mintrom, 2001; Dargent and Urteaga, 2016). 
Finally, political actors may be on either side: favoring or not the implementation of politicized 
policies, depending on whether they adopted (or supported the adoption) of the policy, their 







Overall, the literature suggests four main explanations for divergent implementation patterns. First, 
some authors have argued that a lack of resources may limit implementation. Second, others have 
argued that implementation could be limited when a policy was adopted without consulting actors 
that would be affected or by coercion. Third, some actors (like civil society, network agents, and 
policy entrepreneurs) can push for a policy to be implemented. Fourth, politicians may push or 
limit implementation, according to their interests. This paper argues that two factors are key to 
disentangle the divergent implementation of diffused policies: the strength of state capacity and 
the role of outsiders. 
1.2. The Argument 
Karch (2007) wrote: “Diffusion is about movement of a policy across jurisdictional boundaries. In 
contrast, adoption is the decision to establish a policy in an individual jurisdiction.” By extension, 
implementation is to put into effect a policy in an individual jurisdiction. But the fact that policy 
was adopted following diffusion may influence implementation dynamics. My argument aims at 
explaining the heterogeneous implementation of policies adopted following diffusion pressures. 
My argument rests on the necessary distinction of the adoption of a policy following diffusion and 
its implementation. Whether the implementation is conceptually part of the policy diffusion 
process (as the last stage) or not (i.e grasped as a policy consequence of the policy diffusion) has 
no impact on the argument. Its cornerstone is only that adoption and implementation are distinct 
(but not necessarily independent) processes, which may be the result of different explanatory 
factors. The distinctiveness between policy formulation and implementation was largely 







the increasingly key recognition of “the interrelationship between policy formulation and the 
implementation process” (Hill and Varone, 2017). 
The argument distinguishes three (ideal-type) degrees of implementation that are defined as 
followed:  
1) No implementation: the policy is merely window dressing, it is not implemented nor are 
there concrete action plans to implement it; 
2) Partial implementation: the policy is partly implemented, the implementation is incomplete 
in terms of regularity, precision, scope and/or independency;  
3) Extensive implementation: the policy is largely implemented nationally, and there is 
regular, precise and independent reported evidence of implementation. 
My argument states that the degree of implementation essentially results from the potential 
capacity of the sector and external pressures. 
The potential capacity of the implementing sector is first (but not only) determined by state 
capacity. The conceptualization of state capacity here builds on the framework of Lindvall and 
Theorell (2016), which identifies “resources that are required to project [political] power” (through 
policy instruments to reach policy outcomes) as the dimension of state capacity that can be 
observed. State capacity is defined as resources that may support policy enforcement and include 
money, human capital and information. This definition differs from the ones that conceptualize 
state capacity as a certain function, or a combination of two or three functions. The functions 
consist, for example, in the following ones: “fiscal or extractive capacity”, “legal capacity”, 







and Sigman, 2013; Hendrix, 2010; Lindvall and Theorell, 2016; Soifer, 2015). These functional 
conceptualizations orientate state capacity toward outcomes, and not means, which is theoretically 
and empirically limitative21. Besides, distinguishing between means and ends facilitates the 
comparison of the capacity of states pursuing different outcomes (Lindvall and Theorell, 2016). 
A strong state capacity translates into a strong potential sector capacity. Similarly, a weak state 
capacity suggests a weak potential sector capacity, but this association is not automatic. Indeed, 
countries with weak state capacity may receive foreign support or aid for specific sectors (through 
international aid or cooperation for instance). If this foreign support is sustained and enhances 
institutional capacity, then the potential capacity of the sector is strengthened over time. If there is 
no or limited foreign capacity support, then the potential capacity of the sector remains weak.    
As for external pressures, they are put forward on the implementing actors by outsiders, which 
include interest groups, the population, governmental departments and agencies from other policy 
sectors (especially health and economy) as well as politicians and local authorities not in charge 
of implementing the policy. By pressures, we refer to concrete actions and communications that 
raise the awareness on a specific issue, and ask for a response from the implementing actors.    
The implementation of policies adopted following diffusion pressures takes place in a context in 
which the policies adopted differ from a country to another, partly depending on state capacity. As 
                                                          
 
21 It first neglects that developing one specific functional capacity for a state certainly requires political choices to be 
made. Theoretically, even a weak state can develop strongly one specific function if all its means are invested toward 
this outcome. Conversely, a weak functional capacity may result from a lack of state capacity to develop this specific 
function as much as from a non-prioritization of this function despite resources being sufficient to develop it. 
Moreover, functional capacity is at least partly measured by outcomes and does not consider that the strength of state 







argued elsewhere (second paper of this dissertation), at the adoption phase, strong state capacity 
tends to limit diffusion when diffused policies represent a strong domestic challenge for the 
country or affect a strong stakeholder, whereas weak state capacity tends to lead to extended 
diffusion.  
On the one hand, when state capacity is strong, the policy is likely to be immediately valid at the 
time of adoption. The adoption of policies in an environment with strong state capacity has likely 
taken into account the costs and constraints of implementation. Therefore, de facto implementation 
is possible (see Figure 1). But it does not necessarily take place systematically, for everywhere and 
for everyone. Indeed, the policy is extensively implemented only if external pressures are strong. 
If external pressures are weak, implementation remains partial. This partial implementation may 
be more or less transparent about its limitation (and therefore, in the latter case, be window-
dressing).  
Figure 1. Impact of State Capacity on the Adoption and Implementation Steps of Policy 
Diffusion 
 
On the other hand, when state capacity is weak, the policy is not necessarily intended to have 
immediate de facto validity because resources are lacking at the time of adoption to previously 
generate knowledge about the challenges that the policy could entail for stakeholders and to 
State Capacity Adoption Implementation
Strong
Strong Ability to Consider 
Domestic Costs, Constraints 
and Impacts of Policy
Strong Sector Capacity:
De Facto Implementation 
Possible (but not Certain)
Weak
Limited Ability to Consider 
Domestic Costs, Constraints 
and Impacts of Policy
Weak Sector Capacity: 
Immediate Implementation 







posteriorly enforce it despite these challenges (see Figure 1). With these limited resources, the 
policy may still be partially implemented, but only if external pressures are strong. Otherwise, the 
policy is likely to remain mere window dressing (i.e. not implemented). However, a weak state 
capacity may also be supported by foreign resources, given the globalization context in which 
countries evolve and the policy diffusion pressures that accompany such a context. If this foreign 
support is sustained over time and of a capacity-building nature, then implementation may follow 
a similar pattern to the one of states with strong capacity: be extensive if external pressures are 
strong (in which case policy diffusion would be frame-shaping) and, if external pressures are weak, 
be rather partial. Of course, the situation is nevertheless different from the one in strong state 
capacity contexts, because the sector then depends on foreign support, and if the latter is 
interrupted, the domestic sector capacity may not be sufficient to maintain the same levels of 
implementation. The argument unfolds into the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1.1. Implementation is extensive when state capacity and external pressures 
are strong. 
Hypothesis 1.2. Implementation is extensive when state capacity is weak, but foreign 
capacity support is sustained and external pressures are strong. 
Hypothesis 2.1. Implementation is partial when state capacity is strong, but external 
pressures are weak. 
Hypothesis 2.2. Implementation is partial when state capacity and external pressures 







Hypothesis 2.3. Implementation is partial when state capacity is weak and not 
supplemented by sustained foreign capacity support, but external pressures are strong. 
Hypothesis 3. There is no implementation when state capacity is weak and not 
supplemented by sustained foreign capacity support, and external pressures are weak.  
Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize the argument and hypotheses. 
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
State Capacity Foreign Capacity 
Support 
External Pressures Implementation 
+ + / - + Extensive 
- + + Extensive 
+ + / - - Partial 
- + - Partial 
- - + Partial 
- - - None 
 
Figure 2. The Implementation of Non-Politicized Policies Adopted Under Diffusion 



































2. Analytical Framework, Methodology, Variables and Data 
The hypotheses are tested with an empirical analysis of the implementation in Bolivia and Chile 
of their respective drinking-water quality standards derived from the WHO guidelines. The latter 
emerged from a Western Europe and a North American perspectives. They were first edited in 
1984, and revised once per decade in the following years (in 1993, 2004 and 2011). 
2.1. Policy Scope 
Analyzing diffusion of the WHO drinking-water quality guidelines first allows to easily separate 
the adoption step from the implementation one (in a framework of policy diffusion) and therefore 
to study the implementation step in and of itself. The adoption step, in our analytical framework, 
consists in the adoption of national drinking-water quality regulations by countries. The 
implementation step refers to the control and monitoring of drinking-water quality in the countries.  
Because of the nature of WHO guidelines and national standards for drinking-water quality, the 
object of transfer/diffusion is primarily policy content, according to the categories of Dolowitz and 
Marsh (1996: 349-350). The object of transfer is a constant in the empirical analysis of this paper, 
which also aims at limiting differences between cases. This policy content considers the drinking-
water quality health-based guidelines the WHO set for a list of substances. Our analysis focuses 
on limit values set by the WHO for microbiological and chemical substances. These are considered 
because they are particularly important for health and because external pressures to control and 
monitor drinking-water quality may vary from one substance to another within a same country. By 
considering the diffusion of limit values for all these substances, and more precisely the 
implementation of the limit values adopted by countries, our analysis gains in depth and precision 







2.2. Case Selection 
Testing our argument with Latin American countries first builds on an observation of Marsh and 
Sharman (2009: 280):  
“Many of the mechanisms that are said to drive transfer and diffusion could be 
expected to exert a stronger influence in the developing world than anywhere else. 
[…] If policies are adopted for symbolic reasons, rather than to meet functional 
needs, this disjuncture should be most apparent and consequential outside the West. 
As such, the developing world again provides a powerful testing ground for 
examining the relationship between policy transfer and effectiveness.” 
Second, the focus on countries from a same region and geographically close to one another limits 
differences of diffusion mechanisms and contexts that could entail differences of outcomes. 
Indeed, WHO facilitates the policy diffusion of its drinking-water quality guidelines for all 
countries in a similar way, especially within a region (Stone, 2012: 490-491). The WHO drinking-
water quality guidelines were indeed promoted in Latin America by the Pan-American Health 
Organization (regional office of the WHO). Moreover, the two countries studied were chosen from 
a same sub-region of Latin America, the Andean region: Bolivia and Chile. 
The two countries differ in their level of state capacity, which is relatively weak in Bolivia and 
strong in Chile. This allows to explore the causal dynamics in each of these two contexts. Yet, the 
causal inference does not build on the comparison of these two countries between themselves, but 
rather on a detailed and precise within-case analysis of each (Seawright, 2016). This within-case 
analysis considers the implementation of drinking-water standards nationally (including all main 
cities as well as rural areas) and covers over three decades for each country. The differences in 
external pressures and foreign capacity support within each country (over time and between 
subnational units) are key to the analysis. Table 2 summarizes the variations of variables between 


















Bolivia Weak Varies 
over 
time. 




1.2 (weak SC, sustained FCS, strong EP) 
2.2 (weak SC, sustained FCS, weak EP) 
2.3 (weak SC, limited FCS, strong EP) 
3 (weak SC, limited FCS, weak EP) 




1.1 (strong SC and strong EP) 
2.1 (strong SC and weak EP) 
2.3. Variables and Measurement  
The main variables of the analysis include state capacity, foreign capacity support, external 
pressures, and degree of implementation. The extent of foreign capacity support, the strength of 
external pressures and the degree of implementation over time, following the adoption of each 
national drinking-water quality regulation, were measured qualitatively, as described hereafter.  
State capacity considers existing resources to support policy enforcement, including money, 
human capital and information (Lindvall and Theorell, 2016). Measures of GDP per capita (for 
availability of financial resources) and government effectiveness (for the strength of human capital 
and availability of information) are indicative of state resources. Bolivia and Chile, the two case 
studies, are respectively weak and strong on both measures of state capacity (World Bank, 2016; 
2017).   
Foreign capacity support consists in international aid or cooperation given to the sector and 
focused on strengthening institutional capacity. This variable is measured qualitatively, by first 
identifying among the list of international aid and cooperation agreements and projects dedicated 







of archival documentation). Each of these instances of foreign capacity support is then 
characterized: as “sustained” when it lasted at least five years (more than one term of government) 
and was economically substantive compared to the sector’s resources; and as “limited” otherwise.  
External pressures are measured qualitatively. They are labelled as strong when there a public 
health alert related to drinking-water is reported, when governmental reports from other sectors 
(independent of the provision of water services) are made public and when public protests on 
drinking-water quality are reported in the media or officially supported by authorities (not in 
charge of providing the services). They are characterized as weak otherwise.  
As for the degree of implementation, it is measured on the basis of precise criteria: the regularity, 
precision and extension of drinking-water quality controls, as well as the reporting and compliance 
of control results with national drinking-water quality standards. Table 3 details the criteria 
characterizing each degree of implementation. 
Table 3. Measuring Implementation of Drinking-Water Quality Standards  
Degree of 
Implementation 
Monitoring and Controls Results of Controls 
None None None 
Partial Irregular, unprecise and/or 
circumscribed 
May or not be reported, uncertain or 
limited compliance with standards 
Extensive Regular, precise and widespread Systematically reported, and 
extended compliance with standards 
2.4. Process-Tracing Approach and Data Sources  
Data availability of the dependent variable is particularly challenging. In various countries, at 
different moments in time, data on drinking-water quality controls and their results have not been 
compiled nor systematically reported or preserved over time. Therefore, analyzing only countries 







this data would most likely have been systematically compiled because of the implementation 
decisions made by governments and could be systematically preserved over time (or not) given 
the strength of state capacity. Therefore, the research strategy aimed, for data on implementation, 
to prioritize systematic official reporting and documentation (when available), but also to rely on 
primary and secondary sources to document the extent and changes in drinking-water quality 
control and monitoring. To document and assess the impact of main independent variables, the 
research approach was to trace the process of implementation through a variety of sources. This 
approach refers to the definition of process tracing intended as the identification and exploration 
of “causal pathways” (Seawright, 2016). 
In Bolivia, a systematic localization of reports on water and sanitation services was conducted in 
the archives of the Ministry of Water (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua), of the Drinking 
Water and Sanitation Regulatory Agency (Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua 
Potable y Saneamiento Básico including archives of its predecessor, the Superintendencia de 
Saneamiento Básico – SISAB), of the Ministry of Public Works, Services and Housing (Ministerio 
de Obras Públicas, Servicios y Vivienda, including archives of its predecessors, the Ministerio de 
Asuntos Urbanos and the Ministerio de Urbanismo y Vivienda), of the Bolivian Office of the Pan-
American Health Organization, of the National Institute of Standardization Norms (Instituto 
Boliviano de Normalización y Calidad – IBNORCA), of water services of La Paz and Cochabamba 
(SAMAPA and SEMAPA), as well as in the electronic library archives of the CEPIS,22 of the 
                                                          
 
22 CEPIS was the Sanitary Engineering and Environmental Science Center (its acronym comes from its Spanish name: 
Centro Panamericano de Ingenieria Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente) of the Pan American Health Organization and 







World Bank and of the German Cooperation in Bolivia (BIVICA – Biblioteca Virtual de la 
Cooperación Alemana en Bolivia). A systematic review of university theses (on the Bolivian water 
sector) completed in three main Bolivian universities since 1985,23 and of documentation from two 
university centers specializing in water sanitation (Instituto de Ingeniería Sanitaria – Universidad 
Mayor de San Andrés and Centro de Aguas y Saneamiento Ambiental – Universidad Mayor de 
San Simón), as well as of newspaper articles on the water sector of the ten main Bolivian 
newspapers between 1992 and 199824 also contributed to data collection. Additionally, over 30 
interviews were conducted in La Paz and Cochabamba with governmental officials, 
representatives of international, foreign and private organizations and academics (who were actors 
or close observers of the development in the drinking-water sector at some moment between 1980 
until today) to significantly and uniquely inform the process-tracing analysis. 
In Chile, an important source was the Chilean Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios’ (SISS) 
documentation (including both public and internal archives), which has been systematically 
reviewed: specifically the annual reports of drinking-water quality in urban services for years 
1991-2004, the monthly drinking-water quality journals and reports (Boletín de Calidad de Agua 
potable and Resultados de Control de Agua Potable) from 2000 to 2014, and other documentation 
on parallel controls of drinking-water quality. Archival documentation of the Instituto Nacional 
de Normalización (INN, Ruta Digital 409), of the Health Ministry, of the National Congress 
                                                          
 
23 Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, Universidad Católica Boliviana and Universidad Mayor de San Simón.  
24 Over 8000 newspaper articles (in paper formats) were classified under this subject/category for 1992-1998 by the 
Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia (CEDIB) of the Universidad Mayor de San Simón and were 
reviewed. The ten newspapers constituting the CEDIB archives are: Los Tiempos, Presencia, Hoy, El Deber, Primera 







Library, of the Chilean chapter of the Inter-American Association of Sanitary and Environmental 
Engineering (Agrupación interamericana de ingeniería sanitaria y ambiental – AIDIS), and at the 
Civil Engineering Library of the University of Chile have also been reviewed and resulted in 
providing significant original sources, especially useful to document the period prior to the 
existence of the SISS and aspects less covered in the SISS documentation. Additionally, water 
providers’ annual reports, as well as academic and newspapers articles were reviewed to 
supplement or document specific aspects. To complete data collection, over 15 interviews were 
conducted with governmental officials from different ministers and agencies, representatives of 
private companies and international organizations, as well as academics, who have been actors or 
close observers of the drinking-water sector at least for some period of time between the late 1970s 
until today. 
3. Bolivia 
Bolivia adopted drinking-water standards for the first time in 1985, through the Norma Boliviana 
512 (NB 512). They were developed as part of the “International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade”, as had been proclaimed the 1981-1990 period by the UN on November 10, 
1980 (a proposal that had emerged from international meetings in Canada, Argentina and the 
URSS in 1976-1978). These initial Bolivian standards have been revised periodically, in 1997, 
2004 and 2010. 
Prior to the establishment of the first Bolivian drinking-water quality standards, there was very 
little treatment of drinking water and control of its quality. In 1975, a report prepared for the 







chemical and bacteriological quality [was] not adequate”. It specified for urban water supply: “Of 
the 37 water supply systems, seven have surface water sources and of these, only two, La Paz and 
Sucre, have water treatment plants in operation. With the exception of only three water supply 
systems, La Paz, Sucre and Santa Cruz, the remaining 34 systems do not employ any system of 
disinfection or bacteriological quality control”. And the situation of rural water supply was 
reported to be even worse, with inconsistent control of water quality, and “in fact disinfection 
[was] not practised by any of the agencies responsible for rural water supplies” (WHO/IBRD 
Cooperative Program, 1975: 18-23). In 1979, a sector analysis conducted by the Bolivian 
government and the WHO/PAHO determined that there was no national plan for monitoring and 
controlling drinking-water quality, and that only SAMAPA (La Paz) and SAGUAPAC (Santa 
Cruz) were auto-monitoring drinking-water quality (LRCCA, 1984: 2).  
This section first describes the context of the water sector development in Bolivia from 1980 until 
2014 from the lenses of independent variables (subsection 4.1), then reviews the implementation 
of each edition of the Bolivian drinking-water quality standards between 1985 and 2014 (in 
subsections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4), and finally summarizes the variations in independent variables and 
the dependent variable for the whole period in subsection 3.5.  
3.1. Foreign Capacity Support and External Pressures for the Drinking-Water Sector in Bolivia 
(1980-2014) 
Bolivia has largely been classified for the whole period with weak state capacity, given its limited 
financial and administrative resources. Supplementing this weak capacity, the development of the 
drinking-water sector in Bolivia was regularly supported by foreign countries and international 







between the early 1980s and 2014. Most of them were focused on specific, localized drinking-
water services, and were limited in scope, time or resources. But others supported by foreign 
resources developed capacity of the sector over time, which resulted in three periods with sustained 
“foreign capacity support”. The first period corresponded to the early 1980s when, following the 
proclamation of the 1981-1990 decade as the “International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade” by the United Nations, Bolivia formulated an action plan (under an agreement with the 
German Cooperation Agency and the PAHO/WHO). The second period extended from 1990 until 
1997. Projects of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank sustained the 
development of capacity in the three metropolitan drinking-water services of La Paz/ El Alto, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. The third period started in 2010 and was still undergoing in 2014. 
Largely sustained by the German Cooperation Agency (through PROAPAC and PERIAGUA), it 
aimed precisely at strengthening the capacity of the sector nationally and the sector’s regulating 
institutions. It had started in 2001 but was interrupted between 2005 and 2009 (while awaiting the 
establishment of the new regulatory framework by the new government) (PAHO/WHO, 1987; 
World Bank, 1990; 1998; Bolivia, 2001; Sonntag, 2000; Interviews). 
The development of the water sector in Bolivia was also marked by external pressures for better 
drinking-water quality. These pressures were identified (on the basis of interviews and systematic 
documentation) as strong for three short periods between 1980 and 2014. The first moment was 
the cholera crisis of the early 1990s, which put in evidence that microbiological treatment of 
drinking water was fundamental for public health. The second was between 1994 and 1997, when 
the national government embarked the road toward the privatization of two water services, in La 







president and government elected in 2006 of a human right to water and of the obligation of the 
state to guarantee water access, which was incorporated in its “plurinational” constitution in 2009. 
Drinking-water services became a political priority and, starting in 2010, this priority encompassed 
drinking-water quality more specifically. Besides, there have also been population complaints 
about drinking-water quality that occurred sporadically in the 1990s and 2000s, but remained at a 
micro-local scale and did not lead to protests (on the issue of drinking-water quality). These latter 
pressures therefore remained overall weak; the consciousness of the population about the 
importance of drinking-water quality was perceived as weakly developed. Interestingly, although 
the Health Ministry was officially in charge of monitoring drinking-water quality before the 
regulatory agencies took over that faculty, it practically was not or very little equipped to ever do 
so (CEDIB, 1992; Bolivia, 2009; SIRESE, 2004; Interviews with two independent experts). 
Table 4. Sustained Foreign Capacity Support and Strong External Pressures in Bolivia, 
1980-2014 





1980-1984 X  National 
1990-1997 X  Metropolitan areas (La Paz/ El 
Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) 




1994-1997  X La Paz/El Alto and Cochabamba 
2010-2014 X X 
(on all parameters) 
National 
 
Table 4 summarizes the periods of sustained foreign capacity support and strong external pressures 
in Bolivia between 1980 and 2014. Given these values for the independent variables, we would 
expect, according to hypotheses 2.1, 2.2., 3.1 and 3.2, the implementation of drinking-water 












Parameters Under Strong 
External Pressures 
Implementation Progress  
1985-1989 - - None 




All (1994-1997 in La Paz/ 
El Alto and Cochabamba) 
In metropolitan areas: extensive for 
microbio.,  partial for others  
Outside metropolitan areas: partial 
for microbio., none for others 
1997-2004 - - None 
2005-2009 -  - None 
2010-2014 At national level All Extensive 
3.2. First Steps during the International Water Decade (1981-1990) 
The first edition of Bolivian drinking-water standards, the Norma Boliviana 512 (NB 512) of 1985, 
was almost exactly identical to the WHO international standards of 1971 and therefore differed 
from the WHO guidelines of 1984-1985 (Bolivia, 1985; WHO 1971; 2004). The latter were not 
even referenced in the regulation, suggesting the process was completed before they could or were 
intended to be included. Nevertheless, the influences of the WHO international standards of 1963 
and 1971 made no doubt.  
Interestingly, the first stage of the implementation of the new standards was developed in parallel 
(rather than successively) to the process of defining and adopting these quality standards. Like the 
standards, it originated from the proclamation by the UN of the 1981-1990 period as the 
“International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade”. Under the agreement between the 
German Technical Cooperation Agency and the PAHO/WHO, the Bolivian government created a 
national committee dedicated to the International Water Decade, which developed an action plan 
for water and sanitation services (Plan nacional de Saneamiento Básico, PLANASBA) including a 
national program of control and monitoring of drinking-water quality to be developed in all nine 
regions (departamentos) of the country, starting with pilot programs (each including a laboratory) 







the university laboratory was already working with SAMAPA) and in Cochabamba (where the 
university and regional authorities agreed to create the laboratory) (LRCCA, 1984; IIS, 1987; 
PAHO/WHO, 1987; Sánchez, 1993; Quiroga et al., 1999). An interviewee who participated in 
these initiatives mentioned that regional programs were developed in these two regions (and not 
others) because of “institutional initiatives”. Quiroga et al. (1999) also reported specifically that a 
lack of resources played a role: “the endeavors to realize similar programs in other departments 
were vain, since none of them materialized. The main challenges encountered were the lack of 
institutional leadership, the lack of resources and regional policies that allowed these works to be 
undertaken” (author’s translation). 
The two pilot programs implemented found drinking water not complying to different extents with 
standards of chemical and bacteriological quality: in Cochabamba, over 40% of samples with high 
levels of iron, and over 50% with coliforms; in La Paz, over 20% of samples with at least one 
physical or chemical parameter too high and over 80% with coliforms (LRCCA, 1984; IIS, 1987). 
Following-up on these pilot programs, the laboratories that had been established conducted a few 
other confined studies of drinking-water quality in the 1980s and early 1990s in the regions of La 
Paz, Cochabamba and others, that also found high levels of deficiencies in bacteriological quality 
(in various communities, it was the case that a water service that had been constructed was not 
used anymore) (IIS, 1988; Quiroga et al., 1999). However, there was no mark left of longer-term 
regular monitoring of drinking-water quality. An analysis of the sector in 1995 reported that, up to 
1991, the ministry of Urban Affairs, in charge of supervising service provision, did so very 
limitedly because of a “lack of means” and “the absence of defined mechanisms for control 







water quality in the 1980s and 1990s mentioned that the cost of conducting analyses and the lack 
of resources to expand the programs restrained further monitoring.  
In 1987-1988, with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, the PAHO and the Urban 
Affairs Ministry of Bolivia conducted a study of drinking-water services in the 10 main cities of 
the country (Sánchez, 1993). Its final reports highlighted that the quality of drinking water 
provided by urban services differed greatly between cities. Two cities had drinking water treated 
only through disinfection which was said to be sufficient given the initial good quality of the water 
sources (Montero and Santa Cruz); whereas others had treatment plants that presented deficiencies 
(La Paz, Cobija and Sucre), distribution networks with deficiencies (Cochabamba and Trinidad), 
or not any treatment of water (Huanuni and Potosí). And one city (Riberalta) did not have drinking 
water services (Ministerio de Asuntos Urbanos, 1989).  
Overall, the different studies and analyses conducted in the 1980s and early 1990s suggested that 
the implementation of the 1985 drinking-water standards, by the early 1990s, had remained very 
partial. The initial move towards a national program of control and monitoring of drinking-water 
quality did not expand beyond the two original pilot programs. Some initiatives were taken in the 
two regional laboratories created, but they were constrained geographically and in time by 
resources.  
3.3. Road toward the Modernization and Privatization of the Sector (1991-1998) 
In the early 1990s, a new stage of the implementation of the NB 512 of 1985 started with the 
launch of the national plan “Programa Agua para todos” in 1992. The plan included the adoption 
of the Reglamento nacional de prestación de servicios de agua potable y alcantarillado para 







guarantee “drinking water” (Bolivia, 1992). This did not include the obligation to implement a 
monitoring strategy. 
Whereas the government was developing the 1992 action plan, the country was facing a cholera 
crisis. Indeed, given the evolution of the cholera in Peru, the state for national emergency was 
decreed in February 1991 (Decreto Supremo N° 22899). The role (the lack of) water and sanitation 
systems could play in the propagation of the bacteria were evidenced and, among other measures, 
“the detection of the bacterium in drinking water and in wastewater networks was initiated to 
undertake measures for sanitary and epidemiological control” (author’s translation; Arévalo and 
Estévez, 2011). These measures were however temporary and specific, drinking-water quality 
monitoring more generally was not established in a longer-term perspective during the 1990s 
except in the three metropolitan areas (La Paz/El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba). Indeed, in 
the other regional capital cities (Potosí, Montero, Oruro, Tarija, Trinidad, Yacuiba), there was 
generally disinfection treatment but no regular monitoring of drinking-water quality that was 
reported. Issues with bacteriological drinking-water quality were sometimes encountered, for 
instance in Potosí. Besides, in most rural areas, there was generally no or irregular disinfection, 
less so treatment. Initial drinking-water quality controls tended to only be made at the installation 
phase, if ever (Oficina Internacional del Agua, 1999; Quiroga et al., 1999; CEDIB, 1993; 1994; 
1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; Interviews with representative of an international organization and with 
an academic). As explained in a UNDP-World Bank report, in 1990 the development of the water 
and sanitation sector (especially in rural areas) faced various constraints, among which “a severe 
financial restriction [which] limited the extent and reach of the investments” (author’s translation; 







it did not actually have the material resources to do so. It couldn’t, therefore, pressure the sector: 
“Until the 1990s, the [water] companies were working out of the law. There was no quality control” 
(author’s translation, Interview with an independent expert, see Appendix 4). As a consequence, a 
national picture of drinking-water quality was still lacking at the end of the 1990s (SIRESE, 2004).  
The water services of the three metropolitan areas (La Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) 
distinguished themselves from this general pattern. Indeed in 1994 the survey of the laboratories 
across the country confirmed that the technical and human capacity to control water quality was 
nationally limited, but significantly better in water companies of the metropolitan areas and in 
some academic institutes. For bacteriological quality, the laboratories of water companies in La 
Paz and Santa Cruz, the institutes specialized in chemistry, sanitation and environment, and the 
academic institutes created in the pilot programs of the 1980s (IIS-USMA and LRCCA-UMSS) 
were complying with technical and human criteria at more than 75%. However, the regional offices 
for environmental health in Cochabamba and Oruro and the water companies outside of Santa Cruz 
and La Paz were only complying at up to 30%. For chemical quality, only the water companies of 
La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz had the equipment required for controls (Oficina 
Internacional del Agua, 1999: 52, 79). Around 1997, the Cochabamba water service further 
increased its capacity to monitor drinking-water quality regularly in the tanks and distribution 
network, with the creation of a Laboratory Unit (Interview with SEMAPA worker). Overall, by 
1997-1998, the water provided by the metropolitan water services usually complied with 
bacteriological and chemical quality standards when exiting the treatment plants but remained at 
risk of (re)contamination in the distribution network. These metropolitan water services did control 







quality was an important issue for areas of the cities not connected to the metropolitan services (or 
connected but regularly not receiving water): their proportion diminished over the period, 
especially in Santa Cruz, but remained high in Cochabamba and El Alto (Prada et al., 1995; 
Quiroga et al., 1999; Vargas García, 1998; CEDIB, 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; Interviews 
with Roberto Prada Ramírez, Gonzalo Maldonado, Jorge Alvarado and two independent experts). 
These improvements of drinking-water quality (and its monitoring) in the three metropolitan water 
services resulted from projects of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development from 1990 
to 1998, that strengthened the institutional capacity of the water services, and from pressures put 
by privatization processes. One general manager of SEMAPA in the 1990s explained: “The credits 
[from the World Bank and the IDB] came to fund infrastructures but there were also components 
for technical cooperation, institutional strengthening. [Without these credits] I did not have money 
for my engineers to train in Brazil” (author’s translation; Interview with an ex-manager of 
SEMAPA, see Appendix 4). Additionally the water services of La Paz/El Alto (SAMAPA) and 
Cochabamba (SEMAPA) embarked on privatization processes from 1994 until, respectively, 1997 
and 1999. These processes came with an extension of the main credit from the World Bank, which 
gave resources and a deadline to use them to implement major works, for instance the installation 
of the water main Pampahasi- Ovejuyo in La Paz and the rehabilitation and expansion of the Cala 
Cala treatment plant and distribution networks in Cochabamba (World Bank, 1998:10, 18-20).  
Overall, by 1997 (the year a revised NB 512 was adopted), drinking-water quality standards had 
only been partially and heterogeneously implemented over the country, despite a progressive 
improvement, mostly in metropolitan areas. With the support of foreign sources to develop 







privatization processes in La Paz and Cochabamba in 1994-1999, the implementation of drinking-
water quality standards progressed largely in metropolitan areas: extensively for microbiological 
parameters and partially for chemical ones. However, outside the metropolitan areas, only 
microbiological standards (if any) were to some extent controlled and monitored.  
3.4. Privatization, a Superintendencia and a (First) Regulatory Framework (1997-2004) 
Following the second edition of the WHO drinking-water quality guidelines, a revision of the NB 
512 was adopted in Bolivia in 1997. In that same year, the La Paz/ El Alto water company was 
adjudicated by concession to Aguas del Illimani and the Superintendencia de Aguas (that became 
the Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico – SISAB – two years later) was created.  
The revised drinking-water quality standards included a few more limit values than the first edition 
of 1985, but changes remained overall relatively minor. However, the La Paz/ El Alto concession 
had to comply with other standards, defined in the first appendix of the concession contract. These 
standards included many chemicals that were not included in the NB 512 of 1997, but these were 
not all relevant. For chemical substances concentrations up to 50% higher than limit values listed 
were also accepted. Besides, microbiological criteria were more detailed for bacteria and parasites 
but also more permissive for coliforms (see Appendix 1; Oficina International del Agua, 1999: 59-
66).  
Starting in 1997 the Superintendencia developed and managed progressively a national regulatory 
framework, which included the monitoring of drinking-water quality. A credit of the World Bank 
was key in sustaining the establishment of the Superintendencia de Aguas in 1997, which was first 
mostly regulating Aguas del Illimani and eventually mostly the main water services of the country 







mentioned: “It was a very intense moment of training. There were still funds from the World Bank. 
[…] They lasted only during the first and the second years [after the creation of the 
Superintendencia]. […] They were the residual [resources] that remained from the capitalization” 
(author’s translation, see Appendix 4). In 2000, a World Bank report noted that the regulation of 
the sector had progressed significantly in Bolivia in the 1990s, but that these progresses were 
fragile and would require further foreign assistance to consolidate: “great strides [were made] since 
1994 through the adoption of a Water Supply and Sanitation Law in October 1999 and the 
establishment of a national regulatory system under the Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico. 
The rapid development could be further cemented through continued Bank financial assistance to 
the sector” (World Bank, 2000). Support from the German cooperation, starting in 2001, was 
intended to strengthen the strategies, instruments, and tools of the Superintendencia and to train 
the staff (program PROAPAC). This foreign capacity support was however interrupted in 2004, 
reportedly due to the uncertainty in the national context. As the German cooperation reported: 
“Between 2005 and 2008, there hasn’t been any advisory work specifically devoted to the 
regulatory entity because the Plurinational State authorities had announced their intention to 
modify the regulatory focus of the country” (author’s translation; GIZ/ PROAPAC, N.d.: 20). 
Once created, and as it expanded its reach further than Aguas del Illimani, the Superintendencia 
essentially relied on data provided by “regulated water providers”, once they had registered with 
the Superintendencia. Data was compiled and reported between 2002 and 2007 but was 
nevertheless incomplete: data was missing for some years for three of the nine biggest services 
(population of over 100 000) and for six of the nine medium-size services (population between 







(SISAB, 2002-2007). An interviewee who worked at the SISAB mentioned that the SISAB did 
not have its own laboratory and its means were limited; it conducted an “oversight” type of 
regulation. There wasn’t either apparent pressure on the sector from the population: “The lack of 
sanitary information and education is noteworthy for a majority of the attended population, who 
does not demand quality for the water provided by the EPSAS” (author’s translation; Bolivia, 
2001, vol. II: 32). With foreign support (as part of the “Convenio de Participación con el Proyecto 
de Asistencia Técnica para la reforma Regulatoria y la privatización AIF 3108-BO”) the SISAB 
conducted in 2004 a study to monitor drinking-water quality in the 27 “registered” waterworks. It 
analyzed 129 samples of water collected between June and August 2004. It concluded that 
drinking-water quality of these 27 waterworks met physical, chemical and bacteriological 
standards after treatment (SISAB, 2004). However, 2005 data reported by waterworks suggested 
that disinfection criteria was met at least at 90 % in only seven of the nine biggest services, in four 
of the nine medium-size ones and in three of the nine smallest services (SISAB, 2006). Data on 
controls of chemical quality of drinking water did not appear regularly reported, if ever tested.  
For rural services, no national portrait of the situation of drinking-water quality was depicted: some 
particular projects found good drinking-water quality, but some others found deficiencies. Yet, 
data from the 2005 Households Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares) conducted by the 
National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) suggested that an important 
proportion of the rural population did not drink treated water, since only 39% received water 
through water pipes, whereas more than a third accessed water through superficial sources, and 








Overall, despite the development of a national regulation framework starting in 1997, the 
implementation of the standards for drinking-water quality showed little improvement. Monitoring 
of drinking-water quality was irregular or rare in most water services except the three metropolitan 
ones (of La Paz/ El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz), and the results of controls (when 
conducted) were reported unsystematically or imprecisely. This very limited implementation was 
the result of foreign support that was only limitedly contributing to build capacity, as it was not 
sustained, and of a lack of resources (both technical and human).  
3.5. A New Era, a Ministry for Water and New Targets (2005-2014)  
A third edition of the NB 512 was adopted in Bolivia in 2005 (and reconfirmed in 2007 by the 
government of Evo Morales). Some microbiological and chemical criteria were added, including 
for pesticides, which largely integrated the second edition of the WHO guidelines of 1993 (and its 
1998 addendum). However, the main change was that a Reglamento was also adopted to 
accompany the NB512, established four types of control (minimal, basic, supplementary and 
exceptional) and a precise frequency requirement for each of these controls for water exiting the 
water tank and in the distribution network, depending on the size of the water services. Yet, in 
2010, providers requested a revision of the NB512 because they could not comply with it. A fourth 
edition of the NB 512 was adopted shortly after, at the end of 2010. It did not change limit values 
for the frequency of monitoring for smaller water providers (see Appendix 1; IBNORCA archives; 
Bolivia, 2005; 2007; 2010). This modification in 2010 was also indicative of the implementation 
of drinking-water quality standards in this period.   
For the newly elected government of Evo Morales, which took power in 2006, the water sector 







water as a human right in the Bolivian Constitution in 2009 undoubtedly signalized that water was 
a priority in the political agenda of the new government. However, the focus was first on expanding 
access, and not on the quality of water. Indicators of success for the sector that were compiled and 
reported measured access to water, and progress toward the Millennium Development Goals 
(Ministerio del Medio Ambiente y Agua’s Archives; Interview with civil servant from MMAyA). 
As water services were expanded (under political pressures), testing first the drinking-water quality 
of the sources before approving a new project was sidestepped, despite the fact that before 2006 it 
was a common practice (AAPS, 2011). An interviewee detailed:  
“The problem is that […] the new government of Evo committed itself to increase 
[water] access and meet the Millennium Goals, which included water provision and 
reach almost 100%. Therefore, what did 100% meant? To give water. They started 
to receive a greater quantity of projects and to accept them all. But these projects 
did not consider water analysis. And many of these projects [of the Agua I and Agua 
II programs] provided water without doing an initial analysis. They built the water 
system and analyzed water [quality] after. And then, the problems appeared: this 
source is totally contaminated, this source requires more than a treatment plant, this 
water needs to be treated to be drinkable […] It is part of the enthusiasm, of wanting 
to meet the objective in a short time” (author’s translation; Interview with 
independent expert, see Appendix 4). 
The national regulatory framework did not initially follow neither. By 2008 27 of the 28 water 
services registered with the SISAB (regulatory agency) reported complying with bacteriological 
quality standards, but no independent controls of drinking-water quality was reported by the 
SISAB and these registered water services were excluding hundreds of others (SISAB, 2006-2008; 
AAPS, 2011). In 2009, the SISAB was abolished and replaced by the Autoridad de Fiscalización 
y Control Social de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico (AAPS). This change was fundamental 
and aimed at restructuring the regulatory framework that had progressively been developed and 







the AAPS (AAPS, 2009; Interviews with two independent experts and civil servant from the 
AAPS). The NB 512 of 2010, and especially its Reglamento, was also adopted as part of this 
process to rebuild a regulatory framework that would be adapted to actual capacities of water 
services, which took place in its revision. The revised regulation indeed limited greatly the 
requirements (number of parameters to be tested and frequency of controls) for smaller and 
medium-size water services (IBNORCA Archives; Interview with SEMAPA worker). An 
interviewee who participated in the revision of the regulation explained that all water services did 
not have the resources to control drinking-water quality to the same extent: “Water companies […] 
did not want to comply with all the values that were in the regulation. Before there was only one 
list of parameters […] and they said: we can’t do all these analyses and neither are there 
laboratories in Bolivia to do all these analyses” (author’s translation, see Appendix 4).  
Despite the changes aimed at improving the applicability of the new regulatory framework, the 
latter developed slowly and a lack of human, technical and financial resources was noted in an 
official diagnostic in 2011. This same diagnostic also noted that registration of water services and 
regulation had to take more into account drinking-water quality (AAPS, 2011).  
By 2014 significant steps in that direction had been taken, with parallel controls and laboratories’ 
accreditations being conducted by the AAPS. The support of the German cooperation was key in 
this development, through the PROAPAC (that had started in 2001, was interrupted in 2005-2008, 
but then followed up until 2013) and PERIAGUA programs (from 2013 to 2019). The first 
program worked “to institutionally strengthen the AAPS from an integral perspective, both 
technically and for organizational management”, the second “aims at optimizing the capacities of 







in the departments of Santa Cruz (10) and Tarija (3)” (author’s translations; GIZ/ PROPAPAC, 
N.d.: 22; GIZ/ PERIAGUA, 2017). 
By 2014 the number of water services regulated by the AAPS remained limited, although it 
increased (mostly in the region of Santa Cruz) (AAPS, 2013; 2015a; 2015b; AAPS Archives). A 
civil servant of the Water Ministry mentioned that the staff in charge of testing drinking-water 
quality (if so) did not necessarily had the resources (of time and material) to actually test it, and 
might therefore simply “make-up numbers” (quote from Interview with MMAyA civil servant, 
author’s translation). Various interviewees mentioned that the Health Ministry does not realize any 
drinking-water quality control, although it should (Interviews with a representative from an 
international organization and two independent experts).   
Overall, pressures from the politicization of the issue were first not favoring better implementation 
of drinking-water quality standards, because the focus was on another aspect of drinking-water 
services (access). However, the expansion of access and the politicization of drinking water over 
time also finally encompassed drinking-water quality. With foreign capacity support, the 
regulation of drinking-water quality developed significantly; first by adapting the standards to 
make them reachable, and second by developing progressively a national capacity to monitor. 
3.6. Summary of the Implementation of Drinking-Water Standards, 1985-2014 
Table 6 summarizes the implementation processes in Bolivia from 1985 until 2014, with the 








Table 6. Summary of Implementation Progresses in Bolivia, 1985-2014 
Time 
period 
Foreign Capacity Support Parameters Under 
Strong External 
Pressures 
Implementation Progress by the 
End of the Time Period 
1985-1989 Limited 
(interrupted in 1984) 
- Partial 
1990-1997 Sustained  
(only for metropolitan areas) 
Microbiological 
All (in La Paz/El Alto 
and Cochabamba) 
In metropolitan areas: extensive for 
microbio.,  partial otherwise 
Outside metropolitan areas: partial 
for microbio., none otherwise 
1997-2004 Limited 
(only from 2001 on) 
- Very partial 
2005-2009 Limited 




(at national level) 
All 




Overall, in Bolivia (where state capacity was weak), the analysis over time of subnational 
variations and variations between parameters suggested that foreign capacity support could indeed 
be significantly important in increasing the capacity of the sector and its ability to implement 
drinking-water quality standards, and that its impact was further calibrated by external pressures. 
On one hand, when weak state capacity was supplemented by sustained foreign capacity support, 
implementation was partial when there was no external pressures (in metropolitan areas between 
1990 and 1997, for parameters other than microbiological) and extensive when there was such 
pressures (in metropolitan areas between 1990 and 1997, for microbiological parameters and 
nationally between 2010 and 2014, for all parameters). These results suggest hypotheses 1.2 and 
2.2 are confirmed. On the other hand, when foreign capacity support was limited, but external 
pressures were strong (like for microbiological parameters outside the metropolitan areas in the 
1990-1997 period), implementation was partial, as suggested by hypothesis 2.3. And when there 







progress was partial (for 1985-1989), very partial (for 1997-2004) or absent (for 2005-2009). 
These last results only partially confirm hypothesis 3 and suggest that foreign capacity support not 
sustained over time or that was interrupted recently could be followed by partial implementation 
progress even without external pressures, if policy entrepreneurs took over. Implementation would 
nevertheless remain partial, at most.  
4. Chile 
Chile was one of the first Latin American countries to adopt drinking-water standards. These 
standards were made official on February 22, 1952 as the Norma Oficial 61-11ch (later labelled 
409ch.52) with the Decree 488 of the Ministry of Public Works and Means of Communication. 
Based on the 1946 US standards, from which all its limit values were taken, this regulation 
established limit values for chemicals in drinking-water sources (before treatment) and in drinking 
water (after treatment), as well as bacteriological requirements for drinking water (U.S. Public 
Health Service, 1946; Chile, 1958; INN Ruta Digital NCh409). A few months after the Ministry 
of Public Works’ decree, on June 26, 1952, the Health Ministry also defined drinking-water 
standards through Decree 1.132. This decree also highlighted the importance of the quality of 
drinking-water sources but did not specify limit values for any chemical. As for the bacteriological 
requirements, they were the same than in the Decree 488 of the Ministry of Public Works (Chile, 
1952). 
A revision process of the Norma Chilena 409 (NCh409) started in 1968 and concluded when it 
was made official with the Decree 354 of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation on 







drinking water standards were also decreed by the Health Ministry on December 19, 1969 (Decree 
735) (Chile, 1969). Legally the Health Decree took precedence over the Public Works’ one (INN 
Ruta Digital NCh409). The 1969 and 1970 Chilean drinking-water quality regulations were 
developed years after the WHO defined its drinking-water standards (first edited in 1958 and then 
in 1963 and 1971). The process that led to the NCh409 of 1970 directly referred to the 1962 WHO 
international standards and the 1962 American standards, as well as to a Seminar of the Pan-
American Health Organization and the WHO held in Buenos Aires on September 20-29 of 1962 
(INN Ruta Digital NCh409). As such, it differed from the 1952 regulations, which were developed 
when no international standards had been defined (and even less so promoted). 
The 1969-1970 regulations were revised in the following decades, and new regulations were 
adopted in 1984 and 2007 (Chile, 1984; 2007). The 1984 revision considered not only the WHO 
Guidelines but a great number of national drinking-water quality regulations. The pressure from 
the Inter-American Development Bank also played a role for the adoption of the limit value for 
arsenic. The 2007 revision also considered other countries’ regulations and the 1993 and 2004 
WHO guidelines (INN Ruta Digital NCh409). The diffusion of WHO guidelines in drinking-water 
quality standards in Chile was overall limited, since the national regulations did not adopt all the 
limit values of the WHO guidelines and also did not include limit values for all substances for 
which the WHO had a health-based guideline (Chile, 1984; 2007; WHO, 1984; 1993; 2004) (see 
Appendix 2).  
This section first describes the external pressures that were put on the water sector development in 







drinking-water quality regulations between 1969 and 2014 (subsections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4), and 
finally briefly presents the variations in all main variables for the whole period (subsection 4.5).  
4.1. External Pressures on Drinking-Water Quality (1960-2014) 
The development of the water sector in Chile was marked by different pressures, at different 
periods of time. Interviews and systematic documentation led to the identification of four main 
moments of external pressures between 1960 and 2014. 
First, in the 1960s there was a public health alert in Antofagasta and its surroundings (region II), 
following many cases of sickness and death attributed to the intoxication by arsenic, which 
contaminated the population through drinking water. In the early 1960s, the first cases of children 
intoxicated with arsenic were detected and some were treated in Santiago. In 1968, the National 
Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud) established a commission to investigate and confirm 
the source of intoxication (the Toconce and Holajar Rivers, for instance). No other regions of Chile 
faced a similar health alert because of cases of arsenicism (Bruning, 1968; Puga et al., 1973; 
Zaldivar, 1974; Borgoño et al., 1977; Ferreccio and Sancha, 2006; Marshall et al., 2007; Ferreccio 
and Steinmaus, 2016). 
Second, in the mid- and late 1970s, the Health Ministry evidenced the large non-compliance of 
drinking-water standards for microbiological quality in Chile, by compiling and publicly 
presenting data on drinking-water quality of water providers nationally. The data had been 
collected for years, but had not been compiled nationally and was largely unknown or ignored. 
The Chilean chapter of the Agrupación interamericana de ingeniería sanitaria y ambiental 
(AIDIS) also contributed to the diffusion of this information, for instance in its 1977 biannual 







put pressure on (then public) water providers to improve microbiological quality of drinking water 
(Monreal, 1977; Interviews with civil servant from Health Ministry and from representative of 
water provider).  
Third, starting in the early 1990s, and following the adoption of a new regulation regime for the 
water sector, in road toward the privatization of drinking-water services, different pressures were 
put on the water providers, following reforms of the Ministries of Finance and Economy. Given 
Law 18.778 by which the government paid subsidies for drinking-water for poorer families, the 
Health Ministry pressured the water sector to comply with drinking-water standards, especially 
microbiological ones as well as ones for arsenic and nitrates. The Ministry of Economy also 
established the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS), which was given the power to 
impose sanctions on water providers (by Law 18.902) and monitored drinking-water quality 
essentially of urban water services starting in 1991. This monitoring was public and detailed until 
2004 (SISS, 1995; 1997-2002; Interviews with Magaly Espinosa and with civil servant of the 
Health Ministry).  
Fourth, especially in 2011-2014, public protests and governmental instances raised issues with the 
quality of water in some places of Chile. On one hand, in Copiapó and its region (Atacama), 
popular protests, the senators Isabel Allende and Baldo Prokurica, the councilmember Christian 
Guzmán and a medical study of Mario Navarro denounced the lack of quality of water in the region 
of Copiapó (Diario de Atacama, 2011; Leal, 2011; Ponze, 2012; Scheuch, 2012; Vera, 2014). On 
the other hand, in different communities, small environmental groups and some academics 
denounced levels of arsenic in drinking water higher than the one allowed starting in 2012 and 







complaints took place in one community of the metropolitan region of Santiago (Lampa), in one 
city of the northern region of Tarapacá (Alto Hospicio), and in two communities of the region of 
Atacama (Diego de Almagro and El Salado)25. The Health Ministry also stood firm by the 
drinking-water quality requirements for arsenic, putting pressure for the compliance with this 
requirement according to the delay defined in the 2007 regulation (Health Ministry Archives; 
Interview with civil servant from Health Ministry).  
Besides, the cholera crisis of the early 1990s affected many Latin American countries, including 
neighboring countries (Bolivia and Peru), but not Chile (SISS, 1996). Although Chile adopted 
some preventive measures, there was no health alert in Chile at that moment.  
Table 7. Strong External Pressures on Drinking-Water Quality in Chile 
Time period Areas concerned by pressures Parameters 
1962-1970s Antofagasta and its surroundings (region II) Arsenic 
1977-1983 All regions, national scope Microbiological 
1991-2004 All areas covered by companies (“urban areas”), 
prior to their privatization 
Microbiological, nitrates, 
arsenic 
2011-2013 Region of Atacama (Copiapó) Various (dissolved solids, 
sulfates, chloride and nitrates) 
Communities in 3 regions (Lampa, Alto Hospicio, 
Diego de Almagro and El Salado) 
Arsenic 
 
Overall, the parameters of strong external pressures on drinking-water quality in Chile are 
summarized in Table 7. Given these values for the independent variables, we would expect, 
                                                          
 







according to hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2, the resulting implementation of drinking-water standards in 
Chile, for the period between 1969 and 2014, to be as shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Expectations for Implementation in Chile (according to hypotheses), 1969-2014 
Time 
Period 
External Pressures Implementation Progress  
1969-
1976 
Strong (arsenic in region of Antofagasta) 
Weak otherwise 










Weak Partial  
1991-
2004 
Strong (microbiological, nitrates, arsenic 
in urban areas) 
Weak otherwise 
Extensive for microbiological, nitrates, arsenic 







Strong (arsenic in four communities*) 
Strong (various in region of Atacama) 
Weak otherwise 
Extensive for arsenic in four communities 
Extensive in region of Atacama 
Partial otherwise  
* These four communities are : Lampa, Alto Hospicio, Diego de Almagro and El Salado. 
 
4.2. After a Public Health Alert Awakening to the Vital Necessity of Drinking-Water Quality (1969-
1983) 
The regulations of drinking-water standards established in Chile in 1969 (by the Health Ministry) 
and in 1970 (by the Public Works Ministry) were the first to be adopted after the WHO had defined 
“international standards”. Both Chilean regulations were influenced by the latter, but nevertheless 
differed in some parameters. Both adopted a less restrictive value for lead, and the Public Works 
Decree also less restrictive values for arsenic and nitrate (see Appendix 2). Legally, the Health 
Decree superseded the Public Works one (INN Ruta Digital 409). The analysis of their 
implementation can be separated in three categories: microbiological parameters, arsenic, and 







For microbiological parameters, standards were partially implemented. Compiled data from the 
Dirección de Obras Sanitarias for the years 1971-1976 revealed that between 20 and 30 % of 
water services (each year) were not systematically monitoring bacteriological quality of water. 
Among the services systematically monitoring bacteriological quality of water, between 43 and  
66 % (each year) were providing water of bad bacteriological quality at least during one month of 
the year (Monreal, 1975; 1977). Data on these important shortcomings in term of drinking water 
quality had been collected for years both by the Health Ministry and the SENDOS but had not 
been put together, and had largely been nationally unknown or ignored until the second half of the 
1970s. The Health Ministry compiled and publicly presented this data, for instance at the biannual 
congress of the Chilean chapter of the Agrupación interamericana de ingeniería sanitaria y 
ambiental (AIDIS) in 1977, and this had a public resonance. A civil servant from the Health 
Ministry recalled: “The results were presented in the Biannual Congress of Sanitary Engineering 
[…] at the end of the 1970s […]. It provoked a lot of commotion because even if the data existed, 
the truth is it was not specified… No, no, essentially it was not used” (author’s translation; 
Interview with civil servant from Health Ministry, see Appendix 4). The publication and diffusion 
of this data led to the development of a national program for monitoring drinking-water 
bacteriological quality in 1980, at the initiative of the Health Ministry. This program included 
controls and monitoring of drinking-water quality by the Health Ministry, that could count back 
then on a network of inspectors, with sufficient staff, that could be properly trained. This program 
also directly put pressure on water providers and the Ministry in charge of the water sector: “every 
year […] a consolidated report was prepared and sent to water services and to the Public Works 
Ministry […]. This resulted in a general preoccupation for water quality” (author’s translation; 







significant improvements of the microbiological quality of drinking water (Chile, 1980; Monreal, 
1987).  
For arsenic, the limit value from the Public Works Decree in force was more permissive (0.12 
mg/L) than the one from the Health Decree in force (0.05 mg/L). Although no national data was 
available for this period, it is generally acknowledged that in most Chile complying with the most 
restrictive limit value did not require specific water treatment. However, the situation was different 
in the northern regions, because of the natural presence of arsenic in some of its water sources. 
Data from water providers and the Health Ministry for towns of northern regions (as reported by 
various scholars), showed that the strictest limit was more or less complied with in the cities the 
most North in the 1970s and the early 1980s, as the levels were lower than 0.05 mg/L in Arica and 
slightly higher than 0.05 mg/L in Iquique and Taltal (Ferreccio and Stainmaus, 2016: 371; Smith 
et al., 1998: 663). However, in the region of Antofagasta, the situation was different. Since 1958, 
when the Toconce and Holajar Rivers became important sources of drinking water for the city 
(despite known levels of arsenic in their waters of over 0.8 mg/L), the levels had been significantly 
above 0.12 mg/L. These high levels engendered intoxication of children that was detected from 
the early 1960s. Only in 1968 did the National Health Service established a commission that 
investigated and confirmed that drinking water was the source of intoxication. And only after that 
commission did the water provider installed arsenic-removal treatment plants: the first started 
operating starting in May 1970 and the second one in 1979. The establishments of these plants 
correspond to the changes in levels of arsenic measured by water providers and the Health Ministry 
(and reported by scholars). In Antofagasta, Mejillones and Chuquicamata, levels were lowered 







Tocopilla and Maria Elena, the levels were higher than 0.12 mg/L until the late 1970s, when they 
were lowered to approximately 0.11 mg/L, a level they maintained for the following years of the 
period. In San Pedro, levels remained approximately at 0.6 mg/L for the whole period (Ferreccio 
and Stainmaus, 2016; Smith et al., 1998; Ferreccio and Sancha, 2006; Bruning, 1968; Puga et al., 
1973; Zaldivar, 1974; Borgoño et al., 1977; Marshall et al., 2007). Despite levels of arsenic in 
water were known to be very high from the end of the 1950s, the treatment plants were built only 
after the health alert raised, especially in Antofagasta, over the course of the 1960s and the Health 
Service put pressure on the sector in charge of providing water. 
For chemicals other than arsenic, their levels in drinking-water were said to be largely unknown 
in 1977. Water providers and Health Ministry’s agencies could only test for lead and chromium in 
the main cities (Santiago, Antofagasta, Concepción and Valparaiso), and only the water provider 
in Santiago could for other chemicals (cadmium, cyanide and selenium). Even for chemicals for 
which monitoring could take place, no data was published or reported, so whether drinking-water 
quality standards were met remained uncertain (Sancha, 1977). As there was no pressure for the 
compliance with drinking-water standards for these chemicals, these standards were only (at most) 
partially implemented. 
Overall, national drinking-water standards in the 1970s and early 1980s were mostly monitored 
and reported, but they were only partly complied with, until external pressures, essentially from 
the health sector, were directed toward the implementing actors to demand compliance for arsenic 
and microbiological parameters. The sector developed responses to pressures over the years, 
progressively, to finally comply with the standards for arsenic and microbiological parameters, but 







4.3. In Road to the Privatization of Urban Drinking-Water Services (1984-2006) 
In early 1984, the Public Works Ministry adopted revised drinking-water standards (NCh409). The 
compliance requirements for microbiological quality were defined more restrictively. The changes 
in chemical parameters included a limit value for arsenic at 0.05 mg/L (as had established the 
Health Ministry in 1969 but not the Public Works Ministry in 1970) and stricter limit values for 
ten other chemicals (ammonia, chloride, copper, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, nitrate, phenolic 
compounds and sulfate), largely (but not exclusively) following the WHO guidelines. For eight 
chemical parameters (chloride, copper, iron, manganese, nitrate, sulfate, total dissolved solids and 
zinc), the NCh409 specified that the Health Ministry could accept values higher than the limit 
values defined in the regulation. Its implementation was characterized very distinctively in urban 
and rural areas.   
On one side, drinking-water quality in urban water services significantly improved during this 
period, both for microbiological parameters and for chemicals considered of most interest by the 
Health Ministry, but not for other chemical parameters.  
For microbiological quality standards, the monitoring program initiated by the Health Ministry in 
1980 significantly improved their compliance, to the extent that in 1985, the water provided by 
distribution was for 94,6 % of the population complying with bacteriological standards (Monreal, 
1987). Microbiological quality continued to improve progressively, and was systematically 
reported by the SISS starting in 1991 (for urban water services). Until 1997 annual reports detailed 
the urban services where monitoring was lacking or where results were not complying with 
microbiological standards. From 1998 on, SISS’ annual reports were less precise and detailed, and 







localities and services) as a percentage for each category of parameters.26 Both for bacteriological 
quality and disinfection standards, these percentages of compliance reported for urban companies 
reached between 99 and 100 % nationally by 1998 and maintained these compliance levels in the 
following years. SISS’s parallel controls have found that bacteriological standards were still not 
met everywhere until 2000 but were from 2001 onward27 and that disinfection standards were 
usually met but with some exceptions in small communities, mostly in water services of smaller 
companies28 (SISS’ Informes de calidad 1991-2006; SISS’ Controles paralelos 1998-2006; 
Interviews).  
As for chemical parameters, there was no national monitoring reported nationally before 1991, i.e. 
before the creation of the SISS. In its 1991 report, the SISS identified the chemical parameters 
exceeding limit values over the recent years in each locality/service and informed the status of 
actions taken or planned to resolve the issue. Chemical quality of water was monitored from then 
on. Until 1997, for each service/locality, SISS reported the parameters exceeding standards that 
                                                          
 
26 These levels of compliance considered the frequency and results of autocontrols conducted by the company, but the 
exact computing of the level of compliance (including how results of different localities served by the same company 
were weighted) was not made public. Moreover, the national drinking-water quality regulation then in effect 
(NCh409/1.Of.84) tolerated for each month a proportion of samples not complying with microbiological standards: 
10% could contain coliforms, 5% coliforms at levels over 5 UFC or NMP/100 mL, 20% could contain less chlorine 
residual than the minimum allowed and 5% could contain no chlorine residual (Chile, 1984; Interviews).   
27 SISS’s parallel controls found levels of coliforms higher than the national regulation in Iquique, Pisagua and Alto 
Hospicio (region I, ESSAT) in August 2000; in Santo Domingo (region V, Coop. Santo Domingo) in January 1998; 
in Pichidegua (region VI, ESSBIO) in February 1998; in Bulnes, Quillon and Florida (region VIII, ESSBIO) in April 
1998; in Puerto Varas and Frutillar (region X, ESSAL) in January 1998; in Balmaceda, Coyhaique and Puerto Aysén 
(region XI, ESSAR) in November 2000.  
28 SISS’s parallel controls found levels of residual chlorine uncompliant with national standards in Hijuela (region V, 
ESVAL) in March 2000; in Pichidangui (region IV, ESSSI) in August 2002; in Quellón (region X, ESSAL) in July 
2003; in Pichilemu (region VI, ESSBIO) in November 2003; in Chacabuco (region XI, ESSAR) in February 2004; in 








were identified annually by water providers. The reporting, as for microbiological quality, was less 
detailed from 1998 on. Along the years, improvements in chemical drinking-water quality were 
observed, but unevenly for all chemical parameters. For the two chemicals identified by the Health 
Ministry as “likely to affect users’ health” (nitrates and arsenic), and monitored more closely by 
the SISS, levels in drinking-water were reported to be complying with national standards in all 
services by 2004.29 For chemicals for which the Health Ministry could allow higher limit values 
(chloride, copper, iron, manganese, nitrate, sulfate, total dissolved solids and zinc) or had agreed 
to raise the limit value in the next revision of the national regulation (ammonia, chloride, copper, 
sulfate and total dissolved solids), complete compliance was not reached by 2006 in most of the 
services which had issues with these chemicals in the early 1990s (especially in smaller 
communities). Other chemicals (cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury and phenolic compounds) 
were only occasionally reported to be higher than their limit values, suggesting their presence in 
drinking water was exceptional or their monitoring less regular (data on chemicals in drinking 
water were only reported when said to be noncompliant). SISS’ parallel controls of chemical 
quality only started in 2002, and were limited in scope (both considering frequency and coverage). 
Nevertheless, results from these controls appear to confirm the general trends of compliance 
observed in data reported by water providers (SISS’ Informes de calidad 1991-2004; SISS’ 
Controles paralelos 1998-2006; Interview with civil servant from SISS). 
                                                          
 
29 Interestingly, for arsenic, in the region of Antofagasta (where a public health alert for arsenic contamination took 
place in the 1960s-1970s), the more restrictive limit value of 0.01 mg/L was met by 2004; but in other places where 
arsenic was naturally present in water (especially the region of Tarapacá) the level was lowered under 0.05 (but not 







The evolution of drinking-water quality in urban services between 1984 until 2004 took place in 
the context of urban services being embarked on the road towards privatization. This lead to the 
development of a new regulatory framework for the sector (and the creation of the SISS), that was 
effective from 1990 on and to the transformation (also in 1990) of water services into water 
(public) companies. In this context, the Health Ministry pressured the new water companies to 
improve the quality of water. Conjointly, the SISS was also putting pressure for the compliance of 
drinking-water quality before the services would be privatized. A civil servant from the Health 
Ministry in the 1990s mentioned:  
“The standpoint that took the Health Ministry […], and that it pretended it would 
implement, was that if the company did not comply with quality, it couldn’t charge 
the water. […] In light of this, the companies were concerned, and the 
Superintendencia was also concerned about doing more controls, etc. It was never 
implemented. But it was the standpoint of the Health Ministry. If it is not drinking 
water, it can’t be charged as drinking water. Therefore, together with the 
Superintendencia, that also strengthened its controls, and the Health Ministry, that 
also strengthened its controls of companies, it resulted in effective improvement of 
water quality” (author’s translation, see Appendix 4). 
In rural areas, the quality of drinking water followed a different trajectory. The microbiological 
quality of water also improved between 1990 and 1997, but not at levels as high as in urban areas: 
half of rural water services were still not complying standards by the end of 1997. In 2004, an 
inquiry conducted by the Public Works Ministry found that 81.9% of rural services (providing 
water to more than 150 people and with a density higher than 15 houses per kilometer) reported 
doing bimonthly controls of bacteriological quality of water, and 83.9% did not report fecal 
coliforms in the last year. As for chemical parameters, they were excluded from SISS’ reporting: 
no results nor evidence of controls of chemical parameters were reported (SISS’ Informes de 







essentially monitored drinking-water quality in urban water services. Moreover, the rural services 
lacked economic resources to control and monitor drinking-water quality (Interviews with 
representative of water provider and with civil servant from Minsal).  
Overall, the implementation of national drinking-water standards improved significantly from 
1984 until 2006, but unevenly. The implementation was significantly extended in urban areas for 
microbiological parameters between 1991 and 1999 and for arsenic and nitrates between 1998 and 
2004 (in response to strong pressures from the SISS and the Health Ministry), but otherwise 
remained essentially partial. The improvements were mostly focused in urban water services prior 
to their privatization processes (which have taken place between 1997 and 2004). Policies of the 
Ministry of Economy and positions of the Health Ministry clearly influenced where and how the 
standards for drinking-water quality have been implemented. Besides, in rural areas, 
implementation was limited by a lack of resources and also as a result of little (if any) external 
pressures on the services.  
4.4. A New Regulation, Privatized Urban Services and Communities Claiming for Water Quality 
(2007-2014)   
The revision of the 1984 national regulation for drinking-water quality standards has been 
postponed from the late 1990s and finally was only adopted and effective in 2007. The new 
regulation was more permissive for a few parameters that were regularly exceeding their respective 
limit values: ammonia, chloride, copper, sulfates and total dissolved solids. However, it lowered 
the tolerance level of incompliance for disinfection parameters (minimal chlorine residual) and 
was more restrictive for arsenic, bringing its limit value at 0.01 mg/L (with a delay of a maximum 







authorization from the Health Ministry) and zinc. It also added limit values to a few other 
parameters, mostly pesticides. Besides, it additionally created the concept of “critical parameters”, 
which are specific to each water service. These consist in substances superseding the allowed 
concentration in the water source of a service without treatment. For these parameters, more 
frequent controls were required, but there was also an accepted tolerance for incompliance of 10% 
and limit values had to be reached as a monthly average of all samples (Chile, 2007; Interviews; 
INN Archives; see Appendix 2). In general, from 2007 on, for most urban water services (that had 
all been privatized by 2004), the changes in the regulation, the new indicators of the SISS and the 
limitations of SISS’ parallel controls resulted in weak pressures on the sector. There was however 
some specific cases where strong pressures emerged, at some moments in time.   
The changes in the 2007 regulation favored higher rates of compliance, at least until the transitory 
new guideline for arsenic came into force, in 2012 at the latest (representing a challenge to be met 
for northern regions where levels of arsenic were close to the 0.05 limit value). Consequently, 
levels of compliance (for bacteriological, disinfection, critical and non-critical parameters) 
reported by most urban services from 2008 on were higher than 90%. Although very limited in 
scope, SISS parallel controls (that were however not publicly reported) did not show results 
significantly refuting the levels of compliance of the providers’ autocontrols. There was one main 
exception to this general complying picture, as shown by levels of compliance reported by 
providers and SISS’ parallel controls: in the III region, Aguas Chañar recurrently did not comply 
with standards for its “critical parameters”, essentially total dissolved solids, sulfates and chloride 
(and sometimes nitrates). The region was facing the issue not only of water quality but also of 







created in 2009 (with the participation of social organizations, trade unions, professionals, 
religious and local instances) water scarcity was one of the main issue it dedicates itself to. From 
2011 its protestations were also claiming for improvement of water quality and politicians (the 
senator Isabel Allende and the municipal council member Christian Guzmán) also participated in 
pressuring the water provider. In March 2012, social organizations presented a writ of protection 
denouncing the water shortage. A week later, the minister of Public Works, Laurence Golborne, 
after meeting with social actors and local instances, announced measures to secure drinking water 
of better quality in a short time and a desalinating plant (to definitely solve the issue) by 2017. The 
SISS initiated in 2013 a sanctioning process for the exceeding levels of nitrates, sulfates and 
dissolved solids in water. Yet, by the end of 2014, the reported quality of drinking water still 
showed little improvement with respect to these parameters. The installation of treatment plants 
that had been planned in 2011 and launched in 2012, following pressures from social 
organizations, did not result in effectively meeting standards by 2014. Following the 2014 rates’ 
fixing process concluded with the SISS, that defined new rates’ increases associated with 
additional effective treatment plants, the existing treatment plant was expanded and a desalinating 
plant to definitively solve the water-quality issue was planned to be effective by the end of 2017 
(SISS’ Informes de resultados de la calidad del agua potable 2007-2016; SISS’ Controles 
paralelos 2008-2014; Decrees 42/2014 and 58/2010 of the Ministerio de Economia, Fomento y 
Turismo; Aguas Chañar, 2010-2016; Argandoña, 2012; El Ciudadano, 2009; Diario de Atacama, 
2011; Leal, 2011; Ponze, 2012; Scheuch, 2012; SISS, 2012; The Clinic Online, 2012; Vera, 2014; 







As for arsenic, where restricting limit values of 0.03 mg/L and 0.01 mg/L represented a significant 
challenge (as reported publicly by water providers), compliance was only reached following 
external pressures from the population, from the Health Ministry and, in ultimate instance, the 
SISS. This occurred in communities of at least three regions: Lampa (in the metropolitan region), 
Alto Hospicio (in the region of Tarapacá), and Diego de Almagro and El Salado (in the region of 
Atacama). In Lampa, levels of arsenic higher than 0.03 mg/L were found in water provided by 
BCC (locality of Santo Tomás) and Novaguas (locality of Valle Grande) in 2011 (despite no 
specific authorization had been given by the Health Ministry for this delay), and also in 2012 
(when the more restrictive maximal limit value of 0.03 was in effect everywhere). It’s only after 
the SISS initiated a sanctioning process against them in 2012 that the providers asked the Health 
Ministry an extension to comply with the regulation – and it is upon the request of the Health 
Ministry that an action plan to solve the issue was developed and presented by the providers on 
March 12, 2013. In parallel and preceding SISS’ and Health Ministry’s processes30, civic 
organizations have constituted themselves and mobilized to denounce and document the high 
levels of arsenic in drinking water in Lampa, starting in April 2012 (as they became aware of an 
academic study by María Angélica Rubio and Marcelo Rocco finalized and published two years 
ago on drinking-water quality in Lampa). In March 2013 these organizations also presented a writ 
of protection (Recurso de protección N°14.710) against Novaguas for incompliance with the 
arsenic limit value. The senator Guido Girardi, the deputy Gabriel Silber and the mayor Graciela 
Ortúzar publicly supported legal actions, and the Health Commission of the House of 
                                                          
 
30 The Contraloría General de la República conducted an investigation on the responses of the Health Ministry 







Representatives also analyzed the issue of water quality in Lampa on March 20, 2013. In May 
2013, water providers put in place the first step of their action plan (under SISS’ control), with the 
addition of a filtration process in the treatment of water, and by August the second step, to 
guarantee water with levels of arsenic below 0.01 mg/L. By mid-2013, SISS’ parallel controls and 
water providers’ autocontrols reported levels below 0.01 mg/L. The deputy Gabriel Silber stated 
in May 2013: “without these protests and public claims, the authority would not have launched the 
changes that took place in the commune for the security of its inhabitants” (author’s translation, 
quote from La Segunda, 2013; SISS’ Informes de resultados de la calidad del agua potable 2007-
2014; SISS’ Controles paralelos 2008-2014; Health Ministry Archives; Contraloria General de la 
República, 2013; Cámara de Diputados, 2013; Universidad Santa María, 2010; Agencia UPI, 
2013; Cooperativa.cl, 2013a; 2013b; Revista Punta Final, 2013; Correa, 2013). In the desert region 
of Tarapacá water services were provided to all communities by Aguas del Altiplano. Arsenic, 
there, was known to be present in the natural groundwater supplies. Treatment plants had indeed 
been installed prior to 2004 to meet the 0.05 mg/L limit value. Reaching lower levels of arsenic in 
drinking water required expanding and building new treatment plants. In 2012 levels of arsenic 
reported by Aguas del Altiplano to SISS were frequently over 0.03 mg/L in Alto Hospicio. The 
construction of a new treatment plant had been planned in 2011, but had not yet been launched. 
Starting in February 2013 (following the publication of December 2012 autocontrols), 
mobilization for lower arsenic levels in water emerged in Alto Hospicio and also other smaller 
communities of the region (with arsenic levels lower than 0.03 mg/L but higher than 0.01 mg/L): 
citizens’ protests and claims reached national newspapers, and a writ of protection was presented 
by the deputy Hugo Gutierrez about drinking water quality in Alto Hospicio. In March, April and 







Médico also documented the levels of arsenic in Alto Hospicio. In November 2013, the first step 
of a new plant dedicated to lowering arsenic levels in water was launched in Alto Hospicio (on 
that occasion the mayor of Alto Hospicio denounced the absence of “the ‘terrorists’ [who scared] 
people [regarding the levels of arsenic in water]”, therefore indirectly acknowledging the impact 
these external pressures had on the sector). Moreover, in 2015 treatment plants of Huara, La 
Huayca and La Tirana were incorporated to the system, investments in the second step of the Alto 
Hospicio plant started and the environmental process of approval for the expansion of the Iquique 
plant was started. Apparently, works to comply with the 0.01 mg/L (to be effective in 2017) were 
accelerated following pressures (author’s translation, quote from El Boyaldía, 2013; SISS’ 
Informes de resultados de la calidad del agua potable 2007-2016; SISS’ Controles paralelos 2008-
2014; Health Ministry Archives; Aguas del Altiplano, 2009-2015; Decrees 13/2013 and 8/2008 of 
the Ministerio de Economia, Fomento y Turismo; Núñez, 2013; Soto, 2013; Sanhueza, 2016). In 
the region of Atacama, a region facing extensive issues with scarcity and quality of water (as seen 
hereabove), two communities also encountered drinking water with high levels of arsenic: Diego 
de Almagro and El Salado. Aguas Chañar (the provider) acknowledged a short episode of high 
levels of arsenic (over 0.08 mg/L) at the end of 2011, but reported levels below 0.03 mg/L in 2012 
and 2013 (but recurrently over 0.01 mg/L). Specifically on the issue of arsenic, a writ of protection 
was presented in May 2012 by a councilmember of Diego de Almagro. The Health Ministry in 
2012-2013 also pressured the provider for the 0.01 mg/L limit value to be met, including by 
imposing a fine in 2012 and initiating a proceeding on December 6, 2013. Following these 
pressures, investments to improve pre-treatment in the plant of Diego de Almagro (providing water 
to both communities) were made in 2014 and 2015 and autocontrols of the provider, as well as 







(including at the critical period of the “Bolivian winter” at the end of the calendar year) (SISS’ 
Informes de resultados de la calidad del agua potable 2007-2016; SISS’ Controles paralelos 2008-
2014; Aguas Chañar, 2010-2016; Araya, 2012; Centro Regional Atacama, 2012; Adaos, 2012; 
Ambler, 2012; TVN, 2012). Overall, as regard to arsenic, the pressures from the population as well 
as from the Health Ministry were key for the compliance with the new limit values. The 
Superintendent of the SISS recognized explicitly the important role of the Health Ministry in 
pressuring the sector:  
“The signal that gave the Health Ministry, that it wouldn’t authorize the extended 
deadlines, forced us to give the instructions that investments had to be moved 
forward. And all the small companies are doing it, as well as the big one of the 
North, that of Iquique, for 2014 or 2015 it will comply. It moved its plan forward. 
All of them will comply” (author’s translation; Interview with Magaly Espinosa, 
see Appendix 4). 
Finally, as for rural services, information of drinking-water quality in each of them is not reported 
publicly, but different documents evidence shortcomings for both microbiological and chemical 
quality of water in these systems. First, standards of microbiological quality were still not met in 
all of them. In 2015 a governmental report on rural water services nationally (of the APR program, 
i.e. mostly of rural services for population over 150) stated that 84.2% of them had monitored 
bacteriological quality in the last five years (without specifying frequency), that 9.3% did not and 
that for 6.5% there was no information. It also reported that the Health Ministry knew 5% of 
services did not meet the standards of drinking-water quality (without specifying which standards 
were not met). For instance, documents from the Health Ministry showed that many systems of 
the regions of Tarapacá and Aysén were not practicing chlorination by 2013 (and data was not 
available for all regions). As for chemical quality more specifically, the Health Ministry has been 







with the same precision for all services by 2014. Nevertheless, it is documented that there were 
issues with the chemical quality of water in different rural services across the country. For instance, 
during the 2006-2014 period, nitrates exceeded the national standard in various services of the 
metropolitan region and the regions of Coquimbo, Maule and Los Ríos; and levels of iron and 
manganese also did not comply with limit values in services of the region of Arica-Parinacota, Los 
Ríos and Bíobío. Moreover, in the region of Tarapacá (and possibly in other northern regions, but 
data is largely lacking), levels of arsenic in water of rural services in 2013 exceeded by far the 
limit, sometimes by more than 30 times the limit value. Precise data for the region of Tarapacá 
showed that in 2013 65% of the rural population receiving water from an APR service and 56% of 
the rural population receiving water from a non-APR program service were provided with water 
of bad chemical quality (Donoso et al., 2015; Health Ministry Archives; Kapples, 2011; Amuri et 
al., 2006; Valenzuela et al., 2012; Carrillo Urra, 2009).  
The poor drinking-water quality in rural areas resulted from the absence of pressures, and also a 
lack of resources, according to interviewees from the Health Ministry. As one of them detailed:  
“I would say that we don’t even really know what is the quality of the water people 
are drinking in many parts of the North of Chile, in rural water services. The 
microbiological quality is also quite… dubious. There is little control. There are no 
resources to control. In general there is no budget for […] sanitizing water. 
Sometimes for example there are chlorination systems but there is no budget to… 
buy chlorine” (author’s translation, see Appendix 4).  
Overall, between 2007 and 2014, the implementation of drinking-water quality standards in Chile 
did not extend significantly, unless pressures were put on the sector from outside, as was the case 
for arsenic levels in a few urban communities from 2012 on. In these cases, it was only when 







4.5. Summary of the Implementation of Drinking-Water Standards, 1969-2014 
Table 9 summarizes the implementation progresses in Chile from 1969 to 2014, with the 
corresponding external pressures for each time period. 
Table 9. Summary of Implementation Progresses in Chile, 1969-2014 
Time 
Period 
External Pressures Implementation Progress  
by the End of the Time Period 
1969-
1976 
Strong (arsenic in region of Antofagasta) 
Weak otherwise 










Weak Partial  
1991-
2004 
Strong (microbiological, nitrates, arsenic) 
in urban areas 
Weak otherwise 
Extensive for microbiological, nitrates, arsenic 




Weak Partial  
2011-
2014 
Strong (arsenic in 4 urban communities*, 
other chemicals in region of Atacama) 
Weak otherwise 
Extensive for arsenic in urban communities 
Partial otherwise (including in region of 
Atacama) 
* These four communities are: Lampa, Alto Hospicio, Diego de Almagro and El Salado. 
 
Overall, in Chile (where state capacity was strong), the analysis over time of subnational variations 
and variations between parameters suggested that, when there was no external pressures, 
implementation remained partial. These results confirm hypothesis 2.1. However, when there were 
external pressures on the sector (because of a public health alert, governmental reports and 
sanctions, or popular protests supported by local authorities or representatives), then 
implementation generally became extensive in reaction to these pressures, as hypothesis 1.1 
originally stated. There is only one exception to this general pattern: the case of the region of 
Atacama, where pressures was put on the sector in favor of increasing water quality (especially 
from 2011 on). In this case, by 2014, implementation was still not extensive. However, some 







was coupled with the problem of water scarcity in the region, have apparently delayed extensive 
implementation of drinking-water standards, despite external pressures.  
Besides, the case of the public alert for arsenicism in Antofagasta interestingly points out that 
effects of a public health alert of a very significant scale may last through time: among all regions 
where levels of arsenic were high it is only in the region of Antofagasta that the limit value of 
arsenic of 0.01 mg/L was met before it was required by national regulations (more than a decade 
prior to requirements). 
Conclusion 
Overall, this paper contends that the capacity of a policy sector and the external pressures put on 
the implementing actors are determinant for the degree of implementation of a policy adopted 
following diffusion pressures. A sector’s capacity depends on state capacity, but can also be 
supplemented by foreign capacity support. Foreign capacity support can thus represent an 
opportunity for weak states to implement more largely policies they adopt: however, it also renders 
this implementation dependent on foreign (re)sources, and therefore conditional on foreign will. 
Moreover, a sector’s capacity does not explain it all. Even when state capacity is strong, 
implementation of a non-politicized policy influenced from abroad is not as automatic as one could 
expect. Indeed, if there are no pressures from outside on the implementing actors, implementation 
remains partial. This partial implementation considers the (economic, political and/or social) cost 
of implementation. External pressures also increase the degree of implementation in weak state 







This paper, by disentangling the implementation dynamics of policies adopted following diffusion, 
highlights the importance of distinguishing the adoption of a policy diffused from its 
implementation, a distinction sometimes overlooked in the diffusion literature. Yet, this distinction 
is essential to assess the potential impact policy diffusion may have in national non-politicized 
policy processes.  
This impact of policy diffusion may vary from mere window-dressing to frame-shaping. It is not 
uniform and depends on the strength of state capacity and the strength of external pressures, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
The main contributions of this paper is to show that policy diffusion in weak states can be both 
window-dressing and frame-shaping, depending on political dynamics. To be frame-shaping, it 
needs a sustained foreign capacity support (that can compensate for the weakness of the state) and 
strong external pressures. Otherwise, in weak states, the adoption of a diffused policy is likely to 
be mere window-dressing, and therefore the real impact of policy diffusion to be low or average. 
This paper also shows that, when state capacity is strong and there are not strong pressures from 
outside the implementing actors, implementation is partial. This drastically contrasts with the 







Figure 3. The Potential Impact of Policy Diffusion on National Non-Politicized Policy 
Processes  
 
Besides, this paper also contributes more specifically to the implementation literature by 
highlighting that the resources of strong states generate the possibility of a “window-dressing 
implementation”. This consists in a policy that is partially implemented, but for which the state 
generates indicators suggesting an extensive implementation.  
Globally, this paper contributes to the neo-institutionalist literature, by presenting an argument on 
why formal institutions and rules are (or not) implemented, especially when they are adopted as a 
result of policy diffusion. It is an important step toward understanding policy-making in our 
globalized world and, especially, the effects “on the ground” of global or transnational influences.  
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Appendix 1. Drinking-Water Standards in Bolivia, 1985-2010 
Table 10. Standards for Microbiological and Chemical Drinking-Water Quality in Bolivia, 
1985-2010 










Microbiological (in bacterias, UFC o NMP / 100mL, except where other volumes mentioned) 
Total Coliforms 10 0 /mL < 2.2 < 2 < 2 
E. Coli or Fecal coliforms 0 0 /mL < 2.2 < 2 < 2 
Thermoresistant Coliforms - - - 0 < 2 
Aerobic/ Heterotrophic 
Bacterias (total)  
- - 100/mL 500 500 
- Pseudomonas 
aeruginosas 
- - 0 / 50mL 0 < 1 
- Clostridium Perfringens  - - - 0 < 1 
Parasites (Amebas, Giardia 
or Cryptosporidium) 
- - 0 /380L 0 0 
Fitoplancton/ zooplancton - - 0 /L - - 
Chemical (in mg/L) 
Acrylamide - - - 0.0005 0.0005 
Aldrin & Dieldrin  - - 0.00003 - - 
Aluminium - 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Ammonia - 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Antimony - 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.005 
Arsenic 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.01 0.01 
Barium 1.00 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 
Benzene - - 0.01 0.002 0.002 
Benzo[a]pyrene   - - 0.00001 0.0002 0.0002 
Boron - - - 0.3 0.3 
Cadmium 0.01 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Calcium 200 200 250 200 200 
Carbon tetrachloride - - 0.003 - - 
Chlordane - - 0.0003 - - 
Chloride 500 250 400 250 250 
Chlorine 1.0 0.3-1.0 1.2 0.2-1.0 0.2-1.0 
Chloroform - - 0.030 0.10 0.10 
Chromium 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Copper 1.5 0.05 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Cyanide 0.5 0.02 0.1 0.07 0.07 
2,4 D - - 0.10 - - 
DDT - - 0.001 - - 
1,2 dichlorobenzene - - 0.0002 - - 
1,4 dichlorobenzene - - 0.00001 - - 
1,2-dicloroethane - - 0.01 - - 
1,1-dicloroethene - - 0.0003 - - 
Epichlorohydrin - - - 0.0004 0.0004 
Ethylbenzene - - 0.10 0.30 0.30 







Heptachlor & heptachlor 
epoxide 
- - 0.0001 - - 
Hexachlorobenzene - - 0.00001 - - 
Iron 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Lead 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Lindane - - 0.003 - - 
Magnesium 150 150 50 150 150 
Malathion - - 0.19 - - 
Manganese 0.50 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mercury 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Methyl Parathion - - 0.007 - - 
Methoxychlor - - 0.03 - - 
Monochlorobenzene - - 0.003 - - 
Nickel - 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Nitrate (as NO3-) 45 - 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Nitrite (as NO2-) 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Parathion - - 0.035 - - 
Pentachlorophenol - - 0.01 - - 
Pesticides (total) - - - 0.0005 0.0005 
Pesticides (individual) - - - 0.0001  
(or WHO/ EPA values) 
0.0001  
(or WHO/ EPA values) 
Phenol - - 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Potassium (permanganate)  - 10 5 - - 
Selenium 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Silver  - - 0.05 - - 
Sodium - 200 200 200 200 
Styrene - - 0.10 - - 
Sulfate 400 300 400 400 400 
Tetrachloroethene - - 0.01 - - 
Toluene - - 0.50 0.70 0.70 
Trichloroethene - - 0.03 - - 
2,4,6 Trichlorophenol - - 0.01 - - 
Trihalomethanes - - 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Vinyl chloride - - 2 0.002 0.002 
Xylenes - - 0.30 0.50 0.50 








Appendix 2. Drinking-Water Standards in Chile, 1952-2007 
Table 11. Initial Drinking-Water Standards in Chile, 1952-1970 

















Microbiological (% accepted of non-complying samples for a month) 
Bacilo coliforms 10%  10%  10% 10% 10% 
Chemical (in mg/L, ppm) 
Alquil-benceno-
sulfonato 
- - 0.5- 0.5 1.0 
Arsenic 0.05 - 0.05 0.12 0.05 
Barium - - 1.00 1.0 1.0 
Cadmium - - 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Chromium 0.05 - 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Chloride 250 - 350 350 600 
Phenolic 
Compounds 
0.001 - 0.001 - 0.002 
Copper 3 - 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Cyanide - - 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Fluoride 1.5 - 1.4 1.2 1.5 
Iron  0.3*1 - 0.5 0.5*2 1.0 
Lead 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.05 
Magnesium 125 - - 125 150 
Manganese 0.3*1 - 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Nitrate (in N) - - 10 15 10 (45 in NO3) 
Nitrite (in N) - - - 0.004 - 
Selenium 0.05 - 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Silver - - 0.05 0.05  
Sulfate 250 - 350 400 400 
Total dissolved 
solids 
- - 1500 1500 1500 
Zinc 15 - 5 5 15 
*1: Iron and manganese together 








Table 12. Microbiological and Chemical Drinking-Water Standards in Chile, Norma Chilena 
409 of 1984 and 2007 
Parameters 1984  
Norma Chilena 409/1 
2007  
Norma Chilena 409-1 
Microbiological (% accepted of non-complying samples for a month) 
Coliforms  10%  10% 
Coliforms > 5 UFC or NMP/ 100 mL 5% 5% 
Minimal Chlorine Residual 20% 10% 
No Chlorine Residual 5% 1% 
Chemical (in mg/L) 





Benzene - 0.01 
Bromodichloromethane - 0.06 
Cadmium 0.01 0.01 
Chloride 250*1 400 
Chromium 0.05 0.05 
Copper 1.0*1 2.0 
Cyanide 0.20 0.05 
DDT+DDD+DDE - 2 
Dibromochloromethane - 0.1 
2,4-D  - 0.03 
Fluoride 1.5 1.5 
Iron 0.3*1 0.3 
Lead 0.05 0.05 
Lindane - 0.002 
Magnesium 125 125 
Manganese 0.10*1 0.1 
Mercury 0.001 0.001 
Methoxychlor - 0.02 
Monochloramine - 3 
Nitrate 10*1 11 (50 in NO3-) 
Nitrite 1.0 1 (3 in NO2-) 
Pentachlorophenol - 0.009 
Phenolic Compounds 0.002 0.002 
Selenium 0.01 0.01 
Sulfate 250*1 500 
Tetrachloroethene - 0.04 
Toluene - 0.7 
Tribromomethane - 0.1 
Trichloromethane 0.1 0.2 
Trihalomethanes - 1 (sum of ratios) 
Xylenes - 0.5 
Zinc 5.0*1 3 
Other (in mg/L) 
Total dissolved solids 1000*1 1500 







Appendix 3. List of Interviewees 
Most interviewees requested not to be identified when quoted and not to be named anywhere in 
the dissertation. This is what explains the format of the list of interviewees listed hereafter and 
the way references are made to interviews in the text. 
 
Bolivia 
Independent Experts and International Organizations 
 Alejandro Luján, officer for Water and Environmental Health, UNICEF, La Paz, 2014. 
 Ana María Romero, Centro Aguas y Saneamiento Ambiental, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Carmen Ledo, CEPLAG, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Claudia Vargas Vucsanovich, expert on water and sanitation, videoconference interview, 
2014. 
 Edwin Astorga, Instituto de Ingeniería Sanitaria, La Paz, 2014. 
 Gover Barja, profesor, Universidad Católica Boliviana, La Paz, 2014. 
 Independent consultant on water and sanitation issues, worked on projects of the World 
Bank in Bolivia (among others), La Paz, 2014. 
 Patricia Venegas, principal adviser in policies, PERIAGUA (Programa para Servicios 
Sostenibles de  de Agua Potable y Saneamiento en Áreas Periurbanas), GIZ (German 
Technical Cooperation), La Paz, 2013. 
 Ricardo Cisneros, Programa Agua y Saneamiento - Bolivia, World Bank, La Paz, 2014. 
 Ricardo Torres, adviser in Environmental Health, Pan-American Health Organization/ 
World Health Organization, La Paz, 2014. 
 Rocío Bustamante, Centro AGUA, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, 
2014. 
Public Administration 
 Civil servant 1 from Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico (AAPS), Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Civil servant 2 from Autoridad de Fiscalización y Control Social de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico (AAPS), La Paz, 2014. 
 Civil servant 1 from Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (Dirección de Planificación), 
Cochabamba, 2013. 
 Civil servant 2 from Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (Dirección de Planificación), 
Cochabamba, 2013. 
 Civil servant from Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua (Viceministro), Cochabamba, 
2013. 
 Civil servant 1 from Ministerio de Obras públicas, Servicio y Vivienda, La Paz, 2014. 







 Civil servant from Health Ministry, 1980s-1990s, phone interview, 2016. 
 Civil servant 1 from SENABSA, La Paz, 2013. 
 Civil servant 2 from SENABSA, La Paz, 2014. 
Water Providers and Private Organizations 
 Edgar Varnoux, manager of customer service, SEMAPA, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Gonzalo Maldonado, SEMAPA manager in the 1990s, Cochabamba, 2014.  
 Jorge Alvardo, SEMAPA manager in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014.  
 Michael Roca, Asociación Nacional de Empresas e Instituciones de Servicio de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado, La Paz, 2013. 
 Oscar Arteaga, Asociación Nacional de Empresas e Instituciones de Servicio de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado, La Paz, 2013. 
 Raul Flores Mejia, SEMAPA general manager, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Roberto Prada Ramírez, SEMAPA manager 1985-1994, independent consultant on water 
and sanitation issues, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Worker of EPSAS-La Paz, La Paz, 2014. 
 Worker of IBNORCA in the 2000s, La Paz, 2014.  
 Worker 1 of SEMAPA in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014. 
 Worker 2 of SEMAPA in the 2000s, Cochabamba, 2014. 




 Jorge Ale Yarad, civil servant of the Ministerio de Economía in the 1980s (in charge of 
the development of the regulatory framework for the water and sanitation sector), 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Magaly Espinosa, superintendent, Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS), 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Dirección de Obras Hidraúlicas in the 2000s, Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Instituto Nacional de Normalización (INN) in the 2000s, Santiago, 
2015. 
 Civil servant 1 of the Health Ministry in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 
 Civil servant 2 of the Health Ministry in the 2000s, Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant 3 of the Health Ministry in the 2000s, Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant of the Ministerio de Economía in the 1980s, Santiago, 2014. 








 Civil servant 1 of the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in the 2000s, 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Civil servant 2 of the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios (SISS) in the 2000s, 
Santiago, 2015. 
 
Water Providers and Private Organizations 
 Alex Chechilnitzky, president, AIDIS (Asociación Interamericana de Ingeniería 
Sanitaria y Ambiental) - Capítulo de Chile, Santiago, 2015. 
 Andrei Tchernitchin, president of Colegio Médico, professor at the Universidad de Chile, 
Santiago, 2014. 
 Representative, CONADECUS, Santiago, 2014. 
 Representative, Consumers International, Santiago, 2013. 
 Worker of water provider 1 in the 1980s-2000s, Santiago, 2015. 









Appendix 4. Record of Minutes of Interviews Quoted 
Table 13. Excerpts from Interviews Corresponding to Quotes in Text 
Interviewee Quote in Text Original Excerpts from Interviews 
From Section 3.3 
Independent 
expert 
“Until the 1990s, the [water] 
companies were working out of the 
law. There was no quality control.” 
“hasta fines de los 90, las empresas [de 
agua] estaban trabajando fuera de la ley, 
no había control de calidad 
Ex-manager of 
SEMAPA 
“The credits [from the World Bank 
and the IDB] came to fund 
infrastructures but there were also 
components for technical cooperation, 
institutional strengthening. [Without 
these credits] I did not have money for 
my engineers to train in Brazil” 
“Los créditos [del Banco Mundial y del 
BID] venían a financiar obras pero 
también había componentes de 
cooperación técnica, de fortalecimiento 
institucional. [Si no fuera por esos 
créditos] yo no tenía recursos para [por 
ejemplo] enviar a mis ingenieros que se 
capaciten en Brasil” 
From Section 3.4 
Worker at the 
Superintendencia 
“It was a very intense moment of 
training. There were still funds from 
the World Bank. […] They lasted only 
during the first and the second years 
[after the creation of the 
Superintendencia]. […] They were the 
residual [resources] that remained 
from the capitalization.” 
“Era una etapa muy intensa de 
capacitación. Todavía había fundos del 
Banco Mundial. […] Solamente fue 
durante el primero y segundo año [de la 
Superintendencia]. […] Eran los 
[recursos] remanentes de lo que quedó de 
la capitalización”. 
From Section 3.5 
Independent 
expert 
“The problem is that […] the new 
government of Evo committed itself to 
increase [water] access and meet the 
Millennium Goals, which included 
water provision and reach almost 
100%. Therefore, what did 100% 
meant? To give water. They started to 
receive a greater quantity of projects 
and to accept them all. But these 
projects did not consider water 
analysis. And many of these projects 
[of the Agua I and Agua II programs] 
provided water without doing an initial 
analysis. They built the water system 
and analyzed water [quality] after. 
And then, the problems appeared: this 
source is totally contaminated, this 
source requires more than a treatment 
plant, this water needs to be treated to 
be drinkable […] It is part of the 
enthusiasm, of wanting to meet the 
objective in a short time.” 
“El problema es que [el] nuevo gobierno 
de Evo, se comprometió con […] 
aumentar el acceso [al agua], y cumplir 
con los objetivos del milenio, que era [el] 
abastecimiento del agua y llegar hasta 
casi el 100%. Entonces, ¿qué significaba 
el 100%? Era dar agua. Empezaron a 
tener mayor cantidad de proyectos y 
aceptar todos los proyectos. Pero esos 
proyectos no tenían análisis del agua. Y 
muchos de los proyectos [agua I y agua 
II] han dado agua sin hacer los análisis 
iniciales, construyeron el sistema de 
agua, y después de esto hicieron los 
análisis del agua. Y allí se vieron los 
problemas: esta fuente está totalmente 
contaminada, esta fuente no necesita solo 
una planta de tratamiento, esta agua 
necesita un tratamiento para ser potable. 
[…] Es la parte del entusiasmo, de querer 








Participant in the 
2010 revision 
“Water companies […] did not want to 
comply with all the values that were in 
the regulation. Before there was only 
one list of parameters […] and they 
said: we can’t do all these analyses 
and neither are there laboratories in 
Bolivia to do all these analyses.” 
“Las empresas de aguas […] no 
quisieron cumplir con todos los valores 
que estaban en la norma. Antes había 
solamente una lista de parámetros […] y 
dijeron no podemos hacer los análisis y 
tampoco hay laboratorios en Bolivia para 
poder hacer todos los análisis.” 




“The results were presented in the 
Biannual Congress of Sanitary 
Engineering […] at the end of the 
1970s […]. It provoked a lot of 
commotion because even if the data 
existed, the truth is it was not 
specified… No, no, essentially it was 
not used.” 
“Los resultados [fueron presentados] en 
el Congreso bianual de Ingeniería 
Sanitaria […] de fines de los 70 […]. 
Causó mucho revuelo porque si bien los 
datos estaban, la verdad es que no se 





“every year […] a consolidated report 
was prepared and sent to water 
services and to the Public Works 
Ministry […]. This resulted in a 
general preoccupation for water 
quality.” 
“se hacia todos los años […] un 
consolidado de información y se 
mandaba a los servicios de agua, se 
mandaba al Ministerio de obras públicas 
[…], lo cual hizo entonces que hubiera 
una preocupación general por la calidad 
del agua” 




“The standpoint that took the Health 
Ministry […], and that it pretended it 
would implement, was that if the 
company did not comply with quality, 
it couldn’t charge the water. […] In 
light of this, the companies were 
concerned, and the Superintendencia 
was also concerned about doing more 
controls, etc. It was never 
implemented. But it was the 
standpoint of the Health Ministry. If it 
is not drinking water, it can’t be 
charged as drinking water. Therefore, 
together with the Superintendencia, 
that also strengthened its controls, and 
the Health Ministry, that also 
strengthened its controls of companies, 
it resulted in effective improvement of 
water quality.” 
“un planteamiento que hizo el Ministerio 
de Salud, […] que se amenazó con que 
se iba a aplicar, que si la empresa no 
cumplía con la calidad, no podía cobrar 
el agua. […] Entonces, frente a eso, en 
realidad, las empresas se preocuparon, y 
la Superintendencia también se preocupó 
de hacer mayor fiscalización, y etc. 
Nunca pasó eso, nunca se aplicó. Pero 
fue el planteamiento de Salud, del 
Minsal. Si no es agua potable, no puede 
cobrar agua potable. Entonces, junto con 
la Superintendencia, que también reforzó 
su fiscalización, y junto con Salud, que 
también reforzó su fiscalización a las 
empresas, lo que se logró fue que 
efectivamente la calidad del agua [se 
mejorara].” 
From Section 4.4 
Magaly Espinosa “The signal that gave the Health 
Ministry, that it wouldn’t authorize the 
extended deadlines, forced us to give 
the instructions that investments had to 
“La señal que dio el Ministerio de Salud 
de que no iba a autorizar los plazos 
obligó a que nosotros instruyéramos que 








be moved forward. And all the small 
companies are doing it, as well as the 
big one of the North, that of Iquique, 
for 2014 or 2015 it will comply. It 
moved its plan forward. All of them 
will comply.” 
empresas chicas lo están haciendo y 
también la grande, la del Norte, la de 
Iquique para 2014 o 2015 va cumplir. O 





“I would say that we don’t even really 
know what is the quality of the water 
people are drinking in many parts of 
the North of Chile, in rural water 
services. The microbiological quality 
is also quite… dubious. There is little 
control. There are no resources to 
control. In general there is no budget 
for […] sanitizing water. Sometimes 
for example there are chlorination 
systems but there is no budget to… 
buy chlorine.” 
“Yo diría que ni siquiera sabemos bien 
cuál es la calidad del agua potable que 
están tomando en muchas partes del 
norte de Chile en servicios de agua 
potable rural.  La calidad microbiológica 
también es muy… dudosa. Se fiscaliza 
poco. No hay recursos para fiscalizar. En 
general no tienen presupuesto para […] 
desinfectar el agua. A veces por ejemplo 
tienen sistemas de cloración pero no 
tienen presupuesto para... comprar 
cloro.” 
